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One of the most troublesome issues that Theodore Roose­
velt faced as President was the so-called *Negro Problem." 
In his effort to deal with it he alternately pleased and 
angered Negroes and Southern whites, liberals and conser­
vatives , extremists and moderates.
During his first administration Roosevelt attempted to 
reform the Republican party in the South by appointing 
Gold Democrats and black Republicans to patronage positions, 
He secured Booker T. Washington as advisor on Southern and 
Negro policy and appointed blacks to office who had the 
stamped approval of Washington. White Southerners were 
offended by Roosevelt’s actions and directed virulent 
criticism at the President, Roosevelt invited Washington 
to dinner at the White House, thus directly insulting 
the South. He followed with two controversial episodes* 
the appointment of William D. Crum to the Coilectorship 
of the Port of Charleston, South Carolina,and closii^ the 
post office at Indianola, Missi^M]^i,Tollowing^^he^arced 
resignation of Mrs. Minnie Cox, the Negro postmistress,
Attempting to assuage a hostile Southern white popula­
tion, Roosevelt stressed sectional reconciliation during 
his second administration. In 1905 he toured the South 
without making reference to lynching, disfranchisement, 
or "Jim Crow." He was noticably silent following the 
Atlanta race riots in 1906 and in the same year he sum­
marily dismissed lo? black soldiers from the Ü.S. Army 
for the alleged participation in the "Brownsville Affair." 
And in 1912 Roosevelt entered the presidential race as 
leader of the Progressive Party and established a "lily 
white" party in the South,
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CHAPTER I
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE NEGRO»
INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical periods in American race rela­
tions occurred at the turn of the Twentieth Century. Histori­
ans have given this period the savory title of the "Progressive 
Era." While being a time of enlightenment and zealous reform, 
it v/as an era of pervasive and militant racism. In the South, 
where ninety per cent of the Negro population lived, black Ameri­
cans were subjected to physical violence,, segregation, economic 
exploitation and disfranchisement. Southern racist doctrines, 
expressing the innate inferiority of the black race, had gained 
wide acceptance and were further expounded by such negrophobes 
as James Vardaman of Mississippi and Benjamin Tillman of South 
Carolina. Northern leaders acquired a racial philosophy "akin
to their southern counterparts," the difference being that
1northern racism was often "circumspect, more subtle." Partie-
2ularly in the South, Progressivism was "for whites only."
■‘On the racial attitudes of Northern progressives see 
David VI . Southern, The Malignant Heritage » Yankee Progressives 
and the Negro Question, 1901-1914^ (Chicago» Loyola University"
3?*ss;"i9S97T ---------  -----
^C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 
(Baton Rouge * Louisiana State UniveriTEy""Press', 195ÏT» pu. 369- 
395.
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Theodore Roosevelt occupied the White House during this 
turbulent era in race relations. Throughout his eight years 
in office, no issue plagued him as much as the so-called "Negro 
Problem." Each approach he took toward a possible solution 
alternately pleased and angered blacks and Southern whites.
As leader of the Republican party, Roosevelt wished to main­
tain the historic bond between the Negro and the party in an 
effort to build a strong organization in the South. He real­
ized that it was among the eleven former Confederate states 
that the party was weakest. Each of his predecessors had 
failed to build a respectable party organization there, owing 
much to the racial attitudes of white Southerners which pre­
vented the acceptance of Negroes as political partners. What 
Roosevelt desired was a party of both black and white Republi­
cans. The difficulties involved in this prospect troubled 
Roosevelt as much as they troubled each Republican president
prior to his administration.^ ;
 — _— _ _
For detailed discussion of the Republican party and the 
Negro prior to Roosevelt's presidency see Vincent P. DeSantis,
Hirshson. Farewell to the Bloody Shirti Northern Republicans and 
the Southern Negro,“T8t7^1093 (Bloomington* ' Indiana Univers 
Press, 1962); Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro» From 
Rutherford B. Kayes to Woodrow WTIson (New York/ iPHe Macmillan ‘ 
Co., I9W *  19637; Paul H. Buck,**fîïe"H'oad to Reunion, 1865-1900 
(Bostons Little, Brown and Co., Î337TI ~
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The racial crisis of the Progressive era had its origins 
in the years following Reconstruction. In President Hayes
initiated a policy of reconciliation toward the South by remov­
ing the last Federal troops from South Carolina and Louisiana.
In an effort to unite the nation and eliminate any sectional 
strife that existed throughout Reconstruction, he restored ''home 
rule** to Southern white Conser'/atives, In effect, Hayes aban­
doned the Southern Negro and the Republican party acquiesed its 
role as **champion'* and "protector" of black political and civil
ri^its. The Negro was no longer considered a "ward of the nation.
/>Ke became,a "ward of a dominant race" in the South. Kayes 
believed that his course of action would ultimately contribute 
to the emergence of a strong Republican party in the South.
Though the Bourbon leadership promised to protect the Southern 
Negro, it was not considering the existence of a two-party bat- 
tl.a in the South, Determined to keep the Southern leadership 
white and Democratic, conservative "redeemers" united behind 
the banner of "white supremacy" and placed the foundation for 
a solid Democratic South,
In subsequent efforts to gain position in the South, Re­
publican leaders resorted to "bloody shirt" tactics, stressing 
the unlawful actions committed against Negro suffrage rights 
by Southern leaders. Throughout the 113880*s and I890*s Repub-
^incent P. DeSantis, "The Republican Party and the 
Southern Negro, 1877-1897," Journal of Hagro History, XLV 
(April, I960), 71-87.
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lican statesmen reiterated their desire to build a strong 
party in the South but the results were negative. Whatever 
strength the party held in the South by 1900 was the result 
of those Republicans who promulgated the belief that the party 
would gain strength only by existing as a "lily white" party. 
They believed that this would be the only possible method of 
combating the Democratic majority in the South,
The Southern Bourbons who secured the reigns of govern­
ment in the South professed to be sincere in their attempts 
of protecting the Negro's rights. However, they believed that 
this would best be achieved under conservative white hegemony. 
Southern Democrats were more interested in industrializing and 
urbanizing their section than restoring the antebellum, slav- 
ocracy. To achieve this industrial "utopia" it was necessary 
to eliminate any signs of racial tension. The "Prophets" of 
the New South, needing capital and labor from the North and 
from Europe to reconstruct their economy, preached nationalism 
and advocated the protection of Negro rights. Northern capi­
talists and their major spokesman, the Republican party, wel­
comed this opportunity to fulfill the promises agreed upon in 
the Compromise of 1877. Further more, they took comfort in 
the fact that the new Southern leadership was bent on preserv- 
ing the recently won rights by Southern blacks.^ But to what
C•'George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind; 
The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destmy, I8l7-19l¥
(lew îforkT Harper and Row, Inc., 1971)» pp’ 190-227. For the 
details of Northern capitalist involvment in the Compromise of 
1877 see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction; The Compromise 
of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston; Little, Brown and C0.T195TTT
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extent were these Southern "redeemers" willing to protect the 
Negro?
Southern conservatives, such as Wade Hampton and Henry 
Grady, believed that the Negro was progressing in the areas 
of economics and education. The Negro would continue to pro­
gress but only under the benevolent guardianship of those 
spokesmen for the "new order. " Since the Negro was acquiring 
property and education, his vote was no longer a menace. He 
would now naturally align himself with the more conservative 
whites. But during the I880*s this "neopaternalist school of 
thought" came under attack. On one side were the extreme 
racists and race-baiting politicians of the South who argued 
that the Negro had not progressed but had degenerated since 
emancipation. To these Southern negrophobes, the only oppor­
tunity for progress for the Negro was under the institution 
of slavery. On the other extreme Southern liberals contended 
that it was impossible for the South to have free and honest
government as long as blacks were denied their right of public 
6equality.
It was during the l890*s that the Southern conservative 
leadership became seriously threatened. The rise of agrarian 
radicalism in the I880*s culminated in the Populist revolt of 
the 1890*3. Populist spokesmen expressed the kinship of com-
6C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New 
York» Oxford University Press,' ’19^5) » PP. 13^7» Fredrickson,pp. 216-22?.
6
mon grievances and common oppression between Southern blacks 
and poor Southern white farmers in an effort to gain black 
support for overthrowing the conservative control of the South► 
Realizing the potential success that Populists would enjoy 
with their appeal to the Negro vote. Southern conservatives 
resorted to crys of "Negro domination" and its ultimate chal­
lenge to white supremacy. They enlisted negrophobe elements - 
fraud, intinidation, bribery, violence and terror - to secure 
their control of the South. Southern Populists, upon defeat, 
placed the blame for their failure on the Negro, Southern 
blacks quickly became the scapegoats for the disruption in 
Southern politics in the 1890*s. The end result was disfran­
chisement in Mississippi in I89O, South Carolina in 1895» and 
Alabama in 19OO. Devices such as the Poll tax and Grandfather 
clause were effectively used to eliminate voting by blacks and 
poor Southern whites. Contrary to the belief that disfranchise­
ment would improve race relations, its implementation in white 
supremacy campaigns in the South raised race hatred to a dan­
gerous pitch. Lynching and one-sided race riots often resulted
from racist propaganda. As 0. Vann Woodward has asserted, lynch-
7ing became "an increasingly Southern and racial phenomenon."
The decade of the 1890*s further witnessed the economic 
and social relegation of the Negro, Subjected to the binding 
poverty of the Southern sharecropping system and the use of such
^Woodward, Origins of the New South, pp. 351-352.
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devices as "crop-lien** and ’’convict leasing,” blacks were forced 
to the bottom of the Southern caste system. Their social status 
declined as the result of ”Jim Crow" laws, judicial sanction of 
the doctrine of "separate but equal” in a Supreme Court ruling 
in 1896 (Plessy vs. Ferguson) and disfranchisement in I898 
(Williams vs. Mississippi). Southern Negrophobia replaced the 
paternalism of the l880*s. No longer considered to be progres­
sing, the Negro was thought to be degenerating. Under slavery 
he was considered to be "docile and subordinate 1 " now he was 
an "uncivilized beast," who had reverted to savagery and threat­
ened to contaminate white civilization.
By the turn of the century Southern racism was more ex­
treme and Northerners were becoming increasingly indifferent. 
Ultraracist nbooks (Thomas Dixon's The Clansmen, Charles Car­
roll's The Negro A Beast, and Robert W. Shufeldt's The Negro*
A Menace to American Civilization) reflected Southern opinion 
that blacks were inferior, immoral, and criminal,^ The popu­
larity of social Darwinism, with its theories of "survival of 
the fittest” and the "preservation of favoured races" lent 
scientific support to the belief that the Negro was degenerating
and would become extinct through the process of evolution and
9the "struggle for existence" between the races.
OOn Southern Negrophobia see Fredrickson, pp. 256-282» 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, chapters XII and XIII; 
Woodward, The Strange Career 6F j'lm Crow, pp. 49-95.
oFor discussion of Social Darwinism and its application 
to the racial climate see Fredrickson, pp. 228-255; Richard Hof. 
stadter. Social Darwinism in American Thought (Philadelphia* 
University of PennsylvanTa^Tress, ’1944)', pp. 170-200,
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Against the background of rising prejudice, discrimina­
tion and deteriorating race relations, a majority of Southern 
blacks continued to follow the advice offered by paternalists* 
to strive for moral and economic development through industrial 
education, racial solidarity and self-help; to eschew politics 
and the demand for civil rights. This was essentially the 
philosophy also expressed by Booker T. Washington and respon­
sible for his acceptance among Southern whites and Northern 
philantropists as the leading Negro spokesman, Washington's 
ideas accorded with the climate of opinion at the time and 
assured his eminence among the "best class" of Southern whites. 
The rise of Washington to national prominence was the one note 
of optimism admidst a hostile environment for the black com­
munity. Through a conciliatory and accomodating approach, he 
was able to penetrate circles that were inaccessible to Negroes 
at that time. Most significant was his selection by Theodore 
Roosevelt as presidential advisor on Southern and Negro policy.
Roosevelt's choice of Washington reflected the racial 
attitude that the former Rough Rider held on his ascension to 
the presidency. He was in substantial agreement with Washing­
ton's overt expressions of accomodation and self-help. He 
wrote in 1900* "It has always seemed to me that the salvation 
of the Negro lay in the development of the Booker Washington 
theory, that is, in fitting him to do ever better industrial 
work."^®
Theodore Roosevelt to L. J. Moore, February 5» 1900, 
Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. 
(Cambridge* Harvard University &ress, 195^), 11 ,"*p. 11 &9.
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Roosevelt's racial views were consistent with those North­
ern and Southern liberals who agreed with the vast majority of 
white Southerns on the inferiority of the Negro but sincerely 
believed that the race was progressing under the benevolent 
white guardianship of the "best class" in the South, Writing 
to the novelist Owen Wister, Roosevelt concurred with the author 
that "as a race and in the mass /“NegroesJT* are altogether in­
ferior to the whites" and asserted that he would never ask "the 
average Negro to be allowed to vote." However, he wished that 
the "occasionally good, well educated, intelligent and honest 
colored men and women be given the pitiful chance to have a
little reward, a little respect, a little regard if they can
11by earnest useful work succeed in winning it." He denied the
possibility of Negro extinction, declaring that the black man
"was here to stay and could neither be killed nor driven away."
"The only wise and honorable and Christian thing to do is to
treat every black man and every white man strictly on his merits
as a man, giving him no more and no less than he shows himself
12worthy to have," This "merit system" in race relations was
essentially what one historian has called Roosevelt's "great
13rule of righteousness."
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Letters « V,
p. 228,
l^Roosevelt to Albion Tourgee, November 8, 1901, Ibid,. 
Ill, pp. 190-191.
13George Sinkier. The Racial Attitudes of American Presi­
dents : From Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt (Garden City, 
N.Y.Ï Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1972), p. 4-l8.
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Southern recalcitrance on racial matters made the Negro 
problem more difficult for Roosevelt. He continuously blamed 
his inability to act effectively in the South during his presi­
dency on race-baiting politicians and Southern extemists. He 
stated to Lyman Abbott, editor of Outlook, that these men acted 
as "grown up and often vicious children" on the Negro question. 
"They shriek in public about miscegenation," Roosevelt later 
commented, "but they leer as they talk to me privately of the 
colored mistresses and colored children of white men whom they 
know.
Roosevelt dissented from Southern extremist opinion that 
the Negro had degenerated since emancipation, describing this 
belief as "the veriest nonsense," "/“The Negro_J7 has on the 
whole become better. Among the Negroes of the South when 
slavery was abolished there was hot one who stood as in any 
shape or way comparable with Booker Washington." Expressing 
his admiration for the Negro educator, Roosevelt added: "I do 
not know a white man of the South who is as good a man as Booker 
Washington today.
1 ilRoosevelt to Lyman Abbott, October 29, 1903» Letters. 
Ill, p. 186.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Ibid., V, 
p. 227.
^^Ibid., pp. 226-227.
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The one exception to Roosevelt*s “great rule of righteous­
ness” was in race mingling or social equality. In his concep­
tion of race, he believed that the white-skinned, English- 
speaking Anglo-Saxon was the most superior being racially and 
c u l t u r a l l y . A s  a strong proponent of Kipling's “White Man's 
Burden” Roosevelt realized that it was the responsibility of 
the Caucasian to lend assistance to the backward races of the 
world. Thus, he advocated a benevolent imperialism abroard 
and a paternalistic approach at home. Southern extemists mis­
interpreted his accomodating policies toward the Negro as an 
effort to establish social equality? an assertion that he em­
phatically denied. Writing to Grenville Dodge, Roosevelt de­
clared : ”I wish to emphasise that we are not fighting for social 
equality, and that we do not believe in miscegenation? but that 
we do believe in equality of opportunity, in equality before 
the l a w . R o o s e v e l t  viewed the problem as how to tiain “the 
backv/ard race so that it may enter the possession of true free­
dom, while the forward race is allowed to preserve unharmed the 
high civilisation wrought by its forefathers." He realized that 
the uplifting of the Negro would be difficult and take time ; 
but most significantly he was aware that black advancement must 
be made compatible with the Southern ban on "social intermingling
^^Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 4 vols. 
(New York* G. P. Putnam's Sons, IW?, 1891, l39^7~Î91?), I, see 
Chapter one entitled "The English Speaking People.”
18Rooseve3.t to Grenville Dodge, November l4, 1904, quoted 
in Sinkier. Racial Attitudes of American Presidents, p. 400,
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of the race." It was apparent to "all reflecting men," that
19"racial purity must be maintained."
During his formulâtive years Roosevelt had little first­
hand contact with black Americans. He became a "vigorous 
Republican partisan" and his early sympathetic statements on
the Negro were more aligned with the party position than a
20profound personal conviction. As a member of the Civil Ser­
vice Commission he had occasion to face the "Negro problem"
and promulgated the belief in offering "equal and exact justice 
21to all." As governor of New York he seriously considered
the problem of "doing justice to and getting good results from
the colored race.,.." He appointed a few Negroes to office
and strongly supported the Elsberg bill which ended racial
22segregation in New York schools.
Roosevelt’s presidency, regarding his relationship with 
the black community, can be divided into two periods. During
19Theodore Roosevelt, Tho Works of Theodore Roosevelt,
20 vols.» Hermann Hagadom, ed. CNew Y ork i Charles' Scribner * s 
Sons, 1925), XVIII, pp. 463-465.
20Richard B. Sherman, The Republican Party and Black 
Americat From McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 iCharlottesvillei 
University Tress of Vir^nia, 1973), PP. 23-24.
^^Roosevelt to Alexander Monroe Dockery, May 24, 1894, 
Letters, I, p. 381.
22Roosevelt to William Henry Lewis, July 26, 1900, Letters, 
II, pp. 1364-1365; Roosevelt to T. Thomas Fortune, March 27, "
1899, Ibid., pp. 972-973» William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility; The Life and Times of Theodore Hoosevelt'TWew 
York; Farrar, Straus and cJudahy, 196Ï), p. 129; G. Wallace 
Chessman, Governor Theodore Roosevelt; The Albany Apprentice­
ship, 1898-190^ (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1965), 
p. 242.
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his first administration he made a sincere effort to do justice 
and provide the opportunity to black Americans for political 
participation. He resisted attempts to establish "lily white" 
Republicanism in the South by appointing William D. Crum, a 
Negro doctor, to the collectorship of the Port of Charleston, 
South Carolina, and defied southern criticism by standing firm 
on his belief in a "Square Deal" for all men. In 1903 Roose­
velt closed the Indianola, Mississippi, post office when white 
citizens refused to accept the appointment of a Negro postmis­
tress. And throughout his term in office he refused to apolo­
gise to the South for inviting Booker T. Washington to dinner 
at the White House.
Roosevelt*s second administration coincided with extreme 
anti-Negro sentiment in the South and his policy was directed 
toward a reconciliation of the South with the rest of the nation. 
In 1905 he made a tour of the South with the purpose of winning 
the affections of the white population which he had alienated 
during his first term of office. He relegated Negro protection 
and political and civil rights to the last of his priorities.
He refused to intervene in the Atlanta Race Riots of 1906 and 
in the same year he dismissed three companies of black soldiers 
from the United States Army for alleged participation in the 
Brownsville Affair, Finally, in 1912 Roosevelt excluded Southern 
black delegates from participating in the Progressive Party Con­
vention. This reversal of policy towards the black community 
signified the importance to Roosevelt of sectional reconcilia­
tion.
CHAPTER II
DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE: THE EMERGENCE OF 
BOOXER T. WASHINGTON AS POLITICAL ADVISOR
When Theodore Roosevelt became President following the 
assassination of President William McKinley on September 
1901, he assumed the most responsible and prestlgous public 
office that existed in the nation. Confronting Roosevelt at 
this time was the problem of securing his nomination in 1904.
He had become President by accident but wished to gain the 
office in his own right. To achieve this goal, he had to 
assure himself enough Republican delegate support. With the 
death of McKinley, Roosevelt inherited title to both the of­
fice and the Republican organisation. The office "with its 
great powers was his alone." The organization, "for the while," 
belonged to Marcus Hanna,^ The powerful Senator from Ohio was 
the chairman of the Republican National Committee and was be­
lieved to be by many, including Roosevelt, an aspirant for the 
Republican presidential nomination in 1904.
Roosevelt was well aware that, in order to secure 
enough delegates, he had to gain the support of Southern Re­
publicans. Hemna had a powerful hold upon the Negro delega-
^John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge: Har 
vard University Press, 1954s reprint ed., New York: Atheneum, 
1967), p. 38.
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1$
tiens in the South and it was the President's primary objec­
tive to bring together black and white Southerners v/hile de­
stroying the Reconstruction political machines which support- 
ed the Senator. Ey the use of federal appointments, Roose­
velt hoped to achieve his goal. To assist him the President 
obtained Booker Ï. Washington as one of his chief advisors 
for Southern and Negro policy.Throughout Roosevelt's terms 
of office, and particularly during his firsk administration, 
the President's relationship with the black community was 
conducted through Washington.
The contrasts between these two men are so great that 
it seems almost impossible that they would jointly influence 
American society at the turn of the century. Roosevelt was 
b o m  into the white aristocracy of New York in l8f8. The 
ancestry of his family traces back to the pre-Revolutionary 
era in American history. His father's forebears were of 
Dutch descent and for more than "seven generations from 
father to son one of them was b o m  on Manhattan Island."^
His mother, Martha Bulloch, was a native of Georgia and traced 
her lineage through the aristocracy of Georgia and South
^Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biographv 
(New York I Harcourt, Braci~and” Co.T 193^7, pp. 393^3^4%^
^Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore 
Roosevelt (New York» Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913)» P» li Prl^ie, p. ?.
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Carolina back to England. Washington, in comparison, came 
from slave ancestry and placed the site of his birth ”near 
a cross-road post office called Kale's Ford ^VirginiaJ7, 
and the year was 1858 or 1859." Washington knew little of 
his ancestry except that on his mother's side they "suffer­
ed in the Middle Passage on slave ships from Africa to Ameri­
ca" and knew nothing of his father, not even his name.'̂
Roosevelt enjoyed the very best personal education and 
supervision that aristocratic America could offer. His ex­
periences were broadened by two trips to Europe before his 
fifteenth birthday. Upon returning home from his second 
trip, his parents paved the way for his entrance into Har­
vard in 1876, Under the liberal curriculum pioneered by Pres­
ident Charles W. Eliot, "Teedie" was able to explore the di­
verse interests that attracted him during his youth. Wash­
ington, being a slave on the Burrough's plantation in Frank­
lin County, Virginia, was not offered the opportunity of an 
early education. In his autobiography he declared* "I had 
no schooling whatever while I was a slave, though I remember 
on several occasions I went as far as the schoolhouse door 
with one of my young mistresses to carry her books.
^Booker T. Washington, Ug Prom Slavey* An Autobiogra­
phy (New York* Doubleday and Co., 'Inc. , Ï9Ô1* reprint ed., 
New York* Bantam Books, 1970), p. 1. Washington's most re­
cent biographer places his birth in the Spring of 1856, see 
Louis R. Harlan, Booker T. Washington* The Making of a Black 
Leader, 1856-1901 (New YôrkT~ÔxF5rd~üniversItÿ~Press, 19'f̂ J* 
p. 3•
^Washington, Ug From Slavery, pp. 4-5.
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These incidents left a deep impression on the mind of young 
Booker and it was not until he came under the influence of 
General Samuel Chapman Armstrong and Hampton Institute that 
his visions of receiving an education became a reality.
In public life the contrasts between these two men were 
equally striking. Roosevelt became a Republican because of 
his aristocratic background and his disillusionment over the 
Democratic politics exemplified by Tammany Hall and the Tweed 
Ring of New York. He entered New York politics with a sense 
of dedication and a strong desire to bring to public life a 
disinterested honesty of purpose.^ At this same time Washing­
ton was deeply engaged in his work at Tuskegee Institute, prom­
ulgating the social philosophy of self-help and economic de­
velopment. Though seldom declaring any political affiliation» 
he was a Republican for the same reason most Afro-Americans 
wereI the Republican î^rty was the party of Lincoln, the par­
ty of freedom, the party responsible for upholding the doctrine 
of racial equality.
Roosevelt and Washington shared some common traits that 
formed the base of their association. As Louis Harlan asserts;
Both were self-made men, though in different senses,.,. 
Both were pragmatists, willing to sacrifice mere princi­
ples for the sake of power, and yet each had a strong sense 
of personal mission. Each saw himself as a practical re­
former with a constructive goal in mind, as much opposed 
to the militant blacks and the "men with the muckrake" as
Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, p. 9t Richard Hofstad- 
ter. The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It 
(New York"* Xifred A . îüiopf, IncT, Vintage Books, pp.215-17-
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to the entrenched white supremacists and "malefactors of great 
wealth." Both were direct and plain-spoken and thought of 
his work in terms of high moral purpose, but, when the occa­
sion called for ruthless action, could decide and act in his 
own interest.'
The most significant factor which brought Roosevelt and 
Washington together was their shared convictions concerning 
the American Negro and his plight in a white society. Wash­
ington's Atlanta Speech in 1895 was attuned to Roosevelt's 
thinking on racial matters. In that speech, delivered before 
a majority of Southern whites at the Cotton States and Inter­
national Expositions, the Negro educator delighted his audi­
ence by revealing his opinion that the position obtained by 
the Negro following the Civil War was a mistake. Washington 
urged the black man to "cast down /”his__7 bucket by making 
friends in every manly way of the people of all races by whom 
^he__7 is surrounded." He urged the colored people of the 
South to "cast down their buckets in agriculture, mechanics, 
in commerce, in domestic service, and in the professions."
He urged whites, too, to "cast down their buckets" among the 
eight million blacks "whose habits you know, whose fidelity 
and love you have tested in days when to have proved treach­
erous meant the ruin of your firesides." "The wisest among 
my race," declared Washington, "understand that the agitation 
of questions of social equality is the extremest folly." He
^Harlan, p. 506.
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stated that if Southern whites would only concede to the Ne­
gro the chance of self-improvement through education and eco­
nomic opportunity, they would be surrounded in the future as 
in the past by "the most patient, faithful, law-abiding, and 
unresentful people that the world has seen." Washington 
reached the climax of his address by acknowledging Southern 
segregation sentiments by stating: "In all things that are
purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one 
as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."^
The concilatory tone of Washington's address brought 
wholehearted approval from the Southern press and the Tuska- 
geean was pronounced "the new Negro leader." The New Orleans 
Picayune called Washington a "prominent" and "sensible" man 
and the Charleston News and Courier referred to him as "one 
of the great men of the South." They continued: "His skin
is colored, but his head is sound and his heart is in the 
right place," The Atlanta Constitution declared that Wash­
ington was a "sensible and progressive negro educator" and 
called his speech the "hit of the day.
The Negro press reaction was ambivalent. The Chicago 
Conservator and the Indianapolis Freeman endorsed Washington's
Davidson Washington, ed.. Selected Speeches of Book­
er T. Washington (New York; Doubleday, Doran à M 'Co., Inc., 
T§3^) t pp. 31-37; Washington, Up From Slavery, pp. 153-15̂ .̂
^Quoted in Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the Negro; 
From Rutherford B. Hayes to Woodrow' Wilson C^w York; The Mac- 
m 1 ITah Üo., 19_$47 l963), p. 2Bl".
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plea to take the economic approach to racial advancement. In 
turn, other newspapers expressed disagreement with the Negro 
educator’s "compromise.” W. Calvin Chase, editor of the 
Washington Bee stated that Washington "said something that 
was the death to the Afro-American and elevating to the white 
people.** The Atlanta Advocate asserted that Washington was 
"so representative of the Negro that his hat flies off the 
moment a small red headed white newsboy is introduced to 
him...." The editorial continued* "We doubt if the Tuske- 
gee normal school will receive any benefit from Prof. Bad 
Taste’s sycophantic attitude but there is no doubt in our 
minds that his race will suffer..
Criticism from his own race did not alter Washington’s 
view on racial matters. He was convinced that the only way 
the Negro could advance in American society and simultaneous­
ly keep racial tensions in the South to a minimum was through 
education, racial solidarity, and economic self-help. His 
social philosophy was embraced by both Southern whites and 
Northern philanthropists, whom he depended upon for financial 
support for Tuskegee Institute. Washington also received en­
couragement from Presidents Cleveland and McKinley.
l^Quoted in Harlan, pp. 225-226.
^Washington met with Cleveland during the Atlanta Expo­
sition and served in a minor advisory capacity during McKin­
ley’s administration. See Harlan, p. 224; Thomas R, Cripps, 
"The Lily White Republicans, the Negro, the Party, and the 
South in the Progressive Era," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universi­
ty of Maryland, 1967), pp. 48-96.
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Washington first net Theodore Roosevelt when the latter 
was governor of New York. They discussed what should be done 
by a President in the South. As Roosevelt later commented*
"We agreed that in the Gulf and South Atlantic States, where 
... there is no real Republican organization ... the thing to 
do would be to recognize Democrats; to try to appoint men of 
high character - Republicans where they were available. Demo­
crats where they were not; and to appoint a very few colored 
men of high character - just enough to make it evident that 
they were not being entirely proscribed.
Upon Roosevelt’s election as Vice-President, Washington 
offered his congratulations and Roosevelt urged the Negro ed­
ucator to visit him the next time he came north and give him 
advise on race matters.Washington took the first train 
north and conferred with the Vice-President. During their 
conference Roosevelt expressed his desire to become President. 
The Negro leader assured him that he would provide a helping 
hand among Black Republican leaders and Roosevelt, in turn, 
promised "to help not only the Negro, but the whole South, 
should he ever become president.
Theodore Roosevelt to James Ford Rhodes, December 15, 
1904, Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roose- 
velt, 8 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University PressT%93^)» vol. IV, p. 1072.
^^Roosevelt to Booker T, Washington, November 10, 190O, 
cited in Harlan, p. 305.
Emmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T, 
Washington: Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.7 
Doubleday, Page, and CoT, 19l6^, pp. 169, 31^-315.
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Roosevelt had been planning a trip South to visit his 
mother's home in Georgia and extend his travels to Tuskegee.
On September 1^, 1901 his plans were abruptly changed with the 
assassination of President McKinley. On the very day that he 
took the oath of office, Roosevelt wrote to Washington*
I write you at once to say that to my deep regret 
my visit south must now be given up. When are you coming 
North? I must see you as soon as possible. I want to 
talk over the question of possible future appointments 
in the south exactly on the lines of our last conversa­
tion together.... ̂-5
When Washington received this message from the President 
he confessed that "it caused me some misgivings." He had 
tried hard to avoid becoming involved in any political activi­
ty for fear of endangering his work at Tuskegee, but a call­
ing from the President could not be "lightly put aside.
Upon Washington's arrival at the White House, Roosevelt im­
mediately outlined to the Negro leader his ideas with respect 
to appointments in the South, emphasizing his determination 
to appoint only the best qualified men, including Democrats 
where Republicans could not be found. As Washington later 
wrote* "^Roosevelt^ repeated and emphasised his determiha-
^^Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, September l4, 1901, 
Letters, III, p. 149.
^^Booker T. Washington, "My Larger Education, Being Chap­
ters From My Experience" in The Booker T, Washington Papers « 
Louis R. Harlan, ed., (3 vols, to date)7 vol. I TÏÏi~~Autobio­
graphical Writings (Urbana* University of Illinoii~Press, 1972), pThWT
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tion to appoint /“men of the highest character_J7 ... regard­
less of political influences or political consequences.” 
Washington urged the appointment of both Negro Republicans 
and conservative Democrats, The President stated that he did 
not propose to appoint a large number of Negroes to office in 
the South but when he did appoint one he would be '‘not only
a man of ability, but of character - a man who had the con-
17fidence of his white and coloured neighbors.” Further, he
promised to appoint well-qualified blacks to offices in the
1 ANorth as well, which delighted Washington.
Returning to Tuskegee, Washington discovered that the 
judgeship for the Middle District of Alabama had just becomes 
vacant through the death of the incumbent. Judge John Bruce. 
This presented an opportunity to initiate the policy of ap­
pointing qualified men to federal posts, as outlined by the 
President. Washington sent his secretary, Emmett J. Scott to 
the White House with a letter recommending the appointment of 
ex-Govemor Thomas G. Jones, a white conservative Democrat, 
for the vacant position. The Negro leader described Jones as 
the best qualified man for the office. "He is a Gold Democrat, 
and is a clean, pure man in every respect," wrote Washington. 
"He stood up in the Constitutional Convention and elsewhere
ITlbid.
1 AOn this idea of the Présidentes, Louis Harlan asserts 
that Washington "silently filed ^it_% away as his ticket to 
a bargain of mutual interest with the Northern black profes» 
sional elite, the "Talented Tenth.*" See Harlan, Booker T, 
Washington, p. 307.
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for a fair election law, opposed lynching, and he has been
outspoken for the education of both races. He is head and
shoulders above any of the other persons who I think will
19apply for the position.”
The President, upon reading Washington's letter, was 
concerned as to whether Jones had supported William Jennings 
Bryan in either I896 or 1900. Scott informed him that the 
ex-Govemor supported McKinley in both elections. Roosevelt 
then questioned Scott on the knowledge of this fact and the 
secretary told him of a letter wherein Jones stated to Wash­
ington that he was "without political ambition because he had 
opposed Bryan...." The President then requested to hear di­
rectly from Washington on the matter and Scott hurried off a
telegram assuring the Tuskegeean that Roosevelt already had
20decided to appoint Jones.
Washington wired "the whole truth" to Scott on the same 
dayI "Party voted for Palmer and Buckner (Gold Democrat Tick­
et) and supported them strongly in ninety six but in order to 
have influence in defeating Bryan's nomination went into Dem­
ocratic primaries in nineteen hundred, voted for him but made 
no addresses, he has strongly and openly supported McKinleys
iq̂Booker T. Washington to Theodore Roosevelt, October 2,
1901, in Scott and Stowe, Booker T. Washington, p. 50,
p. 5 1.
20Emmett J. Scott to Washington, October 4, I901, Ibid.,
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expansion policy, was president of sound money club in ninety
six."21
The following day Scott waited for three hours to see 
the President. When finally invited in, he immediately hand­
ed Roosevelt the letter from Washington. "His face was a 
study," Scott reported, "He was greatly surprised to learn 
that the Governor voted for Bryan." Roosevelt replied to 
Scott; "Well, I guess 1*11 have to appoint him, bât I am aw­
fully sorry he voted for Bryan," The President and Scott then 
discussed Dr. William D. Crum, a prominent Negro doctor from 
Charleston, South Carolina. Scott told Roosevelt that the 
doctor was a "clean representative character and that he was 
favorably considered by /"Benjamin^/ Harrison for the Charles­
ton postmastership..,." Roosevelt found that the position 
Washington has advocated for Crura had been filled, but he told 
Scott to inform Washington that he would consider Crum for any 
other vacancy that might occur. (The appointment of William 
Crum to high office would later become a cause celebre in 
Roosevelt's first administration), Scott asked Roosevelt what 
message he should relay to his boss concerning the appointment 
of Jones. "Tell Mr. Washington without using my name that par­
ty will most likely be appointed - in fact I will appoint him -
pponly don't make it that strong by wire," replied the President.
^Washington to Scott, October 4, 1901, in Harlan, Booker 
T. Washington, p. 309.
22c'Scott to Washington, October 5» 1901, in Scott and 
pp. 53-5 4. For the Crum affair sea chapter IV.
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A few weeks later, while on tour of Mississippi, Wash­
ington received word that the President wished to confer with 
him once again. At the completion of his business he headed 
for the Capital and soon arrived at the home of Whitefield 
McKinlay, a real estate broker and one of Washington's clos­
est friends. There he found an invitation to dinner at the 
White House at eight o'clock that evening. At the appointed 
time Washington arrived at the White House and proceeded to 
dine with the President, his wife, his daughter Alice, and 
his three sons. Also present at the dinner was one of Roose­
velt's old friends, Phillip B, Stewart, a Colorado mining and 
utilities executive.~ After dinner Roosevelt and Washington 
talked at considerable length concerning plans the President 
had about the South. At the end of the evening Washington
o / lboarded a train and headed for New York.
Southern sentiment toward Washington, prior to his sec­
ond conference with Roosevelt, was very favorable. The con*i- 
èiîitpry tone of his speeches were met with astounding applause 
and his work at Tuskegee was viewed with equal admiration.
When news arrived about the appointment of Governor Jones to 
the Judgeship in Alabama, Southern whites expressed further 
approval, even when they were later notified that Washington
^Roosevelt frequently discussed the political situation 
in Colorado with Stewart and had gone on hunting trips in the 
Colorado Rockies with. See Blum, pp. 40-41; Letters, II,p. l46n,
Washington, "My Larger Education,* in The Booker T. Wash­
ington Papers, vol. I, pp. 443-444.
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was responsible for it. However, Booker T. Washington was 
still a Negro and Negroes did not sit down to dinner with a 
white man and his family, especially when that white man hap- 
ens to be the President of the United States. The frenzied 
wave of racism that was sweeping the South at the turn of the 
century was abetted by news of the Washington-Roosevelt din­
ner.
The morning following the dinner Washington noticed that 
the New York Tribune mentioned briefly his dinner with the 
President the previous night. He gave little thought to the 
matter.However, only a few days passed before news of the 
dinner appeared in the Southern press and initiated a “storm 
of controversy.”^^ The New Orleans Times Democrat wrote»
"When Mr. Roosevelt sits down to dinner with a negro he de­
clares that the negro is the social equal of the white man." 
The New Orleans Daily States called the dinner "a studied in­
sult to the S o u t h . S o u t h e r n  editors suddenly discovered 
that Rooseveltism means "nigger supremacy." The New Orleans
^^Ibid., p. 444.
Willard B. Gatewood has focused on the dinner as an 
example of Roosevelt's ability to provoke controversy. How­
ever, he concentrates on the Southern mythology surrounding 
the affair rather than its significance concerning Roosevelt's 
Southern policy and his association with Washington. See Gate­
wood , Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy» Episodes 
of the White Rouse  ̂Ÿears (Mton Rouge» Louisiaha "State univer- 
sTty^ress, 1^7977 PP» 32-61.
^^Quoted in the New York Times, October 19» 1901.
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Picayune called the President “the worst enemy to his race of
any white man who has ever occupied so high a place in this
republic." The Richmond Times stated that the incident “means
the President is willing that negroes shall mingle freely with
whites in the social circle - that white women may receive
attentions from negro men; it means that there is no racial
reason in his opinion why whites and blacks may not marry and
intermarry, why the Anglo-Saxon may not mix negro blood with 
28his blood." On the lighter side, the Raleigh Post offered 
this poetic gesture:
Booker Washington holds the boards - 
The President dines a nigger.
Precedents are cast aside - 
Put aside with vigor;
Black and white sit side by side,
As Roosevelt dines a nigger,
While general disapproval was voiced throughout the South, 
some moderate opinions were expressed. The Raleigh News and 
Observer, calling the incident a radical departure from social 
custom, nevertheless declared: "A man's home is his castle,
whether it be a home in the White House or in a humble cabin.
He has the right to choose his guests, and to sit down at his
28The most detailed account of Southern press reaction 
to the dinner is Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "Dinner at the White 
House: Theodore Roosevelt, Booker T. Washington, and the South," 
Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XVII (June, 1958), 112-130.
^^Quoted in Mark Sullivan, Our Times, the United States 
1900-1925, 6 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1926"), 
III, p. 135.
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own table with whomsoever he pleases to invite to break bread 
with,him."30 To a majority of Southerners, however, breaking 
bread with a black man was stretching the metaphor a bit too 
far.
Southern editors expounded upon the political implica­
tions that were involved with the dinner, realizing that 
Roosevelt had just handed them ammunition to combat any Repub­
lican invasion of the South. Josephus Daniels, editor of the 
Raleigh News and Observer and later Woodrow Wilson's Secre­
tary of the Navy, declared that the dinner "is not a prece­
dent that will encourage Southern men to join hands with Mr. 
Roosevelt" and the Memphis Scimitar stated that the President 
had shattered "any expectation that may have arisen from his 
announced intention to make the Republican party in the South 
respectable. He has closed the door to any accessions of 
Southern white men to the Republican ranks,"
While the dinner episode was receiving harsh criticism 
from the Southern press, it was being viewed favorably in the 
North. In fact the Southern reaction was the primary source 
of concern to Northern editors. The New York Press described 
the outraged Southerners as the "arrogant old plantation strain,"
30^uoted in Literary Digest, XXIII (October 26, 1901), 
pp. 486-487. -------
31lbid.
30
The Boston Transcript stated that "the hysterical and horror- 
striken Southern Shriekers" were the victums of "old ingrain­
ed p r e j u d i c e . T h e  Northern press was quick to point out 
that Booker Washington had previously been entertained by 
many dignitaries in Europe, including Queen Victoria at Wind­
sor Castle, and that he was viewed as one of the most eloquent 
men of his day.
Perhaps nowhere else was Roosevelt’s entertaining of 
Booker Washington at the White House applauded so loudly as 
in the black community. The dinner incident served as a frag­
ment of hope admidst the rising tide of disfranchisement and 
discrimination at the turn of the century. The Washington 
Bee, one of the most prosperous Negro newspapers published 
at the time of the dinner, best expressed the sentiments of 
Black America*
The Southern Democrats hoped and expected to blarney 
the President so as to continue unrestrained in their wick­
ed reign of terror and proscription against the coloured 
race. They are shocked, boiled, smitten, and exasperated. 
In one fell swoop Mr. Roosevelt has smashed to smithereens 
their fondest idol. They are fuming with dire imprecations 
against him, and all because he took a meal of victuals 
with a coloured gentleman who had been entertained by the 
nobility of England, and the best people of America.33
The Cleveland Gazette was another Negro publication that ex­
pressed admiration for Roosevelt’s action and condemnation of
^^Ibid., p. 487. 
33,Quoted in John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom* 
A History of American Negroes (New York; Random House, Vintage 
Books, 1947,
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Southern reaction but its editor, Harry C. Smith, was quite 
skeptical to the effects it would have on Booker Washington, 
According to Smith, the incident was "perfectly right and 
proper," but he predicted that Roosevelt’s entertaining of 
Washington would "eventually prove the latter's undoing" as 
far as his educational work was concerned. He felt that the 
Southern white people, bound by prejudice, were "vindictive" 
and would punish some one for the social distinction con­
ferred upon Washington and the race by the President. Smith 
continued* "Privately or rather sectionally, / “Southern 
whites_/ will quietly work upon Washington and his great 
school. Some years will elapse before the effect will be 
noticed in a general way. This is to be regretted as much as 
the president’s action in inviting the Afro-American to dine 
and counsel with him is to be commended.
For the next few years every racial disturbance that 
Occurred in the South was traced back to the Roosevelt-Wash- 
ington dinner. White Southerners deeply felt that the dinner 
created restlessness and discontent among the Negro population, 
Roosevelt’s attempt at "social qquality" became the sole rea­
son why race riots broke out in Louisiana in 1901, why four 
Negroes were burned at the stake in Statesboro, Georgia in 
1904, and why a shortage of domestic servants persisted in the
3^Cleveland Gazette, October 26, 1901,
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South. Sou the rn Democrats expressed opinions akin to Sena­
tor Benjamin Tillman, when the South Carolinian asserted that 
“entertaining that nigger will ... necessitate our killing a 
thousand niggers in the South before they leam their place." 
And young white Southerners were heard singing a new song;
Coon, coon, coon,
Booker Washington is his name;
Coon, coon, coon.
Ain't that a measly shame?
Coon, coon, coon.Morning, night, and noon,
I think I'd class Mr. Roosevelt 
With a coon, coon, coon.3?
Roosevelt was both surprised and chagrined by the hys­
teria that persisted in the South. "I suppose you have been 
amused," Roosevelt wrote to Phillip Stewart, "at finding that 
our innocent dinner to Booker T. Washington has not only be­
come a national but an international affair." The President 
thought that it "seemed entirely obvious and natural" to show
^^Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy,
p. 3 6.
^^Quoted in Eric P. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny;
A History of Modem American Reform (New York; Random House,
V intage^Books, 193^»~T535TT~P» 137
37samuel R. Spencer, Jr., Booker T. Washington and the 
Negro's Place in American Life (Bostoni^Little, Brown and Co.,m5TTp7T35.
33
the Negro educator "a little ordinary c o u r t e s y . B o o k e r  
Washington represented, in the eyes of the President, the 
type of black man who should be afforded the same opportuniG
ties extended to white Americansr he was a man of "the high­
est character and ability." However, Booker Washington, in 
the eyes of Southern whites, was still a Negro and therefore
should not be treated on the same social scale or offered the
same opportunities as white Americans. Roosevelt, lacking 
insight into the problem, refused to acknowledge this primary 
fact and laid the blame directly on the outraged Southerns 
white population. What is apparent is that Roosevelt failed 
to see that his invitation to Washington was a deliberate 
assault to their convictions. He expressed his view on the 
matter in a letter to his friend, Henry Cabot Lodge*
The Booker T. Washington incident was to me so much 
a matter of course that I regarded its sole importance as 
consisting in the view it gave one of the continued exis­
tence of that combination of Bourbon intellect and intol­
erant truculence of spirit, through much of the South, 
which brought on the Civil War. If these creatures had 
any sense they would understand that they can't bluff me.
my policy of appointing—i ti AC _decent men to office in their local es.
^Theodore Roosevelt to Phillip B. Stewart, October 25t 
1901, Letters, III, p. 182. A French paper exclaimed that the 
affair produced a scandal "from one end of America to the other' 
and a leading French journal, Journal des Debats headed their 
leading editorial "line Tempete autour d^un Negre." See Mercer 
Cook, "Booker T. Washington and the French," Journal of Negro 
History, XL (October, 1955). 319-323.
^^Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, October 28, I901, 
Letters. Ill, pp. l84-l8j.
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Shortly after the initial reactions to the dinner, 
slight alterations to the story appeared in print. Northern 
and Southern apologists for Roosevelt issued their own ver­
sion of the dinner. Their claim was that it was not a dinner 
that the President invited Washington to but a luncheon. The 
story went that the President invited the Tuskegeean for a 
conference and in the middle of their talk a servant walked 
in with a lunch tray for Roosevelt. Rather than interrupt 
their conversation, the President ordered the servant to bring 
a tray for Washington so they could continue their conference 
through lunch. This altered version gained wide acceptance 
among Republicans in the South. It seemed entirely plausible 
for a busy President to impulsively invite the spokesman for 
the black community to share lunch with him, especially when 
no ladies were present. The story also became popular because 
Southerners often referred to the noon meal as either dinner
kQor lunch, and to the evening meal as supper.
Both Roosevelt and Washington avoided publishing their 
account of the dinner. It was not untiUWashinp:ton published----
his autobiographical tract, ^  Larger Education in 1911 that 
the actual account became known. However, the luncheon ver­
sion had gained such wide acceptance by 1911 that Washington's 
story had little effect as a corrective.
40Gatewood, pp. 32-61. Contemporary historians and pub­
licists relied on the luncheon version in assessing the epi­
sode, thus explaining the popularity it received during and 
after Roosevelt's presidency.
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Contrary to Southern claims, there were precedents for 
the White House dinner. In 1900 at Albany, Governor and Mrs. 
Roosevelt "ôordially greeted" a black delegate to the state 
federation of women's clubs at a reception, after she had been 
snubbed by her white fellow members, Also while Governor, 
Roosevelt invited William H. Lewis, a black lawyer and a 
classmate of Roosevelt's at Harvard, to spend the night. And 
finally, Roosevelt had entertained Booker Washington earlier 
at Oyster Bay.
In consequence of the dinner at the White House, both 
Roosevelt and Washington received threats against their lives. 
The drawer of Emmett Scott's desk was full of letters threat­
ening the life of the Negro leader. One incident occurred a 
few weeks following Washington's return from the White House.
A black man, hired by a group of white men in Louisiana to 
assassinate Washington, was hurt jumping off a train before 
arriving at the Tuskegee station. The town had no hospital 
for Negroes so he was taken to the Institute hospital where 
doctors and nurses proceeded to care for him. Amazed by the
help he received, the man became ashamed of himself, refused
1̂ 2to carry out his commission, and confessed the whole plot.
Harlan, Booker T. Washington, p. 312; Henrÿ F, Pringle, 
"Theodore Roosevelt and the Soutn,** Virginia Quarterly Review, 
IX (January, 1933), 14-23.
h-2Basil Mathews, Booker T, Washington; Educator and In­
terracial Interpreter (Cambridgei Harvard University "Press, 
T943T reprint ed.. College Park, Md.t McGrath Publishing Co., 
1948), pp. 233-234.
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The controversy over the Roosevelt-Washxngton dinner 
and the hostile attitude of the South toward the President 
persisted during the next three years. The dinner was men­
tioned in Southern opposition to the appointment of the Negro 
doctor, William D. Crum, as Collector of Customs in Charleston, 
South Carolina and to Roosevelt*s closing of the post office 
in Indianola, Mississippi in 1903» when white citizens intimi­
dated the Negro postmistress, Mrs, Minnie Cox, In 190% two 
peddlers from Chicago were arrested in Indianola for distribu­
ting "obscene photographs" among the Negro population of the 
town.. The "photographs" were pictures of Roosevelt and Wash­
ington dining together, surrounded by banners proclaiming 
EQUALITY. The Maryland political campaign of 1903 witnessed 
the reiteration of the dinner when Democrats issued campaign 
buttons showing Roosevelt and Washington sitting together at 
dinner. Advocates of Negro disfranchisement used the dinner 
as part of their campaign and James K. Vardaman of Mississippi 
referred to the incident on several occasions between 1901 
and 1909.*^
%3Gatewood, p. %3- Another incident that related to the 
dinner occurred in 190%. Lew Dockstadter, a minstrel known for 
his political monologues, filmed a short skit in front of the 
Capitol steps that comprised of a *take off" on Roosevelt*s re­
lationship with Booker Washington, Dockstadter, famous for his 
portrayal of blackface, dressed as the Negro leader and stagger­
ed, as if drunk or ill, along the walkway. A fancy carriage, 
drawn by spirited horses and outfitted with a coachman and foot­
man in White livery including red, white and blue cockades, stop­
ped alongside the black man. The man inside, dressed as Roose­
velt in frock coat and silk hat, proceeded to lend assistance.
The black man was helped into the carriage, given a cigar, and 
the carriage rode away with the two men embracing affectionately.
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What Theodore Roosevelt hoped to do in the South when 
he became President in 19OI appeared to be shattered with one 
move. Hoping to establish a real Republican Party in the South, 
he failed to realize that the racial passions of white Southern­
ers, aggravated by Reconstruction, had not subsided. Roosevelt 
was not disliked in the South, Prior to his administration. 
Southerners were too firmly committed to the Democratic Party 
and too suspicious of Republicans to even pay close attention 
to Republican presidents. However, Roosevelt seamed differ­
ent. His dynamic character and tremendous vigor was admired 
throughout Dixie, His charge up San Juan Hill reminded the 
South of the gallantry shown by Confederate officers in the 
Civil War. Perhaps most significant, Theodore Roosevelt could 
boast proudly of his southern heritage. He pleased the South 
further when he announced his intentions of appointing the 
best qualified men to federal positions, including Gold Demo­
crats, and initiating this policy with the appointment of 
Judge Thomas Jones in Alabama. But when he proceeded to in­
vite a Negro to dinner at the White House, he had made his 
first serious blunder.
The skit quickly assumed "sinister political overtones" and 
rumors spread that the Democratic party had paid Dockstadter 
four million dollars for the use of the film in the 1904 Presi­
dential campaign. Soon Dockstadter became the subject of in­
vestigation by the Secret Service and several city police de­
partments. The minstrel's film was confiscated and destroyed 
with the approval of President Roosevelt. See Willard B. Gate­
wood, "Theodore Roosevelt and the 'Kinetoscope Fakes': An In­
cident in the Campaign of 1904," Mid-America, XLIX (July,
1967), 190-199.
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Roosevelt received greater condemnation for the incident 
than Booker Washington. Several years following the dinner 
Washington gave an illustration of the contempt that Southern- 
ers held for the President, Writing in 1911, the Negro edu­
cator told about a trip he made through Florida some weeks 
after his dinner at the White House. With news that Washing­
ton was aboard the train, a group of people gathered at the 
Gainsville station to greet him. Among the group was a white 
man, whose dress and manner seemed to reveal him to be a small 
farmer. The man entered the train and cordially shook hands 
with Washington. '*! am mightly glad to see you," the farmer 
confessed to the Tuskegeean. "I have heard about you and I 
have been wanting to meet you for a long while." Washington 
was pleased at the man's remarks and the farmer continued to 
compliment hims "Say, you are a great man. You are the great­
est man in this country!" The Negro leader mildly protested 
but the farmer insisted: "^es, sir, the greatest man in this
country." Washington told the man that he felt President Roose­
velt was ÿhe greatest man in the country and the farmer re­
plied: "Huh! Roosevelt? I used to think that Roosevelt was
a great man until he ate dinner with you. That settled him 
for me."
Washington's popularity in the South did decline, however. 
The Southern press continued to attack him, not because of his 
work at Tuskegee, but because he had the insolence to sit down
^^Washington, "My Larger Education," pp. 446-44?.
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and eat a meal in the White House. Southerners also attacked 
him because he was suddenly the chief "referee for patronage" 
in the South for President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt never realized why the South held such con­
tempt toward him. On one occasion he wrotei "I really felt 
melancholy for the South at the way the Southerners behaved 
in the matter." Despite his conviction toward the incident, 
Roosevelt never asked Booker T. Washington to dinner again 
and he later confessed his uncertainty over the matter.
The President's difficulties with the South did not 
cease with the White House dinner. In December, 1902, he 
appointed the Negro doctor, William D. Crum, as Collector of 
Customs for the Port of Charleston, South Carolina and in 
January, 1903 he closed the Indianola, Mississippi Post Office 
when white citizens of the town forced the Negro postmistress 
to resign. Both incidents brought further criticism from 
the South and moved Roosevelt closer to the realization that
47"the Negro Proble# always ye have with you,"
^•^Theodore Roosevelt to Lucius Nathan Littauer, October 24, 
1901, Letters, III, p. 181.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27» 1906, Ibid., V.,
p. 227.
^^Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900 (Boston; 
Little, Brown and Co., 1937)» p. 2ÏÏJI
CHAPTER III
THE INDIANOLA POST OFFICE AFFAIR*
DEFENSE OF THE NEGRO AND THE LAW
While the South yisls responding hysterically to his en­
tertaining of Booker T, Washington at the White House, Theo­
dore Roosevelt was acting upon the policy that he and the 
Negro educator had agreed to* appointing men of character and 
fitness to office in the South. The appointments would go to 
Democrats where Republicans could not be found, and to a few 
upright colored men and women of "property and character" 
who had the stamped approval of Washington.
In regards to Negro appointments, Roosevelt was deter­
mined to remove those black officeholders who were commonly 
associated with the old Reconstruction regimes and those who 
were connected with the machine of Mark Hanna and working for 
the Senator's nomination in 1904. On the recommendation of 
Washington, the President appointed a majority of Gold Demo­
crats and ex-Confederate soldiers to Southern patronage posi­
tions. This delighted the South and caused prominent citizens 
to apply for various offices. To Southern whites, the,Presi­
dent's appointment policy indicated a chance of removing ail 
Negroes from political office in the South, However, Roose­
velt was not considering this for he was aware that slighting 
the black community would result in the loss of support in
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the North as well as in the South.
Roosevelt made two appointments of Negroes in the South 
that became the source of conflict between the President and 
white Southerners. In South Carolina he appointed William 
Crum, and in Mississippi he reappointed Mrs. Minnie M. Cox to 
the Post Office in Indianola. Both appointments, occurring 
simultaneously, provoked a wave of protest and became contro­
versial issues during the President's first administration.
In Mississippi, Roosevelt found the Republican organi­
zation "utterly rotten" and thought that it was impossible 
to rejuvenate the party with the existing leadership,^ On 
the recommendation of Booker T. Washington, he selected Edgar 
S. Wilson as United States Marshal for the Southern District 
of Mississippi in Januairy, 1902. Wilson was an able journal­
ist, editing several newspapers and serving for twelve years 
as Mississippi correspondent of the New Orleans Daily Pica­
yune. He was a Democrat but in 1896 refused to support Wil­
liam Jennings Bryan for President emd turned to the Palmer- 
Buckner ticket, joining the ranks of Gold Democrats. He was
the bother-in-law of Mississippi Governor Andrew H. Longino,
2assisting him to that position in 1899.
^Theodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1903» 
Elting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
8 vols. (Cambridge* Harvard University fress, 19^2), ill,p. 68l
^Roosevelt to Edgar S. Wilson, January 4, 1902, Letters, 
III, p. 2l6ï The New York Times, January 10, 1902; Willard B. 
Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Art of Controversy (Baton 
Rouge* Louisiana”State University Press, 1970}, p. 66.
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Roosevelt was enthused over Washington's recommendation 
of Wilson. He had been informed that both Wilson and Governor 
Longino were men "who had endeavored to put a stop to lynch­
ing and to a division of the educational fund" in Mississippi. 
To the Presidents Wilson was the man he "could trust to recom­
mend ... good people for the offices" in that state.^ Wash­
ington reassured Roosevelt* "Mr. Wilson is not only keeping 
in mind the putting of first class men in office but also ... 
the bringing about of such conditions as will not injure the 
party and the support which you should have from Mississippi.
The more I see of him the more I am convinced of his wisdom
4and unselfishness and his great power for good,"
Both the North and the South praised the selection of 
Wilson as "patronage referee" in Mississippi. It was viewed 
in the North as an indication that Roosevelt was not about to 
appoint unfit Republican officeholders. In the South, the 
appointment signified that the President was keeping his word 
in appointing Gold Democrats to office. To the black communi­
ty, however, the appointment of Wilson was looked upon as an 
effort to formulate a lily-white Republican party in the South. 
The Boston Guardian declared* "The scheme to give the federal 
offices in the South to white Democrats rather than to color­
ed Republicans on the part of a Republican administration and
^Roosevelt to John Graham Brooks, November 13, 1908, 
Letters, VI, p. 1346.
^Booker T. Washington to Roosevelt, December 24, 1901, 
quoted in Gatewood, p. 6 7.
43
to thus build up a white man's party there is a policy which 
meets the opposition of the entire Negro race.”^ The Cleve­
land Gazette asserted* *‘In carrying out that new southern 
policy b o m  under the McKinley administration. President 
Roosevelt seems to *Out-Herod Herod." In vainly trying to 
build up a Republican party in the south he is slowly but 
surely disrupting the portion of the party that is the back­
bone of northern republicanism - namely, its Afro-American 
contingent,
In Mississippi, the most outspoken black man against 
the appointment of Wilson was James Hill. Hill was the most 
prominent Negro Republican in the state and for years had held 
various offices. Roosevelt failed to reappoint him to any 
office and his duties in the state were handed over to Wil­
son. Angered at this move. Hill attempted but failed to block 
Wilson’s confirmation in the Senate and then launched an anti- 
Roosevelt movement among Mississippi Republicans "in the hope 
of securing a delegation to the national convention in 1904 
which would oppose the President's nomination,"^
The appointment of Wilson, together with the removal of 
Hill, led many Mississippi whites to the conclusion that Roose­
velt would eliminate all Negroes from office in their state 
and consider prominent white citizens to replace them. This
^Boston Guardian, July 26, 1902.
^Cleveland Gazette, February 1, 1902.
^Cleveland Gazette, February 15» 1902; Gatewood, p. 68.
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conclusion resulted in an affair that became one more issue 
of controversy in the Roosevelt administration. In the town 
of Indianola* white citizens erroneously concluded that the 
time had arrived to replace the Negro postmistress with a 
white citizen. However, Roosevelt had purposely reappointed 
the woman because she was a person of “property and outstand­
ing character" and he was determined to keep her in office, 
despite the hostile reaction he was to receive from the South, 
Mrs. Minnie M. Cox, a quiet and sophisticated Negro 
woman, had held the postmastership in Indianola for several 
years. She was first appointed by Benjamin Harrison when no 
white Republican in the area qualified for the office. Fol­
lowing the Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland, she 
was again appointed by McKinley in I897 and on January 25»
1900 the office was raised from fourth-class to third-class 
status, elevating it to a presidential office. In 19OO Mrs.
Cox began a four-year term under a commission signed by McKin-
8ley. The postmistress and her husband, Wayne W. Cox, a pos­
tal employee in the railway mail service, were among the most 
prominent citizens in Indianola. Both attended college, Mrs. 
Cox receiving a teacher's certificate from Fisk University 
and her husband graduating from Alcom University. Their ed­
ucational qualifications and their allegiance to the Republi­
can party was manifest in their positions in government ser-
^Gharles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 11, 1902, 
in "Resignation of the Postmaster at Indianola, Miss*.',House Doc­
uments , 57 Gong., 2d sess. Doc. no. 422, vol. 92, ser. no. 433T, 
p. 21 (hereafter cited as "Resignation of the Postmaster").
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vice. Mrs. Cox was one of only five Negroes who had held a 
presidential third-class office.^
The white citizens of Indianola had gained the impres­
sion that in the dispensation of federal patronage certain 
Democrats would be recognized where suitable Republicans could 
not be found» a direct result of Roosevelt's Southern policy 
in Mississippi. Their eyes now focused upon the post office 
and Mrs, Minnie Cox. Relations between the postmistress and 
her white patrons had been quite good for the past ten years 
but suddenly the community discovered they had an "obnoxious 
nigger postmaster." Those individuals who desired the office 
for themselves or for relatives started to raise the question 
of "nigger domination" In the hope of causing a vacancy in the 
post office. Mrs. Cox's presence was now a "menace to white 
civilization."^^
The manner in which Mrs. Cox conducted her office, prior 
to the deterioration of relations with the citizens of Indian­
ola, was praised by her patrons and postal officials. Charles 
Fitzgerald, Post Office Inspector for the area and a native of 
Mississippi, made several visits to Indianola and reported that 
the office was "excellently conducted" and that Mrs. Cox was 
"couteous and efficient and render/"ed_% the patrons a satis­
factory service." He noted that the postmistress even extended
9"The Indianola Case," Outlook LXXIII (January 24, 1903), 
p. 188; Gatewood, p. 64.
^^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 11, 1902, in 
"Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 21.
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her services to include assuming the responsibility of cover­
ing delinquent rent payments with her own funds "in order to 
avoid friction with her white patrons.
In the spring of 1902 several prominent citizens of 
Indianola submitted applications to Postmaster-General Henry
C. Payne and President Roosevelt for consideration in the 
Indianola postmastership. The most persistent candidate for 
the position was A,B. Weeks, the brother-in-law of Indianola 
mayor, J.L. Davis. Weeks stated that because he was finan­
cially hurting, that he was white, and that he shifted his 
allegiance to the Republican party in I896, he should be ap­
pointed postmaster. He declared that Mrs. Cox should be re­
placed because it was unfair "that one family should have 
/~two federal_y offices, especially when theyJ7 are wealthy. 
Weeks continued submitting letters to the President and the 
Post Office Department, assuring them that the people of In­
dianola no longer wished the services of the Negro postmistress 
and were determined "to make ^her_y resign or give up the 
office in some way." He concluded* "They only do this because 
she is colored." •
llpitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15# 1902, in 
"Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 22.
^^A.B. Weeks to Theodore Roosevelt, April 7» 1902, Ibid.,
p. 8.
^^A.B. Weeks to J.L. Bristow, September 19# 1902, Ibid.,
p. 10.
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Late in September, 1902 the white citizens of Indianola 
became alarmed over another incident involving racial matters. 
It seemed that a Negro porter of Cohn’s Brooklyn Bridge Store 
named Burnet was alleged to have shown “misconduct** toward a 
young lady, also employed in the store. Burnet had proved 
himself very useful as a salesman in the store, selling goods 
to Negro customers. For this he was permitted to act as clerk, 
which brought him in close contact with the young lady. He 
became “unduly inflated with his own importance“ and became 
“habitually discourteous“ toward her. She advised her friends 
of the man’s behavior and the word spread throughout the town. 
This inflamed the white citizens against the Negro to such an 
extent that a public meeting was called to take action. When 
the meeting ended, the townspeople voted to banish the porter 
immediately and to also notify Dr. J.G. Fulton, a Negro physi­
cian, that he had until January 1, I903 to leave town.̂ "*̂  Ful­
ton had recently set up practice in Indianola to treat Negro 
patients. By doing so he had taken those patients away from 
several white doctors of the community. It was evident that 
Pulton, like the Coxes, had become “too prosperous“ and there­
fore had to leave town,^^
l^Charles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15» 
1902, in “Resignation of the Postmaster,“ p. 22.
^%heodore Roosevelt to John Graham Brooks, November 13, 
19O8 , Letters, VI, p. 134?; Gatewood, pp. 71-72.
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The Negro porter Burnet left Indianola immediately and 
Fulton* as mentioned* was given until January 1 to arrange his 
business interests. A second public meeting was called in op­
position to the order given to Dr, Pulton. A vote was taken 
and it was decided, 45 to 37» that Fulton should remain, if 
he so desired. Believing that an outraged minority could 
easily become very threatening. Pulton decided that it would 
be in his best interest to leave Indianola, At the meeting, 
attention was called to the fact that a Negro was postmaster 
and it was stated that "this condition should not be longer 
tolerated." It was moved that she be ordered to resign at 
once. By expression of a majority, Mrs. Minnie Cox was order­
ed ^o vacate her office by January 1, 1903.^^
Wayne Cox, husband of the postmistress, immediately 
wrote Post Office Inspector, Charles Fitzgerald, requesting 
"a talk about the 'Indianola Affair.*" Cox believed that he 
could handle the situation by attempting to work out some 
arrangement so that his wife would retain her post until the 
expiration of her commission in 1904. Writing to Fitzgerald,
he stated I "I thought at first, after the 'heat* I could man-
1 7age the affair, but now I am afraid not." ' Fitzgerald wrote 
Mayor Davis of Indianola, asking whether there was any truth
l^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15, 1902, in 
"Resignation of the Postmaster," pp. 22-23.
^^Wayne W, Cox to Charles Fitzgerald, November 18, 1902, 
Ibid.. p. 19.
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to the story that "certain citizens ... have banded together 
and intimidated Minnie M. Cox ... to agree to tender her re­
signation. " The Mayor replied that he had no knowledge of 
any "parties, citizens or others" who have "intimidated Mrs. 
Cox into tendering her resignation." However, he was inform­
ed that a sentiment existed in the community that a change 
should be made in the post office management and when Mrs,
Cox was informed through her husband, she offered to vacate 
her position. The Mayor concluded*
Considering the fact that fully five-sixths of the 
mail handled by the post-office at this place is sent and 
received by the white patrons of the office, it strikes 
me that the people have acted in a very exemplary manner 
to this time, and considering the further fact that she 
has acted as postmistress for years, and that she as post­
mistress, and her husband as mail clerk, have made money 
and are now in easy circumstances, and that she finds the 
people and patrons generally desire a change in the admini­
stration, it seems to me that it is the part of wisdom on 
her part and the best way out of an unpleasaht outcome of 
the matter for her to resign, as it seems she has agreed to do,18
Following the receipt of Mayor Davis* letter, Fitzgerald 
travelled to Indianola to investigate the matter. Both the 
Mayor and the Sheriff of Indianola reassured the Inspector 
that "the people would prefer to see the office discontinued 
before submitting to a negro postmaster any longer." And if 
Mrs. Cox persisted in retaining the office, they "could not
i 8Fitzgerald to J.L. Davis, November 23, 1902t Davis to 
Fitzgerald, November 29, 1902, Ibid,, pp. 19-20.
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guarantee her protection from violence.Fitzgerald con­
cluded that the Indianola assembly was actually a mob gather­
ed together for an unlawful purpose. He reported that the 
meeting was not a mob in the sense that it was composed of
"the riffraff of the community," it was "'the mob of gentle-
20men,* but a mob nevertheless."
On December 9» 1902, Mrs. Minnie Cox wrote Fitzgerald 
stating that "if I don't resign, there will be trouble and 
cause the town to lose post-office facilities." "This is my 
home, and I feel a deep interest in the town and its people. 
Under the circumstances in a few days I will tender my resig­
nation." Two days later Fitzgerald received another message 
from Wayne Cox, expressing agreement with his wife's decision, 
but requesting the Inspector "to frame his y  report so;that 
those that /~have_7 caused this unpleasantness will not pro­
fit by it."21
Fitzgerald called upon B.C. Humphreys, the district at­
torney and Congressman-elect from the Indianola area, hoping 
to reach a settlement of the troubles of the post office.
l^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15» 1902», Ibid.,
p. 24.
ZOlbid.
^%innie M. Cox to Fitzgerald, December 9» 1902; Wayne 
W. Cox to Fitzgerald, December 11, 1902, Ibid., pp. 20, 25.
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Humphreys conferred with several citizens of the town and re­
ported back to Fitzgerald. He found that "the race prejudice 
,.. is running too high just now in Indianola to be checked or 
curbed by a simple resort to reason." The district attorney 
feared that the authorities in Washington would resort to 
abolishing the post office, thereby punishing "many good peo­
ple for an offense which they have not committed." Indianola 
was the county seat of Sunflower County, Mississippi, with 
some 1200 to 1500 inhabitants, "It is a very serious matter
to deprive a community as large as Indianola of postal facili-
22ties," asserted Humphreys.
Whatever pressures were applied by Humphreys, Fitzgerald, 
or Edgar Wilson, they were to no avail. The white citizens 
of Indianola were determined to have Mrs. Cox removed as post­
mistress and replaced by a "respectable" white member of the 
community. The Post Office Department continued to receive 
letters from A.B. Weeks and other citizens of the town, re­
questing to be considered for the position. On December 4-,
Mrs. Minnie Cox submitted her resignation to President Roose­
velt, to be tendered on January 1, 1903 or "as soon thereafter 
as my successor can be appointed and qualified. Fitzgerald
ZZp.G. Humphreys to Fitzgerald, December 22, 1902, Ibid., 
pp. 26-27.
^^Minnie M. Cox to Theodore Roosevelt, December 4, 1902, 
Ibid., p. 20.
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followed Mrs. Cox's resignation with his own decision on the 
Xdianola affairt
It is certain if the Department yields in this case 
it will be the beginning of interminable trouble, for it 
will encourage outbreaks of this kind in the comparative­
ly few communities in this State where we have negro post­
masters ....We have before us the unpleasant spectacle of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States being trampled 
under foot by a community, and to meet the exigencies of 
the case is quite a problem because of its peculiarity.
I would, in the interest of a peaceful solution of 
this question, and at the same time a dignified mainten­
ance of the laws and authority of the United States and 
the Post-Office Department, recommend that the resignation 
of the postmaster at Indianola, Miss., tendered under 
duress, be accepted January 1, 1903, and discontin­
uance of the post-office at Indianola, Sunflower County, 
Miss.24
Fitzgerald's report was forwarded to Postmaster-General 
Henry C. Payne and referred to the President. Roosevelt and 
Payne conferred on what course to take in the Indianola affair. 
It was, indeed, a unique circumstance facing the President.
His appointment policy in the South was primarily aimed at 
receiving delegate support in 1904. However, the affair raised 
the question of individual rights as well as the authority of 
the Federal government. Indianola presented an opportunity 
to test whether a community could force out an officeholder 
appointed by the Executive and also whether the Federal Govern­
ment was powerless to interfere in the race problem. Roosevelt 
refused to accept Mrs. Cox's resignation and followed Fitz-
^^Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, December 15, 1902, Ibid,,
p. 25.
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gerald’s recommendation by closing the Indianola Post Office 
on January 2, 1903. The President specified that the office 
was suspendedr not abolished, since it was situated in a 
county seat of government and thereby entitled to postal facil­
ities. The post office would still exist and the postmistress, 
Mrs. Cox, would continue to draw her salary and whenever she 
could resume her duties, postal service would then be restored. 
All mail that was destined for Indianola would be routed to 
Greenville, located thirty miles from town.^^
The citizens of Indianola were disturbed over the clos­
ing of the post office but were convinced that their represen­
tatives in Congress, Senators Anselm J. McLaurin and Harando
D. Money, would have postal service quickly restored. If not, 
they were willing to allow the post office **to remain closed 
until doomsday” just as long as they were rid of the Negro 
postmistress. Inspector Fitzgerald was sent to Indianola 
to "protect the Government property and funds" that were at 
the office. When he arrived he found "the populace deeply 
stirred, yet on the surface everything was quiet and orderly."^7
^^he New York Times, January 3, 1903î Henry C. Payne 
to J, Holmes Badcer, W.B, Martin, and A.B. Smith, January 2, 
1903, in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 31; Gatewood, 
p. 77.
^^Indianola Enterprise, January 16, 3 0, 1903, quoted in 
Gatewood, p. 77,
^^charles Fitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, January 6 , 1903, 
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 27.
5^
The atmosphere was still too menacing for Minnie Cox and on 
January 5 she left Indianola to stay with friends in Birming­
ham. It was reported by a post office official that he over­
heard a man from the town state that "if that woman should go 
back and take charge of the post-office she would get her neck
pObroken inside of two hours."
As would be expected, there was a mixed reaction in the 
press to Roosevelt's closing of the post office in Indianola. 
The moderate New York Tiroes chastized the President for lack­
ing the knowledge that he "cannot lawfully punish an entire 
community for the offenses of some of its members." Insinu­
ating that his action was part of his political strategy to 
secure his nomination in 1904, the Tiroes asserted that the 
incident "was certainly an act of gross injustice ,.. and was 
not the statutory procedure indicated in such cases and we 
cannot resist the conviction that it was a highly impolitic 
act."^9 In the South, the incident sparked an outburst against 
the President comparable to that which followed his famous din­
ner with Booker T. Washington in 1901. In the eyes of white 
Southerners, Roosevelt was a "cynical Negrophile whose theories 
of social and political equality were responsible for a long
Z&Pitzgerald to Joe P. Johnson, January 8 , 1903; Letter 
of an unidentified post office official, February 23, 1903, 
Ibid.. pp. 30, 33.
OQThe New York Times, January 6 , 1903.
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list of problems ranging from the outbreak of Negro outrages 
to the servant problem in the South." The Louisville Courier- 
Journal claimed that the method used by the citizens of Indian­
ola to oust Minnie Cox from the post office was "merely a re­
sponse to t^e extremism of the President" regarding the race 
question. The Savannah Morning News declaredi "To make a per­
son postmaster who is objectionable to the community is not 
in keeping with republican institutions» ... the rule of the 
majority» ... the principles of local self-government.
One Southerner charged the President with "stirring up a fren­
zy of race feeling such as the South had not exhibited since 
Reconstruction" and another claimed the closing of the post 
office as being the next logical step in Roosevelt’s treatment
of the South. Finally» Harper’s Weekly expressed hope that
31Mr. Roosevelt "will recall the order."
The President did receive support for his action in sev­
eral Northern journals such as the New York Tribune and the 
Washington Evening Star, both commending the government’s ac­
tion in attempting to forestall any further attempt at "law­
lessness," The Nation exclaimed that Roosevelt "rings true
^^•Southem Press on the Indianola Incident," Literary 
Digest, XXVI (January, 1903), 71-72; Gatewood, p. 82.
^^William Garrott Brown, "President Roosebelt and the 
South," Independent, LIX (November 9» 1905), 1086-1089; The 
New York Times, January 7, 1903; Harper’s Weekly, XLVÎ (Jan­
uary 17, 1903), 87.
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again in the matter of the post office....
The rowdy white element in the community, whose Anglo- 
Saxon chivalry towards /“Mrs. Cox*s^7 sex is reserved 
for white women exclusively, has tried to drive her out 
of office simply because of her color. The prosecution 
of the offenders belongs ... to the community, and the 
President's action is a proper bringing to bear of pres­
sure to that end. Southern regeneration from lynching 
must come from the South itself; but the Federal Govern­
ment should not withold its moral influence when its own 
offices are threatened."3^
The Outlook stated that the attack on Mrs. Cox “had its ori­
gin in a political cabal“ because the President was naming 
Democrats to office in the South. Agreeing that the Govern­
ment was bound to protect its officers, its editor, Lyman 
Abbott, concluded that the Post Office Department had not de­
prived the citizens of Indianola the facilities of the United
States mail, “... it appears that the citizens are simply de-
33priving themselves of these benefits,* The New York Evening 
Post viewed the President's action as “simply an act of jus-- 
tice ,.. but for it he deserves great commendation,* and the 
Buffalo Express predicted that Roosevelt's course “will be 
approved by all who believe in law and order."
32%he Nation, LXXVI (January 8 , 1903), 21.
33"The Indianola Case," Outlook, LXXIII (January 24, 
1903), 188-189.
^^The New York Evening Post and Buffalo Express quoted 
in the Cleveland Gazette, January 24, 1903.
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The Negro press hailed Roosevelt for his defense of the 
Negro postmistress* At first skeptical of his appointment 
policy in the South* the black community commended the Presi­
dent for closing the office and for appointing William Crum 
to the Charleston collectorship. Both events helped to rein­
force the faith they held in the President since his dinner 
with Booker T. Washington. The Boston Guardian stated that 
the President, "like Lincoln is taking the right step at the 
right time." His action in the case of Mrs. Cox and his at­
titude toward Dr. Crum "are eminently satisfactory to colored 
Americans. All fair-minded citizens must uphold the president 
in these cases." ^ Perhaps Harry G. Smith of the Cleveland 
Gazette best expressed the attitude of the Negro communityt
The Roosevelt policy ... is the only correct one un­
der the law* is fair and honorable, and while we do not 
always agree with the president in all things he does that 
affect our people* we cannot but honor and give him full 
credit for the stand he has taken in the Crum and Cox mat­
ters, as well as for the principle and policy enunciated 
as a result of the same. The prejudiced southern jackass 
can bray to its heart's content, but it will be in vain* 
because there is at last a man in the White House as presi­
dent who has the courage of his convictions, right or wrong.36
In Washington, Senator McLaurin came to the defense of 
the citizens of Indianola. His initial concern was over the
^%he Boston Guardian, January 10, 1903. 
^^The Cleveland Gazette, January 10, 1903*
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distance that members of the community had to travel to receive 
their mail. With the mail being sent to Greenville, the peo­
ple of Indianola had journey thirty miles. The Senator wrote 
a letter to Postmaster-General Payne requesting that the mail 
be sent to Heathman, a town only four miles away from Indianola. 
More convenient for the citizens, it would also be at no ex­
tra expense to the Government. McLaurin notified Payne that 
the people of Indianola had employed a person to carry their 
mail to Heathman and had directed their correspondents to ad­
dress them at Heathman. "While I have not express authority 
to do so," wrote McLaurin, "I take the liberty in behalf of 
the people of Indianola to propose that whatever extra expense
the Government incurs ... /~it__7 will be paid by the people of 
37Indianola." ' Payne replied to McLaurin that it was impossi­
ble to have the mail sent to Heathman because the post office 
was only a fourth-class office and was "not in any manner equip­
ped for handling mail to the amount which would be received" 
from Indianola.^® Having failed to change the office, McLaurin 
conferred regularly with Payne and Roosevelt in an effort to 
have the Indianola post Office reopened with a white postmaster 
in charge. The President was persistent in keeping the office 
closed until the citizens allowed Mrs. Cox to assume her duties.
^^Anselm J. McLaurin to Henry C, Payne, January l6 , 1903, 
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 32,
Henry C. Payne to Anselm J. McLaurin, January 21, 1903,
Ibid.
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Failing to win any concessions from Roosevelt, the Senator 
took his fight to Congress,
On January 15# 1903 McLaurin rose in the Senate and stated 
that "the white people of Mississippi don't want negro post­
masters appointed to give them out their mail," Rejecting 
the notion that Mrs. Cox had been forced to resign or that any 
threats had been made against her, the Senator referred to the 
President's public explanation of the affair as "a slur upon 
the high-toned, chivalrous, industrious ,,, and law-abiding 
people" of Indianola, The President was not without his sup­
porters and Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin took to his 
defense, "It is as idle as the wind," Spooner declared, "to 
cavil upon the proposition that this was not a forced resig­
nation, It is altogether evasive to dwell upon the 'polite­
ness' of the request for /~Mrs, Cox's_/ resignation. It was 
the power behind it which constituted the duress; it was the 
fact that that power was executed by white citizens of that 
county, and that this person against whom it was directed was 
colored." Spooner referred to the white citizens who forced 
Mrs, Cox to resign as a "brutal and lawless element" of that 
community. To the Senator, the President had acted on the 
principle that the Federal Government must exercise its con­
stitutional authority and administer its affairs "without ob­
struction and without local duress applied to its officials.
^^Congressional Record. 57 Cong., 2d sess,, pp. 853-854, 
1174-1183; The New York Times, January 25» 1903; Gatewood, pp. 
79-80.
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The debate continued in Congress over the Indianola af­
fair. Strong opponents of the President, such as Senators 
John Bankhead of Alabama, Edward Carmack of Tennessee, and 
Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina, were calling Roosevelt’s 
closing of the post office a "tyrannical and unconstitutional 
act.** Senator Bankhead condemned the President’s action as 
being disgusting and amounting to anti-"lily white** conduct. 
Senator Tillman asserted that the appointment of a Negro to 
even a minor post vfâ.s "the match which has touched off an 
electrical line of thought, reaching to the remotest bonds of 
this country." Whenever the Southern people were against an 
issue, their protests ware treated, according to Tillman, with 
"contumely and contempt" by the P r e s i d e n t . I n  the House of 
Representatives, Congressman Edgar D. Crumpaker of Indiana 
introduced a resolution to investigate the entire Indianola 
affair and Postmaster-General Payne sutmitted all relating
hidocuments to Congress,
The Indianola incident became an important issue in 
Mississippi politics. In the elections of 1903, Governor 
Longino was running for the Senate and his opponent was the 
incumbent. Senator Money. Due to illness. Money was absent 
during the debate in the Senate over Indianola. Upon his re-
Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2511- 
2560Î Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillingi South Caro- 
llnian (Baton Rouge* Louisiana Sia'Ee University Press, Ï 9 W ) , 
p. 416 .
^^The New York Times, January 20, 1903.
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turn in March, he delivered a speech in the defense of the
citizens of Indianola. He effectively mixed his defense with
lengthy segments on the general inferiority of the Negro smd
Ilpthe implications of the Washington-Roosevelt dinner. His 
opponent. Governor Longino, became the victim of the communi­
ty’s outrage over the incident. He was accused of appointing 
Negroes to office and was the subject of a circular, distri­
buted throughout the town, charging him of having "Negro 
blood" in his veins, Longino refused to admit that the racial 
question was an issue in the campaign, declaring that he would 
not appeal to race prejudice to obtain office,
The most outraged and antagonized citizen of Mississippi 
over the closing of the post office in Indianola was James K. 
Vardaman, The cousin of Senator Money and the editor of ths 
Greenwood (Miss.) Commonwealth, Vardaman was an ardent champi­
on of white supremacy. He had previously run twice for gov­
ernor, defeated in 1895 by McLaurin and in 1899 by Longino, 
Nevertheless, he was determined to succeed in 1903 and the 
Indianola crisis provided him with an ample theme to appeal 
to the racist convictions of the white population of Mississippi, 
In the autumn of 1902 Vardaman delivered several speeches in 
Indiahola where he "chided the people for tolerating a negro
k2Congressional Record, $8 Cong,, 1st sess., pp. 123-133; 
Gatewood, p7 8 3.
^^Albert D. Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks t Mississippi 
Politics, 1876-1923 (Gloucester, Mass.* Peter Smith, 1964),
î>p. 13^-15^
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wench as postmaster" and expressing his view that her presence 
was because of Roosevelt's "referee system." In an editor­
ial in the Commonwealth, Vardaman lashed out at the Presidenti
It is said that men follow the bent of their genius and 
that prenatal influences are often potent in shaping 
thoughts and ideas of after life. Probably old lady 
Roosevelt, during the period of gestation, was frighten­
ed by a dog and that fact may account for the qualities 
of the male pup which are so prominent in Teddy ,,,, I 
am disposed to apologize to the dog for mentioning it.^5
In 1902 the passage of the primary law, where the selec­
tion of a party's nominee was made by the voters rather than 
by convention delegates, aided Vardaman's campaign. A candi­
date's personality and oratory were now essential to capture 
the nomination and these two factors were deeply imbedded in 
the editor from Greenwood. By exploiting the Indianola affair 
and appealing to anti-Negro sentiments among white Mississip- 
pians, Vardaman, along with Senator Money, was elected in 
1903.4*
Despite the existence of such demagoguery and negrophob- 
ia, Roosevelt never entertained the thought of retreating from
^Gatewood, p. 71.
4-^Kirwan, Revolt of the Rednecks, p. 153.
^*Ibid., p. 132, Also see Clara Lopez, "James K. Varda­
man and lEHe Negro; The Foundation of Mississippi's Racial Pol­
icy," Southern Quaterly, III (1965)» 168-171.
63
his original position. He closed the post office not for the 
Negro vote, for this was not an issue involving race. The 
citizens of Indianola had denied the authority of the Federal 
Government and must be reprimanded for such defiance. Writing 
to Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, Roosevelt 
stated that "to connect either ... appointments /~in the South_/
... or ray actions in upholding the law at Indianola, with such
questions as 'social equality* and 'negro domination* is as
absurd as to connect them with the nebular hypothesis or the
L'ytheory of atoms." In another correspondence, Roosevelt clus­
tered labor strife, the Northern Securities case, and Indianola 
as being "three facets of the same crystal." "The sick Wall 
Street man ... the labor leader ,., and the white man who at­
tempts to act outside the law against a colored man must all 
three be made to understand that the law applies to them as 
well as their fellows," asserted the President,
Roosevelt was following precedent in his ordering the 
Indianola post office closed. In fact, Edgar Wilson reminded 
Postmaster-General Payne that similar incidents had occurred. 
President McKinley had closed an office in Pickens, Mississip­
pi, because of the refusal of the people to accept a colored 
postmaster, and it remained closed for nearly a year. Wilson
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Clark Howell, February 24, I903, 
Letters, III, p. 431.
^®Roosevelt to Oswald Garrison Villard, July 2 5, 1903t Ibid., p. 531.
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also recalled that President Cleveland issued an order to close 
an office in Missouri because its patrons refused to accept a 
•’white” postmaster named under his administration.^^ Under 
such circumstances, Roosevelt asserted that he would "under no 
consideration ... refrain from doing what I did in closing the 
Indianola post o f f i c e .
The post office at Indianola remained closed until 1904. 
Roosevelt had intended to keep it closed as long as the white 
citizens refused to accept Mrs. Cox as postmaster. However, 
certain events unfolded that convinced him to reopen the office. 
In 1903 James K. Vardaman was elected Governor of Mississippi 
and this signified that Indianola residents were determined 
to prevent Mrs. Cox or any Negro from serving as postmaster.
In January, 1904, the Mississippi legislature passed a reso­
lution attacking Roosevelt's "wilful nullification of the Con­
stitution ... and the laws of Congress" in closing the Indian­
ola post office. Mrs, Cox notified the President that she 
would not be a candidate for reappointment. Roosevelt could 
have kept the office closed but this would have involved legal 
complications since Indianola was a county seat and thus re­
quired postal facilities. The President decided to reopen the 
post office with a white postmaster, but he would not consider
^%dgar S. Wilson to Henry C. Payne, January 17, 1903, 
in "Resignation of the Postmaster," p. 33*
^^Theodbre Roosevelt to Richard Watson Gilder, February 7, 
1903, Letters, III, pp. 420-421.
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any applicant for the position who had "been in sympathy with, 
or had anything to do directly or indirectly" with the forced 
resignation of Mrs. Cox.^^ On the recommendation of Edgar Wil­
son and Inspector Charles Fitzgerald, Roosevelt appointed Wil­
liam B. Martin, the chairman of the local Democratic executive 
committee and one of Mrs. Cox's bondsmen, who remained "her 
staunch friend throughout the whole trouble." Finally, Post­
master-General Payne reduced the Indianola post office from 
third-class to fourth-class, stating that the receipts for 
1903-190^ were not sufficient to be considered for presiden­
tial status.
Mrs. Minnie Cox returned to Indianola following her stay 
in Birmingham and shortly after, she and her husband organized 
the Delta Penny Savings Bank of Indianola and purchased a large 
plantation near the town, "worth $35*000 or $40,000." Booker 
Washington kept Roosevelt informed about the Coxes and the Presi­
dent was delighted over their progress. "It is a curious cir­
cumstance," Roosebelt wrote Owen Wister, "that while objection 
was made to this black family at the head of the post office, 
no objection is made to the black man being president of a 
bank in the saune town.
The Indianola Post Office Affair served as another inci­
dent where Roosevelt came in direct conflict with the "Negro
Gatewood, pp. 86-87.
^^The New York Times, January 28, August I6 , 1904.
^^Roosevelt to Owen Wister, June 31» 1906, Letters. V, 
pp. 309-310.
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Problem." He never understood why he angered the South by his 
closing the office, just as he did not understand its hostili­
ty over his entertaining Booker T. Washington at the White 
House. Perhaps the reason was that he shared racial views of 
white Southerners. He was not trying to establish "social equal­
ity" or "Negro domination." All he was asking was the chance 
to apply his "great rule of righteousness" and reward those 
black men and women who are "well-educated, intelligent and 
honest" and who are "propertied and of good character."^
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 27, 1906, 
Letters, V, p. 228,
CHAPTER IV
WILLIAM D. CRUM AND THE CHARLESTON COLLECTORSHIP
In the Autumn of 1902 the Lily White Republicans moved 
against the Negro “with an aggressiveness that was compared 
to that with which the white supremacy Democrats had driven 
him from political life." After launching their campaign of
disfranchisement in the Southern States, the color line was 
drawn and Negro delegates were barred from Republican conven­
tions.^ Roosevelt, seeking political reform in the Southern 
Republican party while destroying the political machines of 
Mark Hanna, initiated his program of appointing Gold Democrats 
and ex-Confederate soldiers to Southern patronage positions.
He also included a few Negroes who had been recommended to 
him by Booker T. Washington.
The President acted first in Alabama with his appoint­
ment of Judge Thomas G. Jones. Then he refused to reappoint 
a lily white district attorney and replaced him with a Gold 
Democrat on the recommendation of James S. Clarkson, former 
Surveyor of the Port of New York, and Henry C. Payne, the
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-193.? 
(Baton Rouge I Louisiana State University Press, 195Ï), pp. 
463-464; Thomas R. Cripps, "The Lily White Republicans, the 
Negro, the Party, and the South in the Progressive Era,"
(Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 196?), Chap­
ters III and IV.
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Postmaster-General. Both Clarkson and Payne had become Roose­
velt’s political advisors. The President's next maneuver» oc­
curring again in Alabama, was the removal of the Collector of 
Internal Revenue for anti-Negro activities. Protest was very 
slight among white Southerns over these two incidents. Roose­
velt's next move, however, created a storm that spread through­
out the South. It occurred in Charleston, South Carolina, and 
-it^nvolved^^the-appointment ut Dr. illiaso^D. Crwn to tĥ e Col­
lectorship of the Port of Charleston. This appointment was 
both a manifestation of Roosevelt's displeasure with the lily 
whites and ah effort to promote his belief that educated and 
propertied Negroes should be given the opportunity of playing 
a part in American politics.
A Charlestonian by birth, William D. Crura was the young­
est of seven children in a family of German-African descent. 
His grandfather was a German who had emigrated to South Caro­
lina early in the nineteenth century and upon arrival angli­
cized his name from Krum to Crum. William's father, Darius, 
had inherited a sizable plantation near Orangeburg where the 
Crum family grew up. Following the Civil War and the death 
of their father, the family fortune was depleted and the older 
sons migrated North in search of work. They had agreed upon 
securing William an education and with their help, he gradu­
ated from the Avery Normal Institute, a school sponsored by 
the American Missionary Association in Charleston, He studied 
briefly at the University of South Carolina, then went to medi-
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cal school at Howard University where he received an M.D, de­
gree in 1881. After establishing a medical practice in Char­
leston, he married Miss Ellen Craft who, like himself, had 
been b o m  free and had enjoyed a formal education. By 1900 
the Crums were among the most prominent members of the black 
community in Charleston. Aside from practicing medicine, Wil­
liam was actively engaged in Republican political affairs in
2South Carolina. ______
Crum was selected as the Republican County Chairman of 
the Charleston district in 1890 %nd was elected to the Republi­
can National Convention in 1892 as a delegate for James G. 
Blaine of Maine. Upon instructions from the convention, Crum 
shifted his allegiance to Benjamin Harrison, who secured the 
nomination for the second time.^
Harrison, during his administration, showed no opposi­
tion to appointing Negroes to Federal offices. He expressed 
his feelings concerning the Negro in the South in a speech on 
the Senate floor in 1886, stating that he was "one of those 
who feel that the colored race in the South since the war has 
been subjected to indignation, cruelties, outrages, and a re­
pression of rights such as find no parallel in the history of
^ho*s Who in America  ̂ 1912-1913 (Chicago, 1912); Willard 
B. Gatewood, "William D. Crum: A Negro in Politics," Journal of 
Negro History, LIII (October, 1968), p. 302.
^The New York Times, November 28, 1902.
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Lcivilization."
Toward the end of his administration, Harrison came un­
der pressure from Negroes concerning their condition in the 
South. T. Thomas Fortune, editor of the New York Age, called 
upon him to carry out the party's pledge, made during the cam­
paign of 1888, to help the Negro cause and to avoid President 
Hayes* policy of **conciliating, bowing, and scraping, and apol-
5-ogizing and supplicating the white man^of the South,” Harri­
son attempted to give Negroes what they were requesting and 
proceeded to appoint them to Postmasterships in Southern cities, 
initiating this action in 1892 with the appointment of Crum in 
Charleston.
Opposition stirred among the white citizens of Charleston, 
becoming so bitter that the President withdrew the nomination 
upon Crum's request. Crum acted from the conviction that with­
drawal of his name would relieve Harrison of embarrassment and 
avoid the bitterness that would rise in the community by the 
appointment of a colored man to the office of Postmaster.^
Two years later Crum was selected as the Republican can­
didate for the United States Semate, as an effort to combat the 
attempt by lily whites to eliminate the Negro from the poli-
Vincent P. DeSantis, Republicans Face the Southern Ques- 
tiont The New Departure Years, 1877-189? CBaltimore* Johns Hop­
kins Press, 1959), p. 222.
^Quoted in DeSabtis, p. 222.
^The New Yprk Times, November 28, 1902,
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tical scene in South Carolina. Crura’s candidacy, however, was 
little more than a symbolic gesture, for his opponent was Ben­
jamin Tillman, master of South Carolina's Democratic Party and
staunch defender of white supremacy. By a majority of ^ to 1,
7Tillman was elected by the legislature to the Senate.
When Theodore Roosevelt took office he found John G. Cap­
ers "already installed as the nominal head of the Republican
O
organization" in South Carolina, Capers, the son of an Epis­
copal Bishop, was originally a Democrat but left the party in 
1896 to support McKinley. He was rewarded with the appoint­
ment of District Attorney. He was later appointed by Hanna 
to the Republican National Committee, where he assumed the role 
of "Republican boss."^ In the election of 1900, he officially 
joined the Republican party, campaigning for McKinley and Roose­
velt. Although Capers was appointed by Hanna, Roosevelt accep­
ted him and "ruthlessly threw out all of the old republican 
politicians."^^
Roosevelt made it clear that he objected to any attempt 
to eliminate the Negro from participation in party affairs.
7Francis B. Sirakins, Pitehfork Ben Tillman* South Caro­
linian (Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Press, 19W ) , 
p. 2?2; Gatewood, pp. 306-307,
OTheodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1903, 
Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols., (Cam­
bridge* Harvard University Press, 1952), III, p. 681.
^Gatewood, p. 308.
^^Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, December 24, 1903, Letters, 
III, p. 681* See also John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt 
(Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1954? reprint ed.. New 
York* Antheneum, 296?), p. 45.
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Capers, who shifted his allegiance from Hanna to Roosevelt, 
publicly committed himself to a biracial party in South Caro­
lina. Despite Capers* position as “patronage referee,“ Roose­
velt continued to consult with others regarding appointments 
in South Carolina. Among these was Booker T, Washington, who 
suggested Crum for the Collector of Internal Revenue. Roose­
velt had already designated Louis Blalock, a white manufacturer 
and a strong proponent of the President's policies, to fill
the vacancy. He assured Washington that he would be happy to 
consider Crum for “any other position which became available.* 
Roosevelt's patronage program had to this time failed to 
serve its announced intention of giving hope to Negroes. The 
President turned to Washington for advice in appointing a col­
lector to the Port of Charleston, to succedd R.M. Wallace, who 
died in September, 1902. During a visit to the Charleston Ex­
position early in 1902 Roosevelt had discussed appointments 
with white politicians of both parties but neglected to con­
sult with Negro Republicans. They were convinced that the 
President's ears had been "poisoned against their interests. 
However, this accusation proved to be wrong for on the recom­
mendation of Washington and the approval of Capers, Roosevelt 
appointed Crum Sollector of the Port of Charleston.
Emmett J. Scott to Booker T. Washington, October 5» 
1901, in Emmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T. 
Washington* Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.t 
Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1916), pp. 53-5^»
l^Gatewood, p. 310.
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The announcement came early in November, 1902 and be­
gan a new era of harmony among South Carolina Republicans .
It was also the signal for a long struggle between Roosevelt 
and the South. Led by Southern white Democrats, the citizens 
of Charleston were determined to defeat Crum's nomination and
to persuade the President to abandon such a "reckless and ir-
13responsible course."
------ The opposition was initiated by Mayor James A. Smyth of
Charleston and James C. Hemphill, editor of the Charleston 
News and Courier. Both men were familiar with Roosevelt new 
Southern policy and expressed their concern over the matter. 
Smyth's main opposition to Crura was based on certain specific 
charges that tended to show his unfitness for the office. The 
mayor contended that the proposed postmaster appointment in 
1892 was the fulfillment of a promise made by Harrison for 
Crum's shifting his allegiance. Crum "proved recreant to his
i ilobligation." Spyth also asserted that opposition to Crum 
was expressed in Charleston for the simple fact that he was a 
colored man. "We have sworn never again to submit to the rule 
of the African," the mayor explained to Roosevelt, "and such 
an appointment as that of Dr. Crum to any office forces us to 
protest unanimously against this insult to the white blood,
l^Gatewood, p. 311,
^^The New York Times » November 28 , 1902,
^^Theodore Roosevelt to James Adger Smyth, November 26, 
1902, Letters. Ill, p. 384.
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Hemphill accused Roosevelt of taking advantage of the 
death of a native white citizen of South Carolina to name Crum 
as his successor, "not by and with, consent of the Senate «.. 
but by and with the advice of Booker Washington and the negro 
preachers and politicians of the country." He expressed con­
cern that Crura was a colored man and "that in itself ought to 
bar him from office." Hemphill contended that Negroes were 
not engaged in commercial pursuits in Charleston and would not 
come in contact with him, while ninety per cent of those who 
had business there were white.
Roosevelt answered Smyth and Hemphill with an "Open Let­
ter" that was written on November 26 and was released to the 
press for publication the following day. In reference to 
Smyth's accusation that Crum was "unfit for office," the Presi­
dent assured the mayor that he would give the charges made 
against Crum the "utmost consideration .,. and shall go over
them carefully before taking action." He had "absolutely no
17intention of appointing unfit men to office." '
It was to Hemphill's objection that Crum was a Negro that 
Roosevelt directed his attention. How influential Charleston­
ians "could have gained the idea" that he had said he would 
not appoint a "reputable and upright colored man to office
^^James C. Hemphill, "President,,the South and the Negro," 
Harper's Weekly, LIII (January 9, 1909), 10.
^^Roosevelt to James A. Smyth, November 26, 1902, Letters, 
III, p. 384; The New York Times, November 28, 1902,
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when objections were made solely on account of color," he con­
fessed, "was entirely beyond comprehension." Since his visit 
to Charleston, he averred, several Negroes had been appointed 
in the South.. However, "the great majority of appointments 
in every State have been white men." In South Carolina "to 
the four most important positions ... I have appointed three 
men and continued in office a fourth, all of them, white men - 
thr^  ̂ f^hem originally gold Democrats - two of them ,.. the 
sons of Confederate soldiers," Roosevelt affirmed that he 
could not consent to take the position that "the door of hope - 
the door of opportunity - ... be shdt upon any man, no matter 
how worthy, purely upon the grounds of race or color."
The speculation that the Crum appointment would promote 
"Negro Domination" did not enter the matter, according to the 
President. He believed that the issue raised was much broad­
er. It was a question of "whether it was to be declared that 
under no circumstances shall any man of color, no matter how 
upright and honest, no matter how good a citizen, no matter 
how fair in his dealings with all his fellows, be permitted 
to hold any office under our government." On this, the Presi- 
dentiidtated that he "certainly could not assume such an atti­
tude." He concludedÿ " ... it is a good thing from every stand­
point to let the colored man know that if he shows in marked 
degree the qualities of good citizenship ... then he will not
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l8be cut off from all hope of similar reward.*
When the letter was made public the Charleston News and 
Courier declared that Roosevelt “failed to understand the South.** 
“The President,“ the News maintained, “is not vicious; he sim­
ply is ignorant.“ William Jennings Bryan wrote in his Common­
er that if Roosevelt had “genuine courage#* he would appoint 
"some reputable negro" to a position in a Northern state, Bryan 
felt that the President was deliberately insulting the South.
It was “hardly probable,“ he concluded, “that Mr. Roosevelt 
would dare appoint a negro ... in any Republican community in 
a Northern state." In view of these attitudes from Charleston 
whites and Democratic political aspirants, Roosevelt was more 
determined than ever to support Crum for the position.
Opposition to the Crum appointment was not limited to the 
South. The moderate New York Times expressed its concern over 
the matter, calling it “unjustifiable" and “distasteful and 
offensive to ninety-nine-hundreths of the persons having busi­
ness to do at the Custom House.“ There was no advantage for 
the administration or the Government to force an act that em­
bittered an entire community against the President. “The color­
ed race, either individually or as a whole, had nothing to gain
^Roosevelt to Smyth, November 26, 1902, Letters, III, 
pp. 384-385; Roosevelt to Robert G. Rhett, November 10, 1902, 
Ibid., pp. 375-376; The New York Times, November 28, 1902,
^^Bryan quoted in Letters, III, p. 385».
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by obstinate persistance in a policy which intensifies race 
feeling and confirms the resolve of the whites of the South to 
resist by every means in their power the political advancement 
of the blacks." The Times believed that Roosevelt was using 
the power of appointment to "efface the distinction" between 
the white Southerners and a race which they universally regard­
ed as inferior. "In this attempt the Administration is dashing
20its head against a granite wall." '
Before sending Crum's name to the Senate for confirma­
tion, Roosevelt conferred with Washington and requested him 
"to probe every aspect of the case" in an effort to determine 
the validity of the charges made regarding Crum's unfitness for
office. Receiving the information he requested, Roosevelt con-
21eluded that the only real objection to Crum was his color.
The President submitted Crum's name to the Senate for 
confirmation on January 5* 1903 and it was referred to the 
Senate Committee on Commerce for action. Chaired by Senator 
William P. Frye of Maine, the Committee was composed of ten 
Republicans and six Democrats. There was no assurance that 
the nomination would be reported favorably since there was 
speculation that the two Republicansmembers from the West, 
Senators John P. Jones of Nevada and George C, Perkins of
^®The New York Times, November 29, 1902.
21 ^Theodore Roosevelt to William H. Brawley, December 3,
1902, Letters, III, p. 387; Gatewood, p. 313.
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California, were expected to vote against a favorable report 
to the full Senate. When the committee did vote it rejected 
Crum by an 8 to 7 vote, with New Hampshire Republican Senator 
Jacob Gallinger absent and Jones and Perkins shifting to the
poDemocrats, When informed of the results, Roosevelt became 
enraged over what he considered to be insincerity on the part 
of the Republican members of the committee.
Prior to the committee vote, the black community was 
divided over the issue. The Afro-American Council, the lead­
ing Negro organization of the country at that time, conferred 
with Republican Senators in behalf of Crum. Bishop Alexander 
Walters, the chairman of the Council, confessed that their 
fight for Crum’s nomination was not "made because of his color." 
He continued» "Dr,.Crum is a man of character, has every quali­
fication for the position, and ... no valid objection has been
23offered against the appointment."
On the other hand, some Negroes believed that the nomi­
nation should be withdrawn. An unnamed black delegation -"some 
of Dr. Crum’s friends" - called upon the President and request­
ed that he withdraw the nomination for "reasons not connected 
with Z~him__7 hut with what they considered as the good of the 
colored race." Roosevelt informed them that if Crum withdrew.
p p The New York Times, March 6, 1903 
^^Ibid., February 4, I903.
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he would "accede to his request" but he could not ask him to 
do it.
The President felt that in the Crum Case he "had a right 
to expect the Senate to act one way or the other on the appoint­
ment." He requested Pryfi "not to leave it unacted upon when
Pitthe Senate adjourns." In spite of Roosevelt's plea, the Sen­
ate refused to act on the nomination. It had seemed apparent 
that the people of Charleston were willing to wage an all-out 
campaign to defeat the nomination and it was having its affects 
on the Senate.
The fight against the confirmation on behalf of the citi­
zens of Charleston was taken up by Senators Benjamin Tillman 
and John L. McLaurin, Any efforts to give Negroes office "was 
bound to incur the animosity" of Tillman. Roosevelt's Northern
attitude toward the black man seemed especially designed to in-
2 <flame men of the Tillman type.
Late in January, 1903, the South Carolina Senate and House 
of Representatives passed a resolution protesting the nomina­
tion of Crum to the Charleston Collectorship. The appoint­
ment was stated as being "detrimental to the commercial inter­
ests of the principle port and the chief city" of the State of 
South Carolina. The Legislature declared that Roosevelt's ac-
2iiRoosevelt to William P. Frye, February 14, 1903, Letters, 
III, p. 425.
^^Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, p. 415.
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tion was “in disregard of the sentiment and wishes" of the citi­
zens of Charleston and called upon their Senators "to exercise 
their earnest efforts to prevent the confirmation of the nomi­
nation.
In Tillman*3 case the resolution was unnecessary, for 
he had already decided to do whatever was desired by his con­
stituents in the case. As for McLaurin, it was undeterminable 
whether he would take any action in the matter. The two Sen­
ators were in constant disagreement over previous issues and 
it was known that McLaurin*s relationship with the Administra-.
tion was very close. Roosevelt at one time intended to appoint
27him to a judicial position, but McLaurin declined.
The people of Charleston were given a chance to be heard 
at a Senate hearing before the Committee on Commerce on January 
22, 1903. The delegation for the people consisted of Senator 
Tillman, Mayor Smyth, James C. Hemphill, and A.C. Tobias, Pres­
ident of the Charleston Merchant's Exchange, Speaking in be­
half of Crum were ex-Senator P.B.S. Pinchback of Louisiana and 
Whitefield McKinlay, Booker Washington's close friend and strong­
est supporter in the national capital.
Tillman stated that the real objection to Crum was that 
he was a "nigger." Charleston people would not say he was not
^^The New York Times. January 19, 1903.
^^Roosevelt to Marcus Hanna, October I6 , 1901, Letters. 
Ill, p. 176; Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, November 9, 
1901, Ibid., p. 194; The New York Times. January 19, 1903.
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gentlemanly or capable. He was, in fact, an "educated nigger," 
and was no doubt honest. If he were a white man he would be 
alright but he was not, and that was all there was to it, Til­
lman argued that the people of Charleston had their ideas, and 
it was foolish to try to reform them by doing the things that 
were objectionable to them. He concluded* "Oil and water will 
not unite.
Mayor Smyth reaffirmed his objections based on the sim­
ple reason that colored people did not do any business before 
the Custom House and were not entitled to the office of Collec­
tor. In Crum's defense Pinchback and McKinlay spoke briefly, 
saying that he was one-eighth colored and seven-eighths white ;
that he was well-educated; and that there had never been any
29criticismaof his ability or integrity.
On March 4 the Senate refused to confirm the nomination
of Dr. Crum and on the following day Roosevelt sent his name
back to the Senate for consideration. "The more I have thought
it over," he expressed to Washington, "the more convinced I
have been that Crum must be appointed." If the Senate did not
30act, he would "appoint Crum as soon as it adjourned,"
p OThe New York Times, January 23, 1903. 
29Ibid.
^^Roosevelt to Washington, March 4, 1903, Letters, III, 
p. 438.
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Roosevelt called a special session of the Senate on 
March 5» The first communication presented was the nomina­
tion and request for the nomination of Crum to the Gollector- 
ship at Charleston. It was expected that Roosevelt would re­
nominate Crum, but no one had been prepared for its receipt 
so early during the special session. While Democrats in the 
Senate presented a solid front in opposition, many of the lead­
ing Republicans were reputedly against the nomination, taking 
the view that the President should not force a Negro upon a 
community that did not want him. As a result, the session ad­
journed without acting on the nomination, and Roosevelt was
forced to make the first of three successive recess appoint­
aiments of Crum as Collector, After making the first appoint­
ment, Roosevelt told Crum to "keep in close touch with Mr, Cap­
ers" and admonished him to "administer your office with pro­
bity and efficiency and with such tact and judgment that no
32cause of complaint can be found against you,""̂
The Senate once again refused to confirm the appointment, 
when it returned in session, and oface again Roosevelt renewed 
the appointment. On the third appointment Crum was to assume 
office. Upon notice of this action, Stephen E. Barnwell, an 
employee in the Custom House, immediately sent in his resigna-
^^Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, p. 4^; The New York 
Times. March 6, 1903.
^^Roosevelt to William D. Crum, March 26, 1903, Letters. 
Ill, p, 459.
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tion stating his objection to working under a Negro. Also Miss 
Martha Washington, of the family of the first President, re­
tired from her position as clerk.33
Roosevelt's theory of recess appointments was the center 
of attack for Senator Tillman. Always welcoming the opportunity 
to turn his arguments on the Negro question into a constitution­
al debate, Tillman challenged the President's theory of " con­
structive recess.** He declared that Crura's appointment was "a 
very slight, insignificant incident" compared with the "great 
constitutional question" involved in the application of the 
Senate's right to confirm Presidential appointments, Tillman 
demanded that the Senate take Roosevelt "by the throat" and
3if."stop dawdling around here neglecting its duty."^
The Treasury Department held up the personal account of 
Crum, refusing to pay him on the grounds that he could not re­
ceive compensation until his appointment had been confirmed by 
the Senate. Secretary Leslie Shaw held that nothing other than 
judicial determination could settle Crum's status and while hold­
ing office under a recess appointment he could not be paid,
Shaw sent a letter to the Senate asserting that only the judi­
ciary could determine the authority of Crum's position. Until
^^The New York Times, March 22, 1903.
3^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1106; Sim- 
kins. Pitchfork Ben Tillman, pp. 417-418.
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then the office was to be “held in abeyance" until confirma­
tion.^^
Upon receiving the letter from the Secretary» Tillman 
immediately introduced a resolution, asking for more specific 
information from Shaw, He stated Shay's letter was ambigious, 
and that it failed its object. He asserted that the Secretary 
had “with great adroitness, dodged the issue.“3^
Two months before the Republican Convention, Roosevelt 
wrote Senator Nelson Aldrich, Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Finance and one of the most influential Republicans, and in­
sisted upon action on the Crum case. He felt "not only that 
Crum was entitled to confirmation," but that "politically it 
would be a bad thing for the Senate to refuse to vote one way 
or the other upon his nomination." He told Aldrich that the
Republican party was “being taunted with insincerity and timid-
37ity in the matter."
Congress refused to confirm the nomination on December 6 , 
1903 and Crum was reappointed to the position and took the oath 
of office on January 9, 1904. It was more than evident that
3c^^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1302; The 
New York Times, January 29, 1904.
^^Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2d sess., p. 1105; The 
New York Times, January 30, 1904.
37Roosevelt to Nelson W. Aldrich, April 16, 1904, Letters, 
III, p. 774. ~
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the President was determined to get Crum into the Càllector- 
ship. Opposition increased along with Roosevelt's persis­
tence over the matter. The New York Times, for example, de­
clared: "The Crum Case affords a remarkable illustration of
Mr, Roosevelt's dogged determination to have his own way, even
38though people and Senators oppose him." The Parker Consti­
tution Club attacked the President, charging him with "a usur­
pation of powers of the Senate and with something more than a 
technical violation of the Constitution."39
Roosevelt's determination carried him to the decision of 
having the Senate meet again in special session. However, this 
was to no avail and his hopes dwindled when once again the Sen­
ate failed to make the confirmation. The President reappoint­
ed Crum for the fourth time on April 28, 1904 and received posi­
tive assurance that the Senate would take up the case immediate­
ly on reconvening and that it would be disposed of finally. 
Senator William B. Allison of Iowa, the Chairman of the gommittee 
on the order of business in the Senate, declared that the Crum 
Case "would be pressed to conclusion regardless of the other 
business.
3®The New York Times, April 28, 1904. 
39ibid,, October 2?, 1904,
40ibid., April 29, 1904.
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By December, 1904, Roosevelt was "at wits end" on what 
to do over his Southern policy in general, and the Crum appoint­
ment in pa r ticular.He  concluded that the entire blame had 
to rest with the South "for failure to meet ^his_7 effort half 
way." He confessed that it may have been better "not to have 
originally nominated Crum for the Charleston Collectorship" but 
that personally he felt he was right. Even if he was wrong,
"to say that the South's attitude is explained by this act_7 
is to say that the South is in a condition of violent chronic 
hysteria.
In December news leaked out of Washington that Senator 
Tillman had returned to South Carolina due to illness, thus 
giving up the fight. It was also reported that the Senate Com­
mittee would vote favorably on the issue. On January 5» 1905» 
the Committee authorized a favorable report on the nomination 
and on January 6 Crum was confirmed. On that same day, follow­
ing a debate of a dozen Senators, the Sënate confirmed the nomi­
nation of William D. Crum as Collector of the Port of Charleston.^
When Crum was confirmed, the editor of the Coloured-Ameri- 
can expressed the significance of the appointment to the black 
community* "The Negro had witnessed his greatest political
^^Roosevelt to James Ford Rhodes, December 15* 1904, Let­
ters. IV, p. 1072.
^^Roosevelt to Henry S. Pritchett, December 15» 1904, Ibid, 
IV, pp. IO7O-IO7I; Roosevelt to Owen Wister, April 2 7, 1906,
Ibid.. V, p. 462.
^^The New York Times. January 6, 7» 1905.
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triumph in twenty years. ...Under a general of less courage 
and honour than Roosevelt, history would read differently. It 
has been thoroughly established that the law recognizes no man 
by the colour of his skin ...."
Roosevelt's appointment of William Crum to the Collector­
ship of Charleston played a significant part of his Southern 
policy. This policy attempted to achieve certain goals* im­
prove and strengthen the Republican party in the South; secure 
his nomination in 1904; and recognize the merits of those blacks 
of property and good standing. Crum came to symbolize the new 
breed of Negro that Roosevelt wished to cultivate. His appoint­
ment was a part of his plan to undermine the Southern political 
machine which supported Hanna. In June, 1904, Roosevelt received 
the unanimous endorsement of the Republican Convention and severa 
months later, the greatest popular majority of any President un­
til that time.
The Crura appointment was a great political victory for the 
President. The New York Times summed up the entire affair when 
it stated* "The President's reasons for appointing Dr. Crum 
seemed to him worthy enough and important enough to justify 
overriding the objections of the Senate, Mr. Roosevelt is so 
accustomed to winning his battles that he may make a small
^he Coloured Americ^ quoted in John Hope Franklin, 
From Slavery to freedom* A  History of American Negroes (New 
York* Random House, 194?), p. 43^.
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account of the Crum victory. The matter is not a trivial one, 
however.
William Crum served his position as Collector of the Port 
of Charleston until March, 1909 when William Howard Taft secured 
his resignation. Both Roosevelt and Taft concluded that reap­
pointing Crum would revive the struggle that had previously 
occurred. When Roosevelt learned of Crum’s willingness to sur- 
render his post he called it "first-rate."
^^The New York Times » December 12, 1904.
^^Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, February 26, 1909» 
Letters, VI, p. 1538.
CHAPTER V 
RECONCILING THE SOUTH
Theodore Roosevelt's primary political concern during 
his first administration was to reform the Republican party 
in the South, in order to secure his nomination in 1904, In 
the process, he would secure enough delegates and destroy the 
old Hanna-dominated Republican political machines. This major 
effort culminated in 1904 with the President's renomination 
at the Republican National Convention and his victory in the 
presidential contest.
As his second term began, Roosevelt realized that in the 
process of winning support, he had alienated white Southerners 
with his efforts to recognize prominent Negroes in the South. 
He was now determined to bind the sectional wounds that he had 
helped inflict and direct his attentions toward reconciliation 
between the North and the South. Anti-Negro sentiment was 
flourishing and the President responded by refusing to speak 
out against disfranchisement, "Jim Crowism" and mob violence. 
In 1905 he made an extensive tour of the South with the sole 
purpose of winning the affections of the white population.
He was conspicuously silent following the Atlanta race riots 
in 1906 and in the same year, summarily discharged 167 black 
soldiers from the United States Army for alleged participation
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in the Brownsville affair. During the course of his second 
administration, Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated that sectional 
reconciliation was more important than racial reconciliation.
On February 13» 1905 the President addressed the New 
York Republican Club in commemoration of Abraham Lincoln. In 
his speech, Roosevelt devoted his attention to the race prob­
lem that existed and the principles that should be applied in 
the solution to it. This was his first public statement on 
the subject since his election. He had failed to mention any­
thing during his Inaugural Address of 1905 on disfranchise­
ment in the South or whether he would support the movement to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by calling for a reduction 
of Southern representation in the House of Representatives.^ 
This omission signaled the beginning of his efforts to recon­
cile the South with the rest of the nation. However, in his 
Lincoln Day Speech, the President outlined the race problem 
as that **of so dealing with the man of one color as to secure
him the rights that no one would grudge him if he were of
2another color,*
There was no immediate solution to the problem, but 
Roosevelt felt that an ultimate solution could be reached only
Theodore Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address of 1905," The 
Works of Theodore Roosevelt, 20 Vols. Hermann Hagedom, ed. 
(New York* Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925)» XV, pp. 267-269.
2Roosevelt, "Address at the Lincoln Dinner of the Repub­
lican Club of the City of New York, February 13, 1905," Works. 
XVI, pp. 343-350.
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by an effort "to secure to each man, whatever his color* equal­
ity of opportunity, equality of treatment before the law," 
Roosevelt charged that the vices of "laziness, shiftlessness 
and criminality" among Negroes were more of a hindrance to 
their race than "all acts of oppression put together." He 
admonished blacks to condemn crime when committed by Negroes, 
and to cooperate with local authorites to bring guilty members 
of their race to swift justice. Failure to do this, the Presi* 
dent continued, would make Negroes the "worst enemy of their 
own people as well as the enemy of all people." Roosevelt 
contended that the social question "must ... be left to the 
people of each community to settle for themselves, as in such 
a matter no one community, and indeed no one individual, can 
dictate to any other." "There must be no confusing of civil 
privileges with social intercourse." The President conceded 
that blacks should have an equal opportunity and the "suffrage 
based on character and intelligence for black and white alike." 
He then concluded his address with a special appeal to the South;
I believe in the Southerner as I believe in the 
Northerner. I claim the right to feel pride in his great 
qualities and in his great deeds exactly as I feel pride 
in the great qualities and deeds of every other American,
For weal or for woe we are knit together; and we shall go 
up or down together; and I believe that we shall go up and 
not down, that we shall go forward instead of halting and 
and falling back, because I have an abiding faith in the 
generosity, the courage, the resolution, and the common 
sense of all my countrymen,^
^Roosevelt, "Address at the Lincoln Dinner," Works, XVI, 
pp. 3^3-350; The New York Times, February 14, 1905; "The Presi­
dent and the Negro," Outlook,£XXIX (February 18, 1905)» 4l6-417,
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Several months following his Linoln Day Address, Roose­
velt made preparations for his Southern tour with the purpose 
of winning the South for the Republican administration and 
bringing about a better understanding between himself and the 
Southern white people. This indeed was to be a difficult task. 
To white Southerners, Roosevelt had committed unpardonable sins 
during his first administration, and many considered the Presi­
dent the "blackest* of black Republicans, He had insulted them 
on three occasions to win approval from the Northern black com­
munity* the Crum appointment, the closing of the Indianola Post 
Office, and more seriously, inviting Booker T. Washington to 
dinner and supposedly ^proclaiming to the world his belief in 
social equality.*^
Roosevelt believed that reconciliation toward the South 
was perhaps one answer to the Negro problem. In the fall of 
1906 he wrote Harvard President Charles W. Eliot* "I have been 
at my wits* end in knowing how to deal with this negro problem," 
He believed the situation was bad wherever there were "large 
bodies of negroes" North or South. "Things are hideous in the 
South," He added* "I am certain that what I have done has been 
all right, yet often the results have been most unsatisfactory; 
and while I have in different States tried different experiments, 
none of them have come out so I am really pleased," Roosevelt’s
^"The President and the South," Nation, LXXXI (November 2,
1905), 352.
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next ”experiment" was to travel to the South and make a direct 
appeal to white Southerners,^
The Southern press voiced mixed reaction when it was learn­
ed that the President was to tour the South, The Atlanta Jour­
nal stated that the only influence at work in bringing the Presi­
dent to the South was the existence of "a few Republican office­
holders," Fearing that Roosevelt would not be received cordial­
ly by the Southern people and not extended the courtesy that 
"the great office of President of the United States .,. should 
receive," the Journal expressed hope that the visit would be 
cancelled or delayed, "We are impressed with the belief that 
this man ,,, has purposely derided and scorned the best senti­
ment and the best traditions of all southern people .., and we 
cannot think there will be an overwhelming desire on the part 
of ^SouthemersJ7 to receive him around the hospitable board 
of southern homes," The Houston Chronicle aspired that the 
President "will do nothing to give offense to a Southern com­
munity any more than he would to a Northern community, ,., that 
the sentiments and even what he considers the prejudices and 
the hereditary antipathies of Southern people will be respect­
ed and that .,, he will regard the preferences of Southern com­
munities and not do anything to cause irritation or arouse sec­
tional bitterness," The Charlotte Observer declared, with
^Theodore Roosevelt to Charles W. Eliot, September 28, 
1906, quoted in Horace S. and Marion G. Merrill, The Republican 
Command, 1897-1913 (Lexington* University of Kentucky Press,
1971), p. 236.
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somewhat less intensity, that "despite the fear which many 
Southerners have that the President may continue to stir up 
the race problem by appointing negroes to office, there is no 
perceptible bitterness toward him. On the contrary, he is 
generally regarded as an honest and straight-forward man who 
intends to do right, and whose wrongful acts are all mistakes,
In September, 1905» T. Thomas Fortune, editor of the 
New York Age, expressed the sentiment of many Negroes against 
the President's proposed Southern tour. Fortune believed that 
Roosevelt would lose nothing if he should cut out all of the 
trips "except the visit to Tuskegee Institue where he would 
be among true friends and where nothing would likely occur in 
words or acts to prejudice him against Afro-Americans," If 
the President proceeded with his planned visit throughout the 
South, Fortune asked that he seize the opportunity to denounce 
lynching, discrimination against blacks, and condemn the South­
ern disfranchisement constitutions which were so detrimental 
to black political participation,^
In October, Roosevelt left for his Southern tour. The 
excursion carried him through eight Southern States - Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Arkan­
sas and Louisiana, with special stops at Tuskegee and the Florida
The Atlanta Journal, Houston Chronicle, and Charlotte 
Observer quoted in "Will Southerners Welcome Mr, Roosevelt?," 
Current Literature, XXXVIII (January, 1905), l4-l6.
^The New York Age, September 28, 1905.
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Baptist Academy, In speech after speech, Roosevelt paid homage 
to Lee and the Confederacy and praised the Southern people for 
loyalty to their traditions. He sent roses to Stonewall Jack­
son's widow and had himself photographed with Negro servants 
of the Bulloch family in Georgia. While he spoke on many nation­
al issues, the President failed to mention anything concerning 
Southern disfranchisement or the increasing Jim Crow legisla-
ption which was rapidly spreading throughout the South.
Roosevelt had accepted an invitation to speak at the 
Florida Baptist Academy, a small industrial institution simi­
lar to Tuskegee. This caused the white citizens of Jackson­
ville to make arrangements to keep the President from address­
ing Negroes of the city, J. Douglas Wetmore, a prominent law­
yer of the city and one of the two black members of the city 
council, wrote to the President's secretary, William Loeb, 
and informed him of the situation stating that the Reception 
Committee made no provisions for blacks in their general plans 
of entertainment for the President. When Loeb received the 
complaint, he wired the Committee and requested some type of 
recognition for blacks. The Committee responded that to change 
their original plan would cause "embarrassment" among the white
^enry P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography (New 
York* Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1932), p. 371» The New York Age. 
October 26, 1905; "The President's Southern Tour," North Ameri­
can Review, GLXXXI (November, 1905)» 796-800; C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge* Louisiana 
state University"%ess, 1951)» pp. 465-466.
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citizens of the community. Nevertheless, arrangements were 
made for Roosevelt to address the academy following his sched­
uled speech to the white population of Jacksonville. Because 
he was running on a tight schedule, however, the President 
was only able to be present at the Academy for ten minutes.9
Roosevelt delivered a speech to the students and faculty 
of Tuskegee Institute on October 24, 1905. While he issued 
moral injunctions to Negroes and praised Southern civilization 
throughout his tour, it was at Tuskegee where the President 
devoted considerable discussion to the question of the Negro's 
place in Southern society, and to what they must do to eventual­
ly enter into the possession of those freedoms that most Ameri­
cans accepted as a matter of course.
Roosevelt urged both the white and the black population 
to encourage the Negro to make himself a citizen of the "high­
est type of usefulness." He asserted the belief that the South 
"offered opportunities for blacks in economic development that 
were not offered elsewhere in America." Because of the scar­
city of labor, "it is the part of wisdom for all who wish the 
prosperity of the South to help the negro to become ,.. useful 
to himself, and therefore to the community in which he lives." 
The President reminded his audience that economic development 
was the major hope of Negroes because "the professional and
^August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915» Racial 
Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington (Ann Arbor» Uni- 
versity of Michigan Press, 1963)» p. 301; The New York Tiroes, 
October 16, 1905; The Cleveland Gazette, October 21, 1905; The 
New York Age, November 2, 1905.
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mercantile avenues to success are overcrowded.” He emphasized 
the importance of an industrial education, coupled with train­
ing in agriculture and household duties. It was primarily in 
these three areas where "the Negro can at present do the most 
for himself and his white neighbor." Roosevelt asserted that 
Negro education was "in the interest and for the protection 
of the white man" for "ignorance is the costliest crop that 
can be raised in any part of this Union." "It is not only the 
duty of the white man," explained the President, "but ... /~in_7 
his interest, to see that the negro is protected in property, 
in life, and in all his legal rights."
Roosevelt expressed his concern over lynching in the 
United States. "Lawlessness ... is not confined to any one 
section," he stated, "lynching is not confined to any one sec­
tion." He gave praise to the "countless thousands of high- 
minded private citizens" who have aroused public opinion against 
lawlessness and especially against lynching. Directing himself 
to the educated black community, he declared that "You are in 
honor bound to join hands in favor of law and order and to war 
against all crime, and especially against all crime by men of 
your own race; for the heaviest wrong done by the criminal is 
the wrong to his own race." He called on the men and women 
educated at Tuskegee to lead their fellow citizens toward "sober, 
industrious, lawabiding lives." "The colored people have many 
difficulties to pass through, but these difficulties will be 
surmounted if only the policy of reason and common sense is
98
pursued."
Roosevelt emphasized the importance of moral and indus­
trial education for the progress of the black community. "The 
race cannot expect to get everything at once; it must learn to 
wait and bide its time; to prove itself worthy by showing its 
possession of perseverance, of thrift, of self-control." Speak­
ing to both races, he concluded*
The hope of advancement of the colored man in the South 
lies in his steady, common-sense effort to improve his 
moral and material condition, and to work in harmony with 
the white man in upbuilding the Commonwealth. The future 
of the South now depends upon the people of both races 
living up to the spirit and letter of the laws of their 
several States and working out the destinies of both 
races, not as races, but as law-abiding American citizens.^
The President's Southern tour accomplished its primary 
objective in bringing about a better understanding between 
himself and white Southerners and served to increase sectional 
reconciliation. Southern editors, such as Clark Howell of the 
Atlanta Constitution and Henry Watterson of the Louisville 
Courier-Joumal» expressed approval of Roosevelt's direct 
appeal to the South. Watterson completely reversed himself; 
in 1902 he had called the President "infinitely a worse enemy 
of the white men and women of the south than any of the radi-
Roosevelt, Works, XVI, pp. 351-355» William H. Harbaugh, 
ed., The Writings of Theodore Roosevelt (Indianapolis* Bobbs- 
Merill do., ïnc., 1^6 7), p p . 199-204; The New York Times, Octo­
ber 2 5, 1905; "The President and the South," Nation, LXXXI 
(November 2, 1905)t 352.
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cal leaders of the past."^^ William Garrott Brown called the
President’s tour a "bolder and more direct challenge to the
Americanism, the sense of nationality, of the Southern people
than any ... earlier presidential visitations," "If there has
been any conversion on /~the_7 subject of race_/, " concluded
Brown, "it is rather the President than the South that has
12seen a new light."
To emphasize the spirit of reconciliation, Roosevelt pur­
posely avoided reference to any subject that might irritate 
Southern whites. He passed through Georgia during the bitter­
ly contested disfranchisement campaign, but he never spoke about 
the movement in his public addresses. He made one reference 
against mob violence in Little Rock, Arkansas, but his remarks 
were more of a reaction to the impropriety of the statements 
of Governor Jefferson Davis. The rebuke to Davis came when 
the Governor, following an introduction to the President, "ven­
tured to say a good word for the fiendish institution." Davis 
stated that lynching was caused by the rape of white women by 
black men and intimated that the "only good Negro was a dead 
Negro." Roosevelt turned to the Governor and declared that the 
effect of "one heinous crime by another heinous crime was to re­
duce the man doing it to the bestial level of the man who com-
^^Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 465»
William Garrott Brown, "President Roosevelt and the 
South," Independent, LIX (November 9» 1905)» 1086-1089.
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mitted the bestial crime." He informed Davis that "three
fourths of the lynchings were not for rape at all but was for
other crimes," and reminded him that, as a representative of
the law, he owed it to "humanity to free the United States
13from the menace and reproach of lynch law."
The Negro reaction to the President's Southern tour was 
one of disillusionment. J. Max Barber, editor of the Voice of 
the Negro, conducted a canvass of influential Negroes and twen­
ty five black newspapers to ascertain their opinion on Roose­
velt's trip. Teh per cent voiced approval, but the remainder 
were highly critical of the President's activities in the South. 
W. E. B. DuBois condemned Roosevelt's silence on disfranchise­
ment: "... if men like Theodore Roosevelt dared not speak the 
truth, who shall?" Booker T. Washington refused to reply to 
Barber's survey, but he did approve of the President's conduct. 
After all, was not the President reiterating the philosophy of 
self-help?^^ The New York Age charged Roosevelt with the 
"grave sin of omission" and believed that "no good would come 
of it to the black South.
The theme of reconciliation was further reflected in 
Roosevelt's appointment policy. Following his inauguration
^^The New York Age, November 2, 1905.
^^Voice of the Negro, December, 1905 quoted in Woodward, 
p. 466.
^^The New York Age, November 2, 1905.
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in 1905» he initiated a general appointment policy for the Fed­
eral Government. There was now to be a "uniform policy of re­
taining the incumbents in office during satisfactory service. ** 
The policy would hold "irrespective of the length of service 
of the incumbent and would apply to all branches of the federal 
government." Nine months later, Roosevelt removed most of the 
Southern blacks appointed by McKinley through the application 
of a "two-term tradition," According to this doctrine, those 
officeholders who had served for more than eight years would 
not be reappointed.^^
The President received strong criticism from the Negro 
press for his failure to speak out against lynching on his 
Southern tour, Roosevelt had purposely remained silent on the 
subject for fear of alienating the people to whom he was appeal­
ing for support. The problem did exist, however, and he knew 
its seriousness and was aware thajs silence would not cure law­
lessness, One event seemed to accelerate the dire need for 
action on the subject and cause the President to face the prob­
lem* the Atlanta Riots of 1906.
Violence against Atlanta Negroes erupted on September 22, 
1906 and lasted for three days. Three major factors caused the 
racial disturbance on that evening. Hoke Smith and Clark Howell 
had just finished a hard campaign for Governor, with both stand­
ing on firm ground against Negro suffrage. Two Atlanta news-
l&The New York Times, March 11, 1905»
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papers, the News and the Georgian, had contributed to the racist
campaign via "yellow journalism" in their stories concerning
race relations in the city. And there existed a deep jealousy
among the white citizens of Atlanta toward the well-educated
and prosperous Negroes who had established themselves as promi-
17nent citizens within the community. '
On Saturday September 22, the News and Georgian reported 
that five white women had been assaulted by Negroes during the 
past week and that one of the assaults had occurred just prior 
to the release of the Saturday evening editions. The News ran 
five such editions with large type proclaiming "THIRD ASSAULT" 
and "FOURTH ASSAULT." Competition between the News and Georgian 
for circulation was keen; yellow journalism dramatized each in­
cident, and the result was an increase of racial tensions in 
Atlanta. Following the latest edition of both papers on that 
Saturday evening, white mobs formed to patrol the streets and 
began dragging Negroes off streetcars to beat and kill them.
The police attempted to control the rage, but they were too 
late. Negroes raced into the Decatur Street slums seeking pro­
tection and others fled to the post office, where at least one
^The most detailed account of the Atlanta Riot is Charles 
Crowe, "Racial Massacre in Atlanta, September 22, 1906," Journal 
of Negro History, LIV (April, 1969), 150-173» For contemporary 
accounts see **The Atlanta Massacre," Independent, DCI (October 4,
1906), 799-800; "Pacts About the Atlanta Murders," World's Work, 
XIII (November, 1906), 8147-8148; "The Atlanta Riot, A Southern 
White Point of View," Outlook. LXXXIV (November 3» 1906), 557; 
Booker T. Washington, ^Ÿhe Golden Rule in Atlanta," Outlook, 
LXXXIV (December 15. 1906), 913-916.
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black man died on the steps before he could reach the door. 
Another victim fell from blows delivered by the mob under a 
monument of Henry Grady. At two-thirty in the morning the 
Governor called out the militia. For three more days sporadic: 
violence continued. Negroes mounted fitful counterattacks with 
little effect. By the end of the riot at least twelve blacks 
were dead and over seventy wounded.
The black community was enraged by the mob attacks. The 
Cleveland Gazette and the Washington Bee called for a national 
investigation into the disturbances. Harry Smith of the Gazette 
contended that Roosevelt should be more concerned about the con­
viction and punishment of the "guilty Georgia barbarians" than 
he was about American Jews* protest to the Russian Czar as a
result of the Kishenef Massacre, since blacks were United States
1 Acitizens and were "butchered on American soil."
Booker T. Washington was in New York when the Atlanta
riots broke out. Through the New York Age, the Negro leader
gave Atlanta’s Negroes advice on how the affair should be handled,
urging the "best white people and colored people" to unite in
their efforts to stop the disorder. He cautioned blacks to
exercise self-control and not to make the fatal mistake of
attempting to retaliate but to "rely upon the efforts of proper
19authorities to bring order out of confusion." Washington
^®The Cleveland Gazette, September 29, 1906. 
19The New York Age, September 27, 1906.
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travelled to Atlanta and •’gathered together his frightened peo­
ple amid the smoking ruins of their homes, soothed, calmed, and 
20cheered them.” He surveyed the damage done by the riots and 
later published an optimistic account in Outlook prophesying 
advancements and understanding between the races as a result 
of the riot.^^
Roosevelt failed to act on the Atlanta riot, to the dis­
may of the black community. He viewed the disturbance as a 
civil matter, not warranting federal intervention. A group of 
newspaper editors in Atlanta and former Governor Andrew J. Mon- 
tegue of Virginia approached the President and requested that 
a commission be appointed to investigate and make recommenda­
tions on the Southern Negro problem. The proposal was insti­
tuted by Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
These Southerners urged Rossevelt to announce in his December 
Annual Message of 1906 his intentions in appointing such a com­
mission. The President considered the proposal seriously but 
decided against mentioning it in his message. He explained 
his reasoning to Howell: ”I am very much afraid that a certain 
extreme element here in the North would misunderstand that rec­
ommendation and hail it as having what would be in reality a 
sinister party purpose; and I am almost equally afraid that an
onEmmett J. Scott and Lyman Beecher Stowe, Booker T. Wash­
ington: Builder of a Civilization (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
Page, and Co., I916T» p. 26.
21Booker T. Washington, "The Golden Rule in Atlanta," Out­
look. LXXXIV (December 15, 1906), 913-916.
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exactly opposite element in the South, but an element no less
radical and no less prejudiced, would make the same mistake."
Roosevelt then suggested that a "first-class southern Senator
or Congressman" introduce the bill and he would follow by
"heartedly backing it up," As a result the bill was never
mentioned by Roosevelt in his message, nor was it proposed by
22any member of Congress,
In his Annual Message to Congress in 1906, Roosevelt did 
refer to the Negro lynching problem. He stated that "the great­
est existing cause of lynching is the participation, especial­
ly by black men, /~in_/ the hideous crime of rape - the most 
abominable in all the category of crimes, even worse than mur­
der." In attributing a greater "perpetration" of rape to Negroes 
than to white men, Roosevelt presumably did not consider it rape 
for a white man to force his intentions on a helpless Negro 
woman, nor did he take into consideration how easy it was for 
a black man who accidehtly touched a white woman to be accused 
of rape. He did recognize that "when mobs begin to lynch for 
rape they speedily extend the sphere of their operation and 
lynch for many other kinds of crimes," He asserted that "two- 
thirds of the lynchings are not for rape at all" and that "a 
considerable proportion of the individuals lynched are innocent 
of all crime," In the President's judgment, "the crime of rape 
should always be punished with death, as in the case with murder,"
22Theodore Roosevelt to Clark Howell, November 5» 1906, 
Elting E. Morison, ed,. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 Vols, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), V , pp, 4#7-488.
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and "assault with the intent to rape should be made a capital 
crime, at least in the discretion of the court." But he em­
phasized the necessity of "justice under the law," Roosevelt 
continued: "There is no question of 'social equality' or 'negro 
domination* involved; only the question of relentlessly punish­
ing bad men." Every colored man should realize that the worst 
enemy of his race is the negro criminal, and above all the 
negro criminal who commits the dreadful crime of rape." He 
urged that "respectable colored people must leam not to harbor 
criminals.
Roosevelt linked the problem of crime with the need for 
more education for Negroes, He felt that education would les­
sen the possibility of crime and believed "the best type of ed­
ucation for the colored man, as a whole" was that given at such 
schools as "Hampton and Tuskegee," where "young men and young 
women are trained industrially as well as in the ordinary public 
school branches." He added that "hardly any of them become
criminals," especially of "the form of that brutal violence
24which invites lynch-law."
In his address to Congress, Roosevelt confronted the issue 
of lynching, as requested by the black community, but what he 
said did not concur with their sentiments on the matter. Be-
^^Roosevelt, Works, XV, pp. 351 ■*354; Harbaugh, ed.. The 
Writings of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 204-208.
2LRoosevelt, Works, XV, pp. 354-355*
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lieving that reconciliation toward the South was of the utmost 
importance, he sided with the arguments of white Southerners 
and placed the responsibility on the black community. Further­
more, he expressed concern over the sheltering of black crimi­
nals by members of their own race, without taking issue with 
white Southerners who sheltered their criminals, especially 
following the execution of lynch-law. Prior to his address to 
Congress, Roosevelt expressed this sentiment* **I speak of the 
grave and evil fact that the negroes too often band together 
to shelter their own criminals /land this_y action had an un­
doubted effect in helping to precipitate the hideous Atlanta
race riots. I condemn such attitude strongly for I feel that
25it is fraught with the gravest danger to both races."
Roosevelt's direct appeal to white Southern sentiment 
during his second administration was in the effort of "winning 
the South." But while he moved closer to the South, he moved 
away from the black community. His lack of response to lynch­
ing, disfranchisement, and the Atlanta riots only proved to 
Negroes that sectional reconciliation was more important to 
the President than racial reconciliation. When Roosevelt sum­
marily dismissed l6? black troops in Brownsville, Texas, for 
alleged participation in a raid on that town, the black com­
munity fully realized that the man in the White House was no
^^Roosevelt to Silas McBee, November 27, 1906, Letters, 
V, p. 509.
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longer their friend. Black dissatisfaction with the President's 
decision reached its zenith, and for the first time a disaffec­
tion from the Republican ranks appeared as a serious consequence 
of his appeal to the white South.
CHAPTER VI 
THE BROWNSVILLE AFFAIR
When Theodore Roosevelt returned from his "Southern tour" 
he had gained the admiration and support of the South. With 
his silence following the Atlanta Riots of 1906 and his accep­
tance of the Southern argument on lynching, announced in his 
annual message to Congress in the same year, it was apparent 
that the President had formulated a new policy toward the South, 
This policy was confirmed by an act that further alienated the 
black community. In October, 1906, Roosevelt summarily dis­
missed members of the Twenty-fifth Infantry Regiment of the 
United States Army, because of alleged participation in the 
"Brownsville Affair .B eca use  these particular soldiers were 
Negroes, all hope and confidence that the black community had 
once held in Roosevelt was shattered.
The details of the Brownsville Affair can be found in 
Report on Brownsville Affray, U.S. Senate, 59th Cong., 2d sess.. 
Doc. 1537 pt. 1, Vol. XI, ser. no. 50?8; Joseph B. Foraker,
Notes of A Busy Life, 2 Vols. (Cincinnati: Stewart and Kidd Co., 
1917), II, pp. 231-327; Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair: 
National Crisis and Black Reaction (Port Washington, N.Y.: Ken- 
nikat Press, Inc., 1971); Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 
pp. 458-464; Emma Lou Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and 
the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV 
(December, 1957)» 469-493: James A. Tinsley, "Roosevelt, For­aker, and the Brownsville Affray," Journal of Negro History,
XLI (January, 1956), 43-65; John D. Weaver, The Brownsville 
Raid: The Story of America's Black Dreyfus Affair (New York:
W.W. Norton, 197^7.
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Around midnight on August 13» 1906, a number of men, 
estimated to be between ten and twenty, ran through the main 
street of Brownsville, Texas, shooting at random. The "raid* 
lasted approximately ten minutes. One man was killed and two 
more were injured.
Two weeks prior to the raid, companies B, C, and D of 
the First Battalion of the United States Twenty-fifth Infantry 
arrived at Port Brown, located just outside of Brownsville.
The Twenty-fifth Infantry, composed of l6? black troops under 
the command of Major Charles W. Penrose, had been stationed 
at Port Niobrara, Nebraska, for more than two years. The 
soldiers were originally ordered to travel to Austin, Texas, 
but the order was rescinded by the War Department at the re­
quest of the white officers of the Twenty-fifth. They feared 
that racial tension in Texas would flourish with the presence 
of black troops. When news arrived in Brownsville that the 
Twenty-fifth was to replace the white troops stationed at 
Port Brown, complaining citizens immediately wired Washington 
requesting that the orders be changed. Secretary of War Wil­
liam Howard Taft replied that racial tension existed through­
out the country and claimed that the black troops were "quite 
as well disciplined and behaved as the average of other troops." 
Refusing to change the orders, the War Department sent the 
Twenty-fifth Infantry to Brownsville. It arrived on July 28,
2"Report on Brownsville Affray," Senate Documents, 59 Cong, 
2d sess., no. 155» P. l6lO (hereafter cited as "Report on Browns­
ville Affray")I Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 14.
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Relations between the white citizens of Brownsville and 
the Negro troops had already deteriorated prior to the raid.
In at least two incidents Negroes were pushed or struck down 
by whites because of "disrespectful behavior." On the day of 
the raid, a complaint issued to city and military officials 
stated that a Negro soldier had attempted to rape a white 
woman in the town.
Circumstantial evidence linked the soldiers to the raid. 
It was claimed that because of the harassment that the troops 
were receiving, the attack was made as a revenge against the 
white citizens of Brownsville. Several citizens alleged that 
they recognized, by sight or by voice, the raiders to be Negro 
soldiers. The area attacked was adjacent to the enlisted men's 
barracks and was separated only by a low wall. Empty shells 
were discovered along the route of the attack and were immedi­
ately assumed to have been fired by the new Springfield rifles
3that the troops possessed.
The white officers of the Battalion initially assumed 
that the troops were innocent and that the raid was a local 
matter. On the day of the attack. Mayor Fred J. Combe called 
upon Major Penrose and advised him to keep his troops confined 
to the Port because of the rape allegation. When the raid 
occurred, Penrose believed it was an attack against the Fort 
and called for defensive positions. After several soldiers
^"Report on Brownsville Affray," p. 446; Tinsley, "Roose­
velt, Foraker, suid the Brownsville Affray," p. 44.
112
were ordered to town to investigate the occurrence, and return­
ed with Mayor Combe, the officers realized that the troops were 
being accused. They refused to believe the accusation until 
Combe returned the following morning with several exploded 
shells, cartridges and clips, the type used by the men in the 
battalion. With this evidence, the officers concluded that 
some of their men must have been involved in the shootout.
The day after the raid, the Mayor appointed a committee 
of four to select a Citizens Committee of fifteen townspeople 
to investigate the raid. When the Citizens Committee began 
its deliberation, it assumed the black troops were guilty of 
the shooting. It was the committee's job to determine which 
of the soldiers were involved. Twenty-two witnesses, all 
citizens of Brownsville, appeared before the committee.
Eight identified the raiders as black soldiers. Five of the 
eight asserted that they actually saw and recognized blacks.
The remaining three testified that they recognized the black
ksoldiers by their voices.
On August 15 the committee telegraphed President Roose­
velt their conclusions and the President responded immediately 
by ordering Major August P. Blocksom, Assistant Inspector- 
General of the Southwestern Division, to Brownsville to take 
charge of the investigation. Blocksom recommended that the
18-19.
^"Report on Brownsville Affray," pp. 445-446; Lane, pp,
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troops be removed from Port Brown because of the tension that 
existed in the town. By August 25 the battalion was on its 
way to Port Reno, Oklahoma Territory, where Blocksom completed 
his inquiry. He filed his report on August 29 and charged an 
unidentified number of the battalion with the actual guilt of 
the raid and the remainder with banding together in a "con­
spiracy of silence" to shield the guilty. Blocksom asserted 
that the troops wished to gain revenge for the harassment com­
mitted against them by the white citizens of Brownsville. He 
concluded his report by recommending that the entire battalion 
be discharged from the Army if the "conspiracy of silence" was 
not broken.^
Roosevelt received Blocksom's report and gave it his 
approval. On October 4 he ordered General Ernest A. Garlington, 
the South Carolina Inspector-General, to Port Reno, specifying 
that the troops be informed that unless those who had knowledge 
of the raid and its participants came forward, every member of 
companies B, 0 and D would be discharged without honor. On 
October 22 Garlington submitted his report:
After due opportunity and notice, the enlisted men 
of the Twenty-fifth Infantry have failed to tell all that 
is reasonable to believe that they know concerning the 
shooting. If they had done so, if they had been willing 
to relate all of the circumstances - instances preliminary
^For the complete report of Major Blocksom see "Report 
on Brownsville Affray," pp. 425-450.
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to the trouble - it is extremely probable that a clue suf­
ficiently definite to lead to results would have been dis­
closed. They appeared to stand together in a determination 
to resist the detection of the guilty;^therefore they should 
stand together when the penalty falls.®
By November 5 Roosevelt had read Garlington*s report, 
agreed with its conclusions, and ordered Secretary Taft to carry 
out the recommendation. Execution of the order began November 
1 6, and ten days later the last member of the battalion was 
discharged without honor from the United States Army.
The dismissal of the three companies of the Twenty-fifth 
Infantry was a crucial blow to the black community in general 
and to the black soldiers in particular. Roosevelt insisted 
upon punishing the innocent to condemn the existence of a "con­
spiracy of silence." With the dismissal, the President removed 
the most distinguished black soldiers in the United States 
Army. Members of the Twenty-fifth had service ranging from 
six to twenty years. One soldier in particular. Sergeant Mingo 
Sanders of Company B, personified the harm Roosevelt had in­
flicted with his order. Sanders had served in the Twenty- 
fifth continuously for twenty-six years. Because of his over­
seas duty time, less than eighteen months after his dismissal 
he would have been entitled to retire on three-quarters pay 
with all of the rights and allowances provided by law for men 
who served for more than thirty years. Under such circumstances.
Ibid., pp. 445-448; "Committee Report of Military Inves­
tigation; Just Act; Discharging Negro Troops," Outlook, LXXXIV 
(December 11, 1906), 810-812.
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it was doubtful whether Sanders would have sacrificed his en­
listment to participate in the Brownsville shoot up, yet he was 
among the l6? men dismissed by the President's order.
Rodsevelt realized that there would be objections to 
his order from black Americans, but he was unprepared for the 
storm of protest that erupted. The response of blacks was one 
of extradordinary outrage and anger. The Negro had suffered 
injustice, intimidation, disfranchisement, and lynching, but 
the source of these inflictions came from irresponsible racists. 
Now the attack came from Theodore Roosevelt, a man viewed as 
a friend to the black race and held in reverence not equalled 
since Lincoln. Who was the Negro to turn to for help when the 
man in the White House, the man who had entertained Booker T. 
Washington, closed the Post Office in Indianola, and fought 
for the appointment of William Crum in Charleston, South Caro­
lina, had now turned against him?
The most significant comments and criticisms of the black 
community came from the editorial pages of the Washington Bee, 
the Cleveland Gazette, and the New York Age. When the dismis­
sal order was issued, W. Calvin Chase of the Bee declared that 
Roosevelt and his advisors held a profound prejudice against 
the Negro. Chase contended that the President sought the
^Joseph B. Foraker, "Testimony in the Brownsville Inves­
tigation," North American Review, CLXXXVII (April, 1908), pp. 
551-552; "Again the Black Battalion," Current Literature, XLII 
(February 4, 190?), 132-135.
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"heàrty approval of Southern rebel opinion" with his order.
Harry C. Smith of the Gazette denounced the President's action 
as an "undeserved and unmerited triumph of Southern prejudice"
Qagainst the black race.
The Gazette and Bee were usually anti-administration, and 
their protests were to be expected. But the New York Age, the 
most distinguished Negro paper, was controlled by Tuskegee and 
the criticisms that flowed from the pen of its editor, T. Thomas
9Fortune, alarmed Roosevelt.
Fortune's initial reaction to Brownsville was not a criti­
cism of Roosevelt's decision, but a warning to "any black man 
who offered to enlist in the United States Army to fill the 
place of the innocent members of the Twenty-fifth." Such men. 
Fortune wrote, "should be hated and shunned by the Afro-American 
race at large ^for_7 if we cannot get justice in the army, we 
are not compelled to enter it." As the events of Brownsville 
unfolded, the Age took a progressively harder stand against 
Roosevelt. Fortune later referred to the President's order of 
dismissal as "executive lynch law," and charged Roosevelt with 
being a Democrat.
O
The Washington Bee, November 10, 1906; The Cleveland 
Gazette, January 12, 1957.
% he Age was an important organ for molding Negro opinion 
and even more an expression of Negro opinion favorable to poli­
cies advocated by Booker T. Washington. See Emma Lou Thombrough 
"More Light on Booker T. Washington and the New York Age," Journa. 
of Negro History, XLIII (January, 1958)» 34-49.
^®The New York Age, November 8, 29» 1906? February 21, 190?
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Booker T. Washington found himself in a peculiar situation. 
The black community, hearing of the dismissal, speculated about 
Washington's role in the decision. Washington personally did 
not agree with the President's order but he could not criticize 
"his friend" without jeopardizing his relationship with Roose­
velt.
Publicly, Washington remained noticeably silent about the
Brownsville dismissal, but privately he attempted to get the
order rescinded. The Tuskegeean had advance knowledge of the
President's decision to discharge the troops and had written
asking him to reconsider the order. Roosevelt repliedi "I
could not possibly refrain from acting as regard these colored
soldiers. You cannot have any information to give me privately
to which I could pay heed ... because the information on which
11I act is that which came out of the investigation itself."
Washington turned to Secretary Taft and urged him to 
hold up the discharge until the President returned from his 
trip to Panama. "I have never in all my experience with the 
race, experienced a time when the entire people have the feel­
ing that they now have in regard to the administration," ex-
12plained Washington.
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Booker T. Washington, November 5# 
1906, quoted in Emma Lou Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode 
and the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV 
(December, 1957)» P* 474.
^^Washington to William Howard Taft, November 20, 1906, 
quoted in Ibid., p. 475.
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Taft was also approached by Mary Church Terrell, the wife 
of Judge Robert H. Terrell, and a member of the District of Col­
umbia Board of Education. After waiting nearly six hours, she 
was ushered in to see the Secretary of War and she requested 
him to withold execution of the order until the soldiers were 
given a trial, so that the innocent "shall not be sent forth 
branded as murderers." After Mrs. Terrell left, Taft cabled 
Roosevelt, stating that he would withold the execution of the 
order until he heard from the President. "Discharge is not 
to be suspended unless there are new facts of such importance 
as to warrant you cabling me!," replied Roosevelt. Outraged 
over the protests he was receiving, he continued* "I care 
nothing whatever for the yelling of either the politicians or 
the sentimentalists. The offense was most heinous and the 
punishment I inflicted was imposed after due deliberation.
All I shall pay heed to is the presentation of facts showing 
the official reports to be in whole or in part untrue, or 
clearly exculpating some individual man. If any such facts 
later appear I can act as may deemed advisable, but nothing
has been brought before me to warrant the suspension of the
14order, and I direct that it be executed."
13Mary Church Terrell, "Secretary Taft and the Negro 
Soldiers," Independent, LXV (July 23, 1908), 189-190.
^^Theodore Roosevelt to William Howard Taft, November 21, 
1906, Elting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 
8 Vols. (Cambridge* Harvard University Press, 1952), V., p. 498.
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Taft believed that a suspension of the order would con­
vince people of the fairness of the hearing by granting a re­
hearing. Writing to his wife, Taft informed her that "the 
President is worked up on the subject and does not propose to 
retract from his position," He did not believe that Roosevelt 
had quite realized "the great feeling that has been aroused" 
on Brownsville.^^ Although Taft had no part in the decision 
to discharge the troops, he asserted that the order was "en­
tirely justified." However, he felt that a rehearing would be 
the best method to clarify a matter "where a decision is ques­
tioned." He later commented to his brothers "If a rehearing 
shows that the original conclusion was wrong, it presents a 
dignified way of recalling it; and if it does not, it enforces 
the original conclusion."^ When Roosevelt refused to con­
sider the idea, Taft stood by his chief and refused to question 
or criticize the action. The Secretary of War, according to
his biographer, "was really an innocent victim of Roosevelt's 
17impetuosity."
Roosevelt's determination to dismiss the troops brought 
further attempts to rescind or modify the order. Prominent
William Howard Taft to Helen H. Taft, November 21, 1906, 
quoted in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard 
Taft: A Biography, 2 Vols. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc,, 
1939)» I.» pp. 324-323.
^^Taft to C.P. Taft, January 1, 190?, quoted in Ibid., p. 32:
l?Ibid., p. 323.
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white officials, such as Massachusetts Governor Curtis Guild, 
Jr., wired the President stating that black citizens believed 
that members of the War Department's investigating team were 
prejudiced toward Negroes and that Roosevelt had acted upon 
their prejudice. Angered by this accusation, Roosevelt replied 
that prejudice played absolutely no part in his decision.
"The action was precisely such as I should have taken had the 
soldiers guilty of the misconduct been white men instead of 
colored men." He continued*
When the discipline and honor of the American Army are at 
stake I shall never under any circumstance consider the 
political bearing of upholding that discipline and that 
honor, and no graver misfortune could happen to the Ameri­
can Army than failure to punish in the most signal way 
such conduct as that which I have punished ....^
Writing to Silas McBee, Roosevelt asserted that he was 
"angered and indignant at the attitude of the negroes and of 
the shortsighted white sentimentalists" as to his action. The 
Twenty-fifth Infantry "took action which cannot be tolerated 
in any soldier, black or white, in any policeman, black or 
white, and which, if taken generally in the army, would mean 
not merely that the usefulness of the army was at an end but 
that it had better be disbanded in its entirety at once." 
Roosevelt believed that the pressure being exerted against him.
^®Roosevelt to Curtis Guild, Jr., November 7, 1906, Let­
ters, V., pp. 489-490.
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"not only by sentimentalists but by the northern politicians"
19was an effort "to keep the negro vote."
Roosevelt's decision to dismiss the Negro troops coincided 
with the upcoming Congressional and State elections of 1906.
He soon became the victim of another attack - he was charged 
with playing politics with the Brownsville decision. The dis­
missal was ordered on November 5 but not issued until after the 
November 9 elections, when Republicans retained control of the 
House of Representatives. The Waterville (Maine) Sentinel 
stated that in many northern districts black voters had held 
the balance for the Republicans because of their personal de­
votion to the President. "It was a case of 'we are coming 
brother Theodore, three hundred thousand strong' but they would 
have been coming in different temper had they known that on 
brother Theodore's desk was an order to disgrace and humiliate 
the entire colored ^pregimentJ7 of the 25th Infantry." The New 
York Herald surmised that had news of the order been received
six hours earlier, "it would have caused the Republican major-
21ity in the House of Representatives to drop from 59 to 14."
Other papers pointed out that the President's son-in-law, 
Nicholas Longworth, re-elected to Congress in Ohio, benefitted 
tremendously from Roosevelt's delay in issuing the order. Had
^^Roosevelt to Silas McBee, November 27» 1906, Letters,
V, p. 509.
20The Waterville (Maine) Sentinel, November 26, 1906, 
quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 80.
^^The New York Herald, November 23» 1906, quoted in Tinsley, 
"Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," p. 4?.
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one-half of the Negro vote been switched, Longworth would have
lost the election in Cincinnati. A similar shift of Negro votes
in the New York State gubernatorial race would have meant defeat
22for Charles Evans Hughes. At the Abyssinian Baptist Church, 
Reverend W. Bishop Johnson, pastor of the Second Baptist Church 
(colored) declared;
The President's decree was signed the day after the 
election. He shot us when our gun was empty. But we have 
two years to work, and our slogan shall be “a Republican 
Congress to protect our people in the South, a Democratic 
President to resent the insult heaped upon us." Thus shall 
we answer Theodore Roosevelt, once enshrined in our hearts 
as Moses, now enshrined in our scorn as Judas.
Roosevelt continually denied any political play involved 
in the entire Brownsville proceeding. He wrote to Silas McBee;
"As you know I believe in practical politics, and, where possible, 
I always weigh well any action which may cost votes before I 
consent to take it; but in a case like this, where the issue is 
not merely one of naked right and wrong but one of vital con­
cern to the whole country, I will not for one moment consider 
the political effect."
^^insley, p. k?.
^^The New York Times, November 19» 1906; also quoted in 
Lane, p. 80 and Tinsley, pp. 4?-48.
p j IRoosevelt to Silas McBee, November 21, 1906, Letters, 
V, p. 498.
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During his first term in office, Roosevelt provoked a 
substantial amount of criticism from the Southern press for 
his defense of the Negro. With the Brownsville raid and his 
subsequent action toward dismissal, the President received 
genuine support from the South and was commended by its press.
The Nashville American, for example, called the order "the most 
praiseworthy thing the President has done," and contended that
25the soldiers should have been "discharged without their heads." 
The New Orleans Times~Democrat asserted that black troops were 
"menaces to the country and ... a disturbing influence wherever 
they were stationed." The paper favored the elimination of all 
Negro companies from the Army as the "proper and only solution
26to the problem."
Northern editors generally assumed that a few of the 
soldiers were indeed guilty. What they condemned was the man­
ner in which Roosevelt punished the accused. Many believed that 
he had acted unjustly in punishing the men of the Twenty-fifth 
Infantry without benefit of court-martial. The Washington 
Post argued that "while the President's power to discharge a 
soldier cannot be questioned it is not conferred for purposes 
of punishment. Punishment is suppose to follow a trial." The 
New York Sun observed, "By the old law the individual is entitled
^^The Nashville American quoted in Tinsley, p. 48.
26The New Orleans Times-Democrat quoted in "Again the Black 
Battalion," Current Literature, XLII (February 4, 1907), p. 134.
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to trial and must be proved guilty. By the new law the penalty
falls on a number of men collectively, because they 'appear*
to an investigating or prosecuting officer to 'stand together,•
and to escape the punishment thus imposed by wholesale the in-
27dividual must prove his innocence." The black press assumed
the soldiers had perpetrated the raid, with many of the papers
justifying it. The Cleveland Gazette believed that the men
28acted "in defense of their lives." The black press defended 
the soldiers in some way and criticized the severity of the 
punishment. It was not until the Constitution League of the 
United States and Senator Joseph B. Foraker began their inves­
tigations into the affair, that the black community came to be­
lieve that the soldiers were innocent.
The Constitution League, an interracial organization 
formed shortly before the Brownsville affair to attack disfran­
chisement and other forms of discriminatory practice, submitted 
a report to Congress on December 10, 1906, stating that the 
evidence indicated that the soldiers were innocent. Spirited 
by John E. Milhollard, the organization sent its own investi­
gator, Gilchrist Stewart, to Brownsville and Port Reno and was 
soon notified that the facts in the case did not justify the 
charge. Stewart declared that much of the "evidence accepted
^The Washington Post, November 7» 1906; The New York Sun, 
quoted in the Washington Post, November 24, 1906; also quoted in 
Tinsley, p. 47.
paThe Cleveland Gazette, January 12, 190?.
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as incriminating the soldiers is incompetent, flimsy, and biased,
or expressions only of opinion of witnesses." Stewart turned
upon General Garlington and Major Blocksom and charged them
with "preconceiving the guilt of the soldiers and denying them 
29a fair trial."
The Constitution League report was hastily drawn and con­
tained bias in favor of the soldiers as strong as the bias of 
which it complained. The significance of its statement, how­
ever, was the impact it had on Senator Foraker, provoking him
to examine the President's action more closely and to call for
30a full Senate investigation.
The action of Senator Foraker in the Brownsville episode 
projected the incident into the political arena and it assumed 
national importance. Foraker mobilized the widespread outrage 
of the black community into a lengthy but unsuccessful campaign 
against Theodore Roosevelt. Foraker denied that Brownsville 
played any role in his political aspirations, though his eye 
was on the Presidential nomination in 1908, and the Brownsville 
affair presented an opportunity to undercut Roosevelt's support 
for Taft.
In December, 1906, Foraker introduced a resolution in 
the Senate calling upon the War Department to make available
29"Report on the Brownsville Affray," p. 222; Tinsley,
p. 50.
Joseph B. Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, 2 Vols. (Cin­
cinnati: Stewart and Kidd Co., 1917), II, pp. 234.
126
all information concerning the Brownsville incident. He be­
lieved that the testimony on which the President acted upon 
was "flimsy, unreliable and insufficient and untruthful...."
In a heated exchange on the floor of the Senate, he defended 
his resolution, charging that the soldiers were entitled to
a trial if their discharges rested upon a "conviction that a
31felony had been committed." Foraker*s resolution was adopted.
In response to the resolution, Roosevelt sent a message 
to Congress on December 19» 1906, defending his position and 
justifying his dismissal, without honor, of the three black 
companies. He had ordered the discharge "in the exercise of 
my constitutional power and in pursuance of what, after full 
consideration I found to be my constitutional duty as Commander 
in Chief of the United States Army," He stated that he "re­
sented with the keenest indignation" any efforts to draw a 
line based upon the birthplace of members of the Department's 
investigating team, an answer to critics who pointed out that 
General Garlington was from South Carolina. He declared that 
the same action would have been taken had the soldiers involved 
been white. Roosevelt presented in length the "facts" of the 
Department's report and asserted that the soldier's act "was 
one of horrible atrocity," and so far as he was aware, "un­
paralleled for infamy in the annals of the United States Army."
^Iporaker, Notes of a Busy Life, II, pp. 234-236.
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He continued*
The evidence proves conclusively that a number of 
soldiers engaged in a deliberate and concerted attack, as 
cold blooded as it was cowardly; the purpose being to ter­
rorize the community, and to kill or injure men, women and 
children in their homes and beds or on the streets, and 
this at an hour of the night when concerted or effective 
resistance or defense was out of the question, and when 
detection by identification of the criminals in the United 
States* uniform was well-nigh impossible ... /“the crime 
was_/ supplemented by another, only less black, in the 
shape of a sucessful conspiracy of murder.
Roosevelt explained that this discharge from service was not 
a punishment. "The Punishment meted for mutineers and murders," 
the President proclaimed, "is death." He regretted that it was 
impossible "to have punished the guilty men" but warned the 
black community not to defend their guilty members for they 
"were laying up for themselves the most dreadful day of reckon­
ing."^^
In the Senate, Foraker effectively challenged much of 
the President's message and a debate followed on a new resolu­
tion, calling for a full scale investigation of Roosevelt's 
actions. Recognizing that the evidence was insufficient, Roose­
velt sent Assistant Attorney-General Milton D. Purdy to Browns­
ville for further investigation. Purdy's review contained no 
new evidence but it replaced Blocksom's original statement with
^ "Report on Brownsville Affray," pp. 1-9; "Discharge of 
Negro Soldiers," Independent, LXI (December, 1906), 1531-1532; 
Foraker, Notes, II, pp. 236-239.
128
a comprehensive coverage of all the evidence, along with the 
witnesses' statements presented in the form of sworn affidavits. 
On January 14, 190? Roosevelt sent another message to the Senate, 
offering in detail the evidence of shells, cartridges, as well 
as the eyewitness reports, so that "the fact that the assail­
ants were United States soldiers ... would be conclusive ... if 
not one soldier had been seen .., and if nothing were known save 
the finding of shells, clips, and bullets." The President 
accompanied the Purdy report with an order rescinding the part 
of his original order which debarred the ex-soldiers from appoint­
ment in the civil service. "This action convinced many doubt­
ful Senators that the Pr^ident had strong legal support for
34his stand and that he was acting in good faith."
With the tide slowly turning in his favor, Roosevelt look­
ed to the Senate vote on the Foraker resolution as a test of con­
fidence. Writing to his son Kermit, the President stated that 
Brownsville "is really not any of the Senate's business." He 
was uncertain how the vote would turn out but expressed hope
that "those /~who_7 support me will win; but if they do not,
3*5it will not make the slightest difference in my attitude. 
Roosevelt's chief spokesman in the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge,
^^Quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, pp. 137-138. 
^^Tinsley, p. 5 2.
^%oosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, January 19, 1907, Let­
ters. V, pp. 557-558.
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was joined during the later stages of the debate on the Foraker 
resolution by John C. Spooner of Wisconsin and Philander C. Knox 
of Pennsylvania, and the Republican leadership forced Foraker 
to amend his resolution so that neither the "legality nor the 
justice" of the President’s act was questioned. On January 22, 
1907 the Senate passed the resolution calling for an investi­
gation by the Committee on Military Affairs. Foraker was a 
member of the committee,
Roosevelt was sincerely disturbed with Foraker for in­
troducing his resolution for another investigation. This be­
came apparent on January 26 when the two met head on at the 
Gridiron Club dinner. Foraker arrived at the dinner unaware 
that Roosevelt was to address the Club. During his speech, 
the President spoke about legislation for regulation of cor­
porations and railroads, and the Brownsville investigation, 
subjects on which the two men were in basic disagreement. 
Roosevelt contended that the Senate Brownsville investigation 
was purely "academic," and denounced those who had challenged 
his authority. Following his speech, the toastmaster of the 
Club, Samuel G. Blythe, feeling that "the hour for bloody
sarcasm /~had_7 arrived, ... took the liberty of calling upon
37Senator Foraker for some remarks." What followed was a rare
^^Tinsley, pp. 52-53.
^^Ibid., pp. 53-5^5 Foraker, Notes, XI, pp. 249-257; 
Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 462; Everett Walters, Joseph 
Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican (Columbus; The 
Ohio History Press, 1948), pp. 238-240; Lane, pp. 147-148.
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public confrontation between the President and a United States 
Senator.
Although Foraker was unprepared, he immediately launched 
into a defense of his stand on Brownsville. He called Roose­
velt's order illegal, unconstitutional, and unjustifiable. He 
spoke of Mingo Sanders, and the President's insistence upon 
punishing the innocent with the assumed guilty. Foraker be­
lieved that "the President knew /”Sanders_7 was as innocent of 
offense against the law of any kind whatever from what had ap­
peared in the newspaper accounts of the affair." He asserted 
that his purpose for calling an investigation was not that of 
a "demagogue to secure negro votes." He was seeking "to pro­
vide the troops with an opportunity to be heard in their own
defense ... to the end that if it should appear that injustice
38was done it might be righted."
No sooner had Foraker finished, than Roosevelt jumped up 
and began a short but bitter rebuttal. He emphatically stated 
that if the Senate passed a resolution to reinstate the soldiers, 
he would veto it; if they passed it over his veto, he would pay 
no attention to it. "I welcome impeachment," exclaimed the Pres­
ident.^9 He then left the dinner abruptly, leaving no time for 
discussion.
3®Poraker, Notes, II, p. 251. 
39lane, pp. 147-148.
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Foraker won the sympathy of the crowd that evening. He 
had been attacked by the President before a large and rather 
influential gathering. He was cheered for his courageous de­
fense.
On the following day, Roosevelt reflected on the previ­
ous night,in a letter to Albert J. Beveridge*
Foraker ought not to have been called upon to speak; 
but, as he was called upon, I do not blame him much for the 
speech he did make. I was in two minds what to say in an­
swer; I was inclined to make a Berserker speech myself and 
go over the whole business, and perhaps this would have been 
better; but in the few minutes I had to decide I concluded 
that I would merely make a flat contradiction of what he 
had said, point out the fact that I and not he would pass 
judgment upon the case, and that I should absolutely dis­
regard anything except my own convictions, and let it go at t h a t . W D
Relations between the President and Senator Foraker strain­
ed following the Gridiron Dinner. Roosevelt was determined to 
eliminate the Senator from political life. He refused to ap­
point a lawyer, recommended by Foraker, for a newly created 
district in Ohio. The Senator had recommended Judge John J.
Adams for Roosevelt's consideration, and he assumed that, inas­
much as he was senior senator from Ohio and a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and that the judgeship in question 
was for the Southern District of Ohio, the President would com­
ply with his recommendation. Roosevelt's failure to appoint
^^Roosevelt to Albert J. Beveridge, January 2?, 190?, 
Letters, V, p. 571.
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Adams indicated to Foraker that relations with the President 
were strained beyond repair.
On March 11, 1908, the Committee on Military Affairs com­
pleted its investigation of the Brownsville affair and issued 
its results. As expected, its report was divided into majority 
and minority opinions. The majority report held that the shoot­
ing at Brownsville was done by some of the soldiers but the tes­
timony did not identify the particular soldiers involved. This 
report confirmed the President's convictions. It was signed 
by all five Democrats on the committee and four of the Republi­
can members. These four Republicans also recommended the pas­
sage of a bill that would extend for one year the President's 
authority to re-enlist any member of the Twenty-fifth who could 
prove his innocence.
Four Republicans, including Senator Foraker, subscribed 
to a minority report, stating that the testimony taken was un­
satisfactory, indefinite and conflicting in its nature. It 
failed to identify the particular individuals who participated 
in the shooting and failed to prove that a "conspiracy of si­
lence" existed among the soldiers. Senators Foraker and Mor­
gan G. Bulkeley of Connecticut offered a second minority re­
port which claimed that the weight of the testimony showed that 
none of the soldiers participated in the shooting.
For details of the Senate report see; "Report of the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs," Senate Documents, 60 Cong., 
1st sess.. Report no. 355» pt. 1, vol. II, ser. no. 5219; Lane, 
pp. 33-52Î Tinsley, pp. 55-58.
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Roosevelt accepted the majority report without reserva­
tion. He felt that the committee's results "conclusively show 
that the murderous assault in question was committed by various 
soldiers, probably ten to twenty in number." The Foraker opin­
ion, to the President, amounted "simply to a proposal to con­
done murder and perjury in the past and put a premium upon per­
jury in the future by permitting any murder/~er_/ or perjurer,
who will again perjure himself, to be restored to the United
42States Army...." He would "refuse to sign" the bill and "re-
43fuse to obey if it were passed over my veto." ^He referred to 
it as "academic" and believed that if it received a two-thirds 
vote in each House, "which is not possible,"it would be clearly 
unconstitutional and I should pay not the slightest heed to it." 
Roosevelt reaffirmed his executive position*
No law can take my power of appointment or force me 
to make appointment, any more than I could by Executive 
order decree that I had the power to make appropriations.
The Legislature cannot usurp the functions of the Executive 
any more than the Executive can usurp the functions of theLegislature.44
The choice of the two bills was left to the Senate. If 
they selected the minority report, Foraker would be successful
^^Roosevelt to Francis Emroy Warren, March 9» 1908, Let­
ters, VI, pp. 966-967.
43 ̂Roosev
Ibid., p. 968.
^^Roosev
pp. 1016-1017.
^ elt to Ernest Hamlin Abbott, March 12, 1908, 
elt to William Alden Smith, April 24, 1908, Ibid.,
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in embarassing the President and would enhance his chances at 
securing the Republican nomination. However, a canvass of Re­
publican Senators showed that he could receive the support of 
only thirty-five colleagues. With this knowledge, Foraker de­
cided that more would be gained if consideration of his bill 
were delayed until December, 1908,
In the summer of 1908, however, Roosevelt authorized a 
secret investigation of the Brownsville matter. Feeling For­
aker *s pressure, the War Department hired Herbert J. Brown, a 
Washington journalist, and William B. Baldwin, head of a Negro 
detective agency in Richmond, to discover the guilty members 
by circulating among the ex-soldiers. Brown and Baldwin re­
ported that one of the soldiers, Boyd Conyers of Monroe, Geor­
gia, had confessed his guilt and had provided the names of the 
other participants. Upon receiving this information, Roosevelt 
sent it directly to the Senate. However, Foraker was prepared. 
The Senator held sworn affidavits from Conyers.and several in­
fluential white citizens of Monroe, denying the story. Sheriff 
E. C. Arnold, who was present during Brown and Baldwin's inter­
view with Conyers, stated that when the detectives failed to 
receive a confession out of Conyers, "Brown asked him to give 
the names of some of the baseball players and also the names 
of the most reckless and turbulent members of his company. This 
Conyers did ... and these names ... Mr. Brown ... says were fur-
Tinsley, pp. 58-59.
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nished him by Conyers as the ones participating in the shoot­
ing. Roosevelt spent $15*000 on this private investigation 
and, outside of the Conyers story, could not present any fur­
ther evidence. But because of this secret investigation For­
aker was able to push his bill through Congress,
In December, 19O8 , Roosevelt stuck to his original posi­
tion in another message to Congress, but recommended that the 
Secretary of War be empowered to reinstate any soldier within 
a year if "he felt them to have been innocent." When the 
second session of the Sixtieth Congress opened. Senator For­
aker introduced another bill calling for the creation of a 
Board of Inquiry to reinstate the soldiers. Under presiden­
tial pressure, he agreed that the Secretary of War appoint 
the members of the Board. The Senate passed the bill on 
February 23» 1909» and the House of Representatives followed
suit four days later. Roosevelt ultimately signed the bill
48on March 3» one of his last official acts.
The Court of Military Inquiry began its investigation 
on May 4 and continued it until April» 1910. On April 6 it 
issued a report which concluded that the raid had been per­
petrated by a small group of the black soldiers but the guilty 
members could not be found. No new evidence was discovered.
^^Congressional Record, 60 Cong.» 2d sess., XLIII, p. 800; 
Tinsley» ppT 59~6o.
^^lane » pp. 138-139
^®Tinsley, p. 59.
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and consequently the Court inquiry employed previous testi­
mony and investigations. The Court qualified fourteen of the 
men for reenlistment, and by August 13» 1910, eleven of the 
fourteen had reenlisted. The official record of the Browns­
ville affair had closed.
A period of sixty-six years elapsed before the Browns­
ville case was reopened. On September 28, 1972 the United 
States Army announced that the records of the 16? black sol­
diers discharged without honor by Theodore Roosevelt had been 
cleared. Army officials asserted that the disciplinary action 
in the case was the only documented case of mass punishment 
in its history. Secretary of the Army Robert P. Proehike de­
clared the action "a gross injustice.
The Brownsville affair profoundly shocked the black com­
munity and Roosevelt's assertion of his constitutional power 
to dismiss the soldiers crystallized its opposition toward him. 
While those close to the administration did all in their power
^^Tinsley, p. 6l.
^^The New York Times, September 29» December 31, 1972. 
Historians have offered varied assessments of the Brownsville 
Affair. John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid contends that the 
evidence pointed to the innocence of the black troops. He ar­
gues that some local vigilantes, angered by the black soldiers 
presence, staged a shootout. Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Af­
fair cautiously concludes that the case against the soldiers 
was not proved. Henry P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt; A Biog­
raphy, pp. 458-464,is critical of Rooseveltsand William H. Har- 
baugh. Power and Responsibilityt The Life and Times of Theodore 
Roosevelt, pp. 303-30Ô, condemns Roosevelt*saction but is less 
sympathetic than Pringle to Foraker's defense of the soldiers. 
George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912, pp. 
212-213, assumes the guilt of some of the soldiers and has no
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to supress the criticisms of Roosevelt, others gathered in 
lectures, meetings, conventions and socities to denounce the 
policies of the President on Brownsville, Black Americans, 
for the first time, openly criticized Roosevelt and threaten­
ed a "wholesale defection of Negro votes from the Republican 
party.
criticism for Roosevelt's action. James A, Tinsley, "Roose­
velt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," concludes that 
there is doubt about the soldiers guilt and is critical of 
Roosevelt's methods. Rayford W. Logan, The Betrayal of the 
Negro, pp. 345-347, suggests that Rooseveltfs dismissal of 
the black troops stemmed from a further desire to propitiate 
the South.
^^Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro 
Vote," p. 469.
CHAPTER VII
BROWNSVILLE, TAFT AND THE 
ELECTION OF 1908
On election eve of 1904 Theodore Roosevelt decided to 
give up the Presidency upon the completion of his second term. 
This critical decision left the field wide open for Republican 
presidential hopefuls. Many Republicans believed that Roose­
velt would receive the support of the party if he chose to run 
again in 1908. To most members, both conservative and progres­
sive, any other candidate was considered “a poor second choice."^ 
There were several prominent men who might be considered as 
serious candidates for the nomination. Charles Evans Hughes, 
the Governor of New York, and two of Roosevelt's cabinet mem­
bers, Secretary of State Elihu Roottand Secretary of War William 
Howard Taft, were among the frontrunners. Governor Hughes, how­
ever, showed an independent temperament and disagreed with Roose­
velt's political patronage policy in New York. This forced him
2into an alliance with the President's enemies.
Both Root and Taft were in basic agreement with the Presi­
dent's handling of domestic and foreign affairs. It seemed ap-
^George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the 
Birth of Modem America, 190O-19T? (New York* Harper anà'"Brothers,
Ï93FT Î962TTPP. 180; 226. ----
2William H. Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility* The Life 
yid Times of Theodore Roosevelt TNew York: Farrar, Straus and 
budahy, 19SÎ; Collier Books, 1963), pp. 323-333*
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parent that either man, if selected, would continue his poli­
cies. Root, however, was in bad health, and was considered 
too close to Wall Street to carry on in the Rooseveltian image 
as "trustbxister. ” By 190? the Secretary of State had become 
much too conservative on financial matters and his support of 
corporate interests. Secretary Taft was therefore the man 
chosen by the President as his successor. For two years Roose-
3velt worked to secure Taft*s nomination and election. Taft 
was popular with the American people and he fully agreed with 
the President's policies, but he lacked the enthusiasm and 
ambition for the presidency. He often expressed the thought 
that he was not a politician, and only wished to be recommend­
ed for a position on the Supreme Court. Roosevelt, on the con­
trary, was determined to groom his man for the office of Presi­
dent. Since Roosevelt was also the head of his party, the re- 
lunctant Taft was assured the nomination at the Republican Con­
vention,
Roosevelt and Taft both realized the necessity of con­
trolling the Southern Republican delegates if Taft was to re­
ceive the nomination, and this involved a direct appeal to the 
black community. Taft wanted to appeal to southern racial sen­
timent as well, and in August, 1906, the Secretary delivered 
the "Key Note" address to the North Carolina Legislature in 
Greensboro. In his speech, Taft outlined his views on problems
3Mowry, p. 227.
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that existed in the South, He stated that he would support 
judicial review of disfranchisement but would not give his 
consent to efforts to reduce Southern representation in the 
House. He indicated his disposition to acquiesce in the poli­
tical situation which confronted Negroes, "subject only to 
the judicial rather than federal legislative action."
The Brownsville affair played a significant role in 
Taft's campaign for the Presidential nomination. As Secretary 
of War at the time of the dismissals, Taft was automatically 
linked with Roosevelt’s decision. White Southerners whole­
heartedly approved the President’s action and this guaranteed 
support for his Secretary of War. On the other hand, the in­
cident proved detrimental to Taft’s chances of winning support 
from black Americans. It appeared that Senator Foraker would 
secure t̂ ye Negro vote in payment for his defense of the black 
troops.
Roosevelt was aware of the discontent of the Negro com­
munity over his decision to dismiss the troops. Though he 
would not change his position, he was concerned about the 
chances of a large defection of black votes. This would defi­
nitely hurt Taft’s chances in 1908. The hostility expressed 
by the black press toward Taft’s candidacy was due to Browns­
ville, though the dismissal was the President’s order, with
4"The Candor of Secretary Taft," Current Literature. XLI 
(August, 1906), 127; Henry P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt. A 
Biography (New York* Harcourt, Brace and Go., 19^2), pp. 127»
Î4ÏT
I4l
Taft merely following his chief's instructions. Roosevelt knew 
that his Secretary must be cleared of involvement in the deci­
sion.
Writing his son Kermit in October, 1908, Roosevelt ex­
pressed optimism about Taft's chances of winning the election; 
"The surface indications are certainly our way and I am inclined 
to think that we shall carry the election...." He contended 
that "the defection in the Negro vote ... is real" but would 
only be important "if the election is very c l o s e . I n  a let­
ter to Charles Evans Hughes Roosevelt confessed that the Gover­
nor "will gain some votes that Taft won't ... some negroes and 
some misled and rather bigoted evangelical Protestants who ob­
ject to Taft."6
Because of his involvement in Brownsville, Taft was opposed 
by such anti-administration papers as the Cleveland Gazette and 
the Boston Guardian, as well as by prominent Negro leaders such 
as W. E. B. DuBois and the Niagara Movement, It was therefore 
imperative for Roosevelt to claim responsibility for the deci­
sion and have Taft exonerated for his issuance of the dismissal
7order.'
Theodore Roosevelt to Kermit Roosevelt, October 20, 1908, 
Siting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 Vols 
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 19^2j, VI, pp. I303-1304,
^Roosevelt to Charles Evans Hughes, October 14, 1908, Let­
ters, VI, p. 1286.
7The Cleveland Gazette. January 11, 1908; The Boston G\iar- 
dian, February 15, 1908; Au^st Meier, Negro Thought in America, 
1880-1915; Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington 
(Ann Arbor; University of MicKigan Press, 1963}, p7 lB5T
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Roosevelt at first was not aware that Taft suffered from 
the Brownsville decision. "I had always supposed that every­
one knew that the whole Brownsville business had been carried 
on under my personal supervision," declared Roosevelt. "When 
I get angry my impulse always is to move up as close to my an­
tagonist as possible; and if there was the slightest doubt on 
the subject I was exceedingly anxious that everybody concerned 
should know that I not only accepted but claimed the entire re-
O
sponsibility for the affair."
Roosevelt conferred with Henry C. Corbin over the prob­
lem of Brownsville and Taft's candidacy. Corbin, who was de­
voting his time to the Taft campaign following his retirement 
from the array, explained to the press that "any credit or blame" 
in the affair "cannot in any way be laid to Mr. Taft." He 
asserted that Roosevelt issued the order to dismiss the troops 
and sustained that order in spite of Taft's request that it be 
suspended. To document his explanation, Corbin released the 
President's cable to Taft, ordering the Secretary of War to 
issue the dismissal. Corbin concluded^ "Of course, the Browns­
ville Affair is going to be paraded in the campaign," but, "the 
colored vote ... will be for Taft." Roosevelt, concurring with
QCorbin's statement, announced that it was "absolutely correct."
Q
Roosevelt to John Hayes Hammond, August 8, 1908, Letters.
VI, p. 1163.
9Moris . .,  ____
The New York Times, August 8, 1908.on, ed.. Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. VI, p. Il63n;
1^3
Booker T. Washington was noticeably silent over the Browns­
ville incident. Failing to persuade Roosevelt to rescind the 
order of dismissal, the Negro educator believed that the best 
way to handle the affair was to ignore it and "watch the con­
troversy slowly c r u m b l e . B u t  as opposition mounted against 
the President, Washington was aware that it was also projected 
at him. He wrote to his friend, Charles Andersoni "... the 
enemy will, as usual, try to blame me for all this. They can 
talk; I cannot, without being disloyal to our friend, who I 
mean to stand by throughout his administration."^^
Washington was aware of the damage that might be done if 
opposition to the President led to a defection from the Repub­
lican party. The protests from the black community were jeop­
ardizing his leadership and influence, but he was determined 
to offset them. One method was to continue recommending Negroes 
for patronage positions to the President. Roosevelt was also 
cognizant that by appointing blacks to office, he would be 
presenting evidence to Negroes that he was not against the color­
ed race because of Brownsville. With the hope of winning black 
support, the President, upon conferring with Washington, made 
it known that he was considering the appointment of Ralph W.
Tyler of Columbus, Ohio to the position of surveyor of the port
Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair (Port Washington, 
N.Y.i Kennikat Press, inc., 1971), P. 71.
11Booker T. Washington to Charles Anderson, November 7, 
1906, quoted in Emma Lou Thornbrough, "The Brownsville Episode 
and the Negro Vote," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIV 
(December, 1957), p. 475. Anderson, an ardent supporter of Wash­
ington and Roosevelt, was appointed by the President as collector 
of internal revenue in New York.
1 #
of Cincinnati. Tyler was a part-time journalist and secretary
to Robert Wolfe, owner of the Columbus Ohio State Journal and
the Columbus Dispatch, both of which opposed Senator Foraker.
The appointment of Tyler would also damage Poraker’s political
support in Ohio. But Roosevelt soon changed his mind about
Tyler's appointment, after protests by white Republicans in
Cincinnati. The President's son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth,
protested that the naming of a Negro to a post in his district
would mean his political ruin. Roosevelt also feared that the
appointment would be detrimental to Taft's candidacy in Ohio.
Tyler was subsequently appointed Fourth Auditor in the Navy
Department "where his presence would not offend white voters
and where, it was hoped, he would be useful in keeping Negroes
12faithful to the Republican party."
Washington recommended other appointments to Roosevelt, 
and the President appointed two black lawyers, William H. Lewis 
of Boston, and S. Laing Williams of Chicago, as special attor­
neys for naturalization affairs in their respective cities. 
Washington also suggested to Taft that Negroes be allowed to 
qualify as bandmasters in colored regiments.
1 ?Thornbrough, p. Washington called on the services
of Tyler to write a series of editorials supporting Roosevelt's 
decision in the Brownsville affair. The leading editorial was 
entitled "The Brownsville Ghouls," depicting the critics of Roose­
velt and Washington as "human ghouls, worthless parasites who rep­
resent nothing save selfish avarice." See The New York Age, Oct­
ober 17, 1907; Meier, Negro Thought in America, p. 229.
13Thornbrough, pp. h80-48l.
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Throughout 190? and 1908 the black press continued to 
report news of meetings and petitions protesting the dismis­
sal of the troops. In addition to the protests, Negro organi­
zations were proclaiming their support for Senator Foraker, at 
Secretary Taft's expense. In the spring of 1908 the anti- 
Taft movement took organizational form with the establishment 
of the National Negro American Political League of the United 
States. Included in the League were representatives from the 
Afro-American Council, the Niagara Movement, and the Constitu­
tional League. These three organizations had opposed Roose­
velt's choice of Washington as spokesman for the black communi­
ty. They were all in disagreement with the Negro educator's
conservatism and with his willingness to compromise where the
14rights of Negroes were concerned.
The Afro-American Council, which replaced Fortune's de­
funct Afro-American League in 1898, came under the control of 
Washington after the turn of the century and maintained a con- 
cilitory and moderate tone. But as the repercussions of Browns­
ville mounted, Washington became concerned over his declining 
influence within the Council. A split between Washington and 
Bishop Alexander Walters over Brownsville led to the Council's 
support of Foraker. By 1908 Walters had joined the Niagara
Lane, The Brownsville Affair, pp. 83-84. Washington 
often referred to his critics, especially members of the Niag­
ara Movement, as "the enemy" and "the opposition." See Meier, 
Negro Thought in America, pp. 115-116, 171-189.
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14Movement in an effort to swing the Negro vote away from Taft.
The Niagara Movement, established in 1905 to oppose Wash­
ington’s leadership, denounced Roosevelt’s actions and endorsed 
Poraker. Washington’s unwillingness to criticize the President 
publically on Brownsville induced many of his supporters to 
flee to the radical camp,^^ At the 1908 conference in Oberlin, 
the Niagara Movement presented an address to the black community;
We say to voters; Register and vote whenever and 
wherever you have a right.... Remember that the conduct 
of the Republican party toward negroes has been a disgrace­
ful failure to keep just promises. The dominant Roosevelt 
faction has sinned in this respect beyond forgiveness. We 
therefore trust that every black voter will uphold men like 
Joseph Benson Poraker, and will leave no stone unturned to 
defeat William H. Taft, Remember Brownsville, and estab­
lish next November the principle of negro independence in 
voting, not only for punishing enemies but for rebuking 
false friends.1/
But this potential disaffection from the Republican ranks 
quickly dissolved. Senator Poraker failed to gain the presi­
dential nomination, and once out of the race adopted a concili­
atory tone, stressing the importance of party unity. Republi­
cans throughout the country, when confronted with the Browns­
ville issue, called attention to the Democratic record in race
^^mma Lou Thombrough, "The Afro-American League, 188?- 
1908," Journal of Southern History, XXVII (September, 1961),492- 512.
^^Elliot M. Rudwick, "The Niagara Movement," Journal of 
Negro History. XLII (July, 1957). 177-200.
^^Quoted in Lane, The Brownsville Affair, p. 79.
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policy. Many Democrats endorsed Roosevelt's discharge of the 
black troops, and William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic Presi­
dential candidate in 1908, defended the disfranchisement of 
Southern blacks. The Negro was definitely faced with a dilem­
ma. A few leaders did support Bryan* Bishop Walters, William 
Mohroe Trotter, the militant editor of the Boston Guardian and 
one of Washington's most severe critics, and W. E. B. DuBois, 
spokesman of the Niagara Movement. But on the whole, the black 
community had no other choice but to remain where they were 
politically. A majority of the Negro press had fallen in line 
with the administration and now supported both Washington and 
the Republican party. As one historian has asserted, the black 
community, "genuinely aroused and temporarily united, found no 
way to channel effectively its expressions of outrage and anger. 
Its leaders, initially unanimous in criticizing the President's
action, ultimately succumbed to mounting pressures that urged
18return to loyal republicanism."
Negroes returned to the party of Lincoln but the Browns­
ville affair had left an indelable impression on their minds.
In 19O8 William Howard Taft quickly assumed his predecessor's 
accomodating and paternalistic attitude on the race question, 
Roosevelt assured Lawrence Abbott that the new President "will 
not make a Garrisonian issue on the question of Negro suffrage"
^®Lane, p. 167. For an analysis of the Negro vote in 
19O8 see Thombrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro 
Vote," pp. 492-493.
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and will "carry out the theory upon which I have acted" in re-
19gard to appointments. Upon leaving office, Roosevelt bequeath­
ed to his successor his adviser on Southern and Negro policy,
20Booker T. Washington,
It did not take long for the black community to realize
that they were to receive very little from the new President.
In his Inaugural Address Taft spoke to the South and the Negro,
declaring that he would not appoint Negroes when it was "objec-
21tionable to Southerners." Determined to continue the course 
of reconciliation, the President visited the South after his 
election and made several speeches, one of which he entitled 
"The Winning of the South." In this pronouncement he "reiter­
ated the shibboleths of White Supremacy;" "the best friend that 
the southern Negro can have is a southern white man;" "the his­
tory of Reconstruction was "painful;*" "the fear of federal en­
forcement of social equality was "imaginary;*" and “there was 
nothing inconsistent between the Fifteenth Amendment and South­
ern safeguards against "domination ... by an ignorant elector-
22ate" - that is, disfranchisement."
^^Theodore Roosevelt to Lawrence Abbott, October 6, 1908, 
Letters. VI, pp. 1276-1277.
20Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., Booker T. Washington and the 
Negro's Place in American Life (Boston; Little, Brown and Co.,
p7 T 5 7 .----------- --------
^^Elliot M. Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBoist Propagandist of the 
Negro Protest (New York: Atheneum, 1969),p. 12b.
22C. Vann Woodward, The Origins of the New South, 1877- 
1913 (Baton Rougei Louisiana State University Press, 1951)» 
p. 468.
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Taft believed that Roosevelt had not advanced the cause 
of the Negro by appointing him in southern communities where 
his presence was bitterly resented. Writing to W. R. Nelson, 
he declared* “I am not going to put into places of such promi­
nence in the South, where the race feeling is strong, Negroes 
whose appointment will only tend to increase that race feeling; 
but I shall look about and make appointments in the North and 
recognize the Negro as often as I can....**^^
The Negro problem in the South was just as perplexing
to Taft as it was to Roosevelt, but Taft believed that **in
many of the States ^the Negro question__/ is a mere ghost of
a past issue." He did not "propose to raise it again except
in a discussion with the negroes themselves as to their course
in the matter," He wrote to a friend* "My own judgment is that
the best thing for the negroes is to allow the present status
to continue until the Republicans can control some of the
Southern States, and this will bring about an equal enforce-
24ment of the laws of eligibility for voting."
Taft initiated his southern policy by removing blacks 
from federal offices in the South. In Virginia he removed a 
postmaster who had held a position in Yorktown for more than
William Howard Taft to W. R. Nelaion, February 23, 1909» 
in Henry P. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 
2 Vols. (New York* Farrar and Rinehari, Inc., 1939), I, pp. 389- 390.
24Taft to Mabel Boardman, August 21, 1908, quoted in Hor­
ace S. and Marion G. Merrill, The Republican Command « 1897-1913 
(Lexington* University of Kentucky ^Yess, 1971)» p. 275.
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twenty-five years» and who had enjoyed the support of a ma­
jority of the white citizens of the community. He substitut­
ed the son of a Confederate s o l d i e r . I n  South Carolina,
Taft secured the resignation of Dr. William D. Crum, whose 
appointment as Collector of the Port of Charleston had repre­
sented the high-tide of Roosevelt's efforts to appeal to black 
Americans in defiance of Southern and lily white sentiment. 
Booker T. Washington was able to have Crura appointed as Min­
ister of Liberia, where the Charlestonian served until his 
P Adeath in 1912.
Southern whites applauded Taft's policy of replacing 
black officeholders, and white Republicans revitalized the 
lily white movement throughout the South, In Texas, Cecil 
Lyons, Republican National Committeeman, served notice on 
all black officeholders in Texas that upon the expiration 
of their terms they should not expect to be reappointed; 
their places would be filled by white citizens. Similar in-
^^The Cleveland Gazette. July 10, 1909.
The New York Age, October 7, 1910; The Cleveland 
Gazette. June 18, 1910; Willard B. Gatewood, "William D.
Crum* A Negro in Politics," Journal of Negro History, LIII 
(October, 1968), 301-320; Pringle, The Life and Times of 
William Howard Taft, I, pp. 389-390; Theodore RoosevelT“to 
william H. Taft, Pebruary 26, 1909, Letters, VI, p. 1538.
For details of Crum's service as Minister of Liberia see 
James A, Padgett, "Ministers to Liberia and Their Diplomacy," 
Journal of Negro History. XXII (October, 1937), 50-92.
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27cidents occurred in Louisiana and Florida.
In 1910 Taft asserted, in a letter to William G. Brown, 
that he remained firm in the view on Negroes that he had earli­
er expressed. “In my inaugural address," he wrote, "I attempt­
ed to foreshadow a policy of not making Southern appointments" 
to Negroes. "I have based the principle on the proposition 
that public servants, the discharge of whose official functions 
aroused public prejudice necessarily interferred with the effec­
tiveness of their work smd so the public was deprived of that 
which it was entitled to - an efficient service." He told 
Brown that he now had "another ground upon which this princi­
ple can be sustained," and thought that maybe it "is a ground 
that is higher than the other." Taft reasoned that appoint­
ment of Negroes to positions in the South, "instead of help­
ing the race, retards the growth of that race in its associa­
tion with the whites." To the President, the Southern white 
was the best friend of the Negro, and by appointing blacks to 
office, he would only jeopardize "the benefit that is to de-
2?rive from the friendship and protection of the Southern whites."
The growing lily white sentiment, coupled with increased 
segregation of Negroes in several federal government buildings.
The Cleveland Gazette, July 3» 1909; The New York Age, 
July 1, 1909. For lily white activities in the South see Thomas 
R. Cripps, "The Lily White Republicans: The Negro, the Party, 
and the South in the Progressive Era," (Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of Maryland, 1967), pp. 331-336.
^®Taft to William Garrott Brown, November 3» 1910, quoted 
in Merrill, The Republican Command, p. 315»
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turned many blacks against the leadership of William Howard
T a f t . william Monroe Trotter charged that Taft had done
more to foster and "encourage race prejudice and race antag-
onism than any man in the history of the United States. *•
The leaders of the National Negro Committee, precursor of
the NAACP, met in the summer of 1909 and passed resolutions
asking the President and Congress to "compel Southern states
to abide by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t s . E v e n
the Washingtonians were disappointed with Taft. Fred Moore,
editor of the New York Age, opened his column to anti-admini-
32stration writers.^ Washington himself became somewhat dis­
enchanted with the President, not so much because of his poli­
cies, but because Taft ceased to confer with him regularly. 
Though discouraged, Washington continued to stand by the ad­
ministration.
As the election year of 1912 approached, the black com­
munity once again found itself in a serious dilemma. The Re­
publican administration of William Howard Taft had neglected
^^August Meier and Elliot M. Rudwick, "The Rise of Seg­
regation in the Federal Bureaucracy, 1900-1930," Phylon, 
XXVIII (Summer, 196?), 178-184.
^^The Boston Guardian, October 29* 1910; Meier, Negro 
Thought in America, pp. 113. 165.
^^Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois, pp. 125-126.
^^The New York Age, January 27, March 10, 1910; Meier, 
Negro Thought in America, p. 229.
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them, thus opening the possibility of deserting the party.
But what alternatives were offered? The Democratic party 
was about to name Woodrow Wilson as its candidate, but Wilson 
was a Southerner, Theodore Roosevelt was to return from Afri­
ca to find the Republican party not to his liking, and, fail­
ing to recapture the nomination, to launch the Progressive 
Party with the hopes of attracting the support of disenchanted 
Republicans and Southern Democrats, And Taft was to receive 
the Republican nomination to round out the field. The black 
community was left to decide upon and support one of three 
candidates, each with a strong chance of winning the election. 
The determining factor would be the candidates themselves, and 
how they would appeal to the Negro,
CHAPTER VIII 
THE LILY WHITE PARTY AND THE NEGRO* 1912
Theodore Roosevelt's entrance into the 1912 Presidential 
election presented a peculiar situation for the American people 
in general, and for black Americans in particular. The Repub­
lican party, under the leadership of William Howard Taft, had 
moved too far to the right of the political spectrum for many 
of its constituents. When Roosevelt returned from his trip to 
Africa he was dismayed at the conservatism of the party and at 
Taft's leadership. He attempted to sway the party toward what 
he thought was the progressive mood of the country. Failing 
to capture the nomination from the President, the Rough Rider 
bolted the Republican Convention and called for his supporters 
to gather in Chicago to launch the Progressive party. Thus, 
the election of 1912 became a three-way contest between Roose­
velt, Taft and Woodrow Wilson.
The black community had returned to the ranks of the Re­
publican party in 1908. The performance of President Taft, how­
ever, had proved to many Negroes that he was not concerned with 
their plight. But where were they to turn? The Democratic 
nominee, Woodrow Wilson, a Southerner, was viewed as posessing 
all the traits and prejudices of that section of the country. 
Many members of the black community therefore turned to Roose­
velt and joined the Progressive ranks.
15^
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Upon Roosevelt’s declaration of candidacy for the Repub­
lican nomination in February, 1912, his campaign managers or­
ganized black headquarters in the North and sent representa­
tives to the South to convince Negro delegates to disregard 
their pledges to vote for Taft at the nominating convention. 
These representatives travelled through the South charging 
Taft with establishing the rule that no Negroes could hold 
office against the objection of Southern whites; removing al­
most every black officeholder from prominent positions; and 
encouraging Southern members of the Civil Service Commission 
to travel throughout the South seeking whites to apply for 
positions in the Civil Service normally held by Negroes.
The Roosevelt managers made progress in the South. The 
Jackson Evening News erroneously reported that Booker T. Wash­
ington was using his influence among black delegates from Mis­
sissippi to switch their allegiance from Taft to Roosevelt. 
Charles Banks and Perry W, Howard, the former a close friend 
of Washington, indicated that they were going to cast their 
ballots for Roosevelt despite instructions for the President. 
This led the Taft administration to believe that it would be
difficult to hold the Mississippi delegates to their initial 
2pledge. Senator Joseph M. Dixon of Montana, Roosevelt’s cam-
^The New York Age, May 16, 20, June 13» 1912,
^The New York Age, May 30, 1912; August Meier, Negro
Thought in America, 1880-1915 (Ann Arbor; University of Michi- 
gan Press, 1963), p. 148.
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paign manager in New York and Chicago, reported to the Colonel 
that he was "anxious to see the bubble pricked of *a solid south,**
3and believed it could be done. Writing to L. L. Wrenn, Dixon 
declared* "The reports from North Carolina are coming in over­
whelmingly for Roosevelt. We are going to get Texas sure, and
... many other places in the South like Tennessee and Kentucky,
4wherever there is a militant White Republican party*..."
Booker T. Washington and his supporters were faced with 
a critical test of political loyalty when Roosevelt entered in­
to the fight for the Republican nomination. Washingtonians had 
worked closely with both potential candidates. Washington chose 
to remain loyal to Taft during the contest. The President was 
in control of the Republican party and Washington believed that 
Roosevelt would not be able to undermine Taft's strength at the 
National Convention. Contrary to a statement printed by the 
Jackson (Miss.) Evening News, he exerted his influence in favor 
of Taft. Washington kept Fred Moore of the New York Age loyal 
to the administration, and sent editorials to Moore in behalf 
of the President's nomination, Washington also secured the 
support of W. Calvin Chase of the Washington Bee. When Roose­
velt announced his candidacy, the Bee declared that the decision 
was unfortunate and doomed to failure. Chase contended that 
Taft was entitled to renomination by the Republican party by
^Joseph M. Dixon to Theodore Roosevelt, February 11, 1912, 
Joseph M. Dixon Papers, University of Montana Archives, Missoula, 
Montana.
^Dixon to L. L. Wrenn, March 6, 19121 Dixon to T. M. George, 
March 6, 1912, Dixon Papers.
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every rule of reason, and went on record as standing "unequiv­
ocally and uncompromising for his renomination." The editor 
asserted that he would do all that was within his power to 
"bring about such results."^
Ralph W. Tyler, author of the famous editorial "The 
Brownsville Ghouls," continued to support the President. Using 
the same methods employed during the 1908 campaign, Tyler wrote 
a series of editorials to influence the black community to vote 
for Taft. His most influential article appeared in the Wash­
ington Bee and was entitled "A Crisis." Tyler began by noting 
that in the Republican Convention of 1908, a resolution had been 
introduced in favor of reducing the representation of the South 
in the convention, but had been defeated "because Taft had op­
posed it," He urged the black delegates selected to attend 
the 1912 convention to "stand loyally to those instructions 
they had received from their legislature." If not, he warned, 
they would "lend credibility" to white newspaper charges that 
black Southern delegates were for sale. The editorial con­
cluded by declaring that deserting Taft would "hasten a Crisis 
that would reduce Southern representation in the Republican 
convention," thereby eliminating all blacks from future con­
ventions . ̂
^The Washington Bee, March 2, 1912, 
^The Washington Bee, June 8, 1912.
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While Washington auid his supporters were working among 
Negroes on behalf of Taft, the President made efforts to gain 
black support. He invited five black Presidential appointees
7to the White House to discuss the "Negro Question," His 
policies in the South, lynching, Jim Crow street cars, and 
segregation in the government bureaucracy were reviewed. Taft 
stated that he deplored mob violence and declared that his 
statement on Negro appointments in the South, contained in 
his Inaugural Address, had been misinterpreted. The delega­
tion requested that the President restate his Southern policy
"so as to leave no room for ambiguities or doubt" among black 
8Americans.
Taft increased his activities to capture the Negro vote. 
In an address at Howard University, he asserted that he favor­
ed higher education for blacks and condemned lynching. The 
President, however, made it clear that Negroes could expect 
little in the way of anti-lynching legislation from his admin­
istration, contending that the courts could not "enforce laws 
against lynching unless public opinion was on its /~sic__7 side. 
He was furthermore convinced that lynching resulted from the 
"slowness of justice to operate," and matters could only be
9improved by making the courts "more expeditious."
^Those present were William H. Lewis, Assistant Attorney 
General, Ralph W. Tyler, Auditor of the Navy, Henry Johnson, Re­
corder of the Deeds, James G. Napier, Register of the Treasury, 
and Whitefield McKinlay, Collector of Customs at Georgetown.g
The New York Age, January 25» 1912; The Washington Bee, 
January 27, 1912.
^The Washington Bee, April 13, 1912.
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The pre-convention fight between Taft and Roosevelt for 
delegates continued throughout the spring. Senator Dixon was 
assured that Roosevelt would carry North Carolina and Texas, 
Ormsby McHarg was sent to the South to gather support among 
those Southern Republicans who feared losing their jobs through 
the defeat of Taft. In the Senate, the Roosevelt faction 
started to investigate the use of political patronage in the 
South by Taft and to block all appointments that were of a 
"political nature." Meanwhile President Taft ordered William B, 
McKinley to "comb Dixie for Roosevelt men" in the state Repub- 
lican organizations and remove them from office.
The fight over black delegate votes surfaced during the
primaries in Maryland and Ohio. In Maryland, Roosevelt forces
were able to carry the state through what opponents called the
"illegal manipulation of the Negro vote" in Western Maryland
12and Baltimore County. However, in Ohio, the former President 
found the black community hostile to his political ambitions 
because of Brownsville. In an address in Springfield, Roose­
velt, reversing his earlier position, sought to nullify this
10Spencer B. Adams to Joseph M. Dixon, March 5t 1912;
Dixon to Cecil Lyon, telegram, March 6, 1912; Dixon to Hiram B. 
Worth, March 11, 1912, Joseph M. Dixon Papers.
11Theodore Roosevelt to Ormsby McHarg, March 4, 1912, in 
Biting E. Morison, ed.. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 195&J, Vll, p. 516;
George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946), pp. 226-22?.
12Mowryv p. 267,
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opposition by stating that his dismissal of the black troops 
came only after the recommendation of his former Secretary of 
War. He told his audience, composed primarily of Negroes, that 
Taft was as guilty of the dismissals as he and that "Mr. Taft 
should be held responsible for his action, too." To counter 
Roosevelt, Taft sent an Ohio Congressman to the state with Min­
go Sanders, one of the dismissed Negro soldiers, to campaign
liiin his interest. Despite this effort by the President, Roose­
velt defeated him in Ohio by a sizable majority.
When the Republican National Convention opened in Chi­
cago, there were sixty-six black delegates present, mostly from 
the South, and an overwhelming majority was instructed to vote 
for Taft, These black delegates played a crucial role as a 
balance of power in the fight for the nomination. In two of 
the major struggles - the selection of the Temporary Chairman 
and the seating of contested delegations - they voted with the 
President.Taft received fifty-eight of the sixty-six black 
votes. In exchange for this support, the President promised 
that he would change his policy of appointments in the South 
and stated that black and white Republicans would work together
^^The Cleveland Gazette » June 1, 1912.
^^The Washington Bee, August 10, 1912,
^^The New York Age, June 20, 1912; The Cleveland Gazette, 
June 22, 1912; "The Delegate Contest at Chicago," Independents 
LXXII (June 20, 1912), 1386-I387.
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to remove lily whitism.^^ The Republican Convention closed 
with Taft securing the nomination and Theodore Roosevelt and 
his supporters bolting. In August the Progressive Party nomi­
nated the ex-President as its candidate for President.
Roosevelt was aware of the fact that a third party con­
stituted a threat to Southern Democratic solidarity. From 
the beginning he asserted that the Progressive was a National 
party and declared that its appeal was made "equally to the 
sons of the men who fought under Grant and to the sons who 
fought under Lee, for the cause we champion is as emphatically 
the cause of the South as it is the cause of the North." He 
was, above all, anxious to break the solid South. "Really
if I could carry one of the eleven ex-Confederate States," he
17wrote, "I should feel as though I could die happy,"
Roosevelt leaders in the South advised the Colonel that 
a strong, permanent Progressive party could be built in the 
South only if it were organized upon a "lily white" basis.
John M. Parker, Roosevelt's chief Southern supporter and ad­
viser, offered his suggestion in a letter to the Rough Rider* 
"... this should be a white men's party, recognizing the su­
perior ability of the white man and his superior civilization.
16The New York Age, June 27, 1912.
^^Theodore Roosevelt to John M. Parker, July 15, 1912, 
quoted in Arthur S. Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South 
in 1912," North Carolina Historical Review, XXIII (July, 1946), 
p. 314.
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attained through countless centuries of struggle and endeavor, 
peculiarly fitting him to lead and direct, as during all of 
this long period, the negro has been perfectly content to re­
main the ignorant savage devoid of pride of ancestry or civic 
ambition. The South cannot and will not under any circumstance 
tolerate the Negro, and my firm belief is that a plan on these
lines, diplomatically arranged would be productive of immense 
18good." Julian Harris of Atlanta, the son of Joel Chandler
Harris and editor of the popular Uncle Remus's Home Magazine,
expressed the desire to have a Progressive "Lily White" Party
in the South. It was his contention that establishing the
party on this basis, would create an outlet for those white
Southerners who vote Democratic because the only other choice
was "Black Republicanism." Harris believed that a Progressive
lily white ikrty would benefit the black community because
19"the Negro’s best friend is the Southern white."
Roosevelt remained silent over the issue raised by his 
advisers. He did not wish to take a conspicuous stand for fear 
of alienating the Negro voters in the North. However, late in 
July the Progressive state conventions in Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama and Mississippi selected two separate delegations, one
John M. Parker to Theodore Roosevelt, July 24, 1912, 
quoted in Arthur S. Link, ed., "Correspondence Relating to the 
Progressive Party's 'Lily White* Policy in 1912," Journal of' \  480.1Southern History, X (November, 1944), -490,
^^Julian Harr 
Ibid., pp. 488-490.
19 is to Theodore Roosevelt, August 3, 1912,
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white and one black, and both arrived in Chicago for the nation­
al convention claiming to be the legitimate representatives of
the party, Roosevelt was suddenly forced to take a definite
20position on the issue.
In a widely publicized letter to Julian Harris, Roosevelt 
outlined his policy concerning the Negro and southern politics. 
Believing that "the Progressive movement should be made ... in 
the interest of every honest, industrious, law-abiding colored 
man, just as it is the interest of every honest, industrious, 
law-abiding white man," Roosevelt declared that "the surest way 
to render it_/ impotent ... would be to try to repeat the 
course ... followed by the Republican Party ..." in the South. 
"In the Republican National Convention," he asserted, "the color­
ed members have been almost exclusively from the South, and the
great majority of them have been men of such character that
their political activities were merely a source of harm, and 
of very grave harm to their own race." Roosevelt continuedi
The action of the Republican machine in the South ... in 
endeavoring to keep alive a party based only on negro votes 
... has been bad for the white men of the South, whom it 
has kept solidified in an unhealthy and unnatural politi­
cal bond ... and it has been bad for the colored men of the
South.... There has in the past been much venality in Re­
publican National Conventions in which there was an active 
contest for the nomination for President, and this venality
20George E. Mowry, "The South and the Progressive Lily 
White Party of 1912," Journal of Southern History, VI (May, 
1940), 237-247* Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive 
Movement, pp. 267-268.
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has been almost exclusively among the rotten-borough dele­
gates, and for the most part among the negro delegates 
from these Southern States in which there was no real Re­
publican party, ... in the Convention at Chicago last 
June, the breakup of the Republican party was forced by 
these rotten-borough delegates from the South. In the 
Primary States of the North the colored men in most places 
voted substantially as their white neighbors voted. But 
in the Southern States, where there was no real Republican 
party, and where colored men, or whites selected purely by 
colored men, were sent to the convention, representing 
nothing but their own greed for money or office, the major­
ity was overwhelmingly antiprogressive.
Roosevelt concluded that the Progressive party would appeal 
”to the best white men in the South ^whoJ  shall create a 
situation by which the colored men of the South will ultimate­
ly get justice." On the other hand, the Progressive party would 
appeal for support from the better class of Negro voters in the
Northern states and welcome them to the Progressive convention 
21as delegates.
Roosevelt's position on Negro delegations was a direct 
result of the outcome of the Republican nominating convention.
He resented the role that Southern delegates had played,. Repre­
senting states that would give the Republican party no elector­
al votes, they had, by remaining loyal to Taft, deprived Roose­
velt of the presidential nomination. Roosevelt further believed 
that the partyhad failed to win popular support in the South be­
cause of its racial identification. By making the Progressive 
party in the South "lily white" Southern Deomocrats would be
21Theodore Roosevelt to Julian Harris, August 1, 1912, 
Letters, VII, pp. 584-590. This letter is also contained in 
Link, ed., "Correspondence Relating to the Progressive Party's 
•Lily White' Policy in 1912," pp. 481-488,
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offered an alternative. Furthermore, by opening the door for 
Northern black delegates, Roosevelt believed that this would 
secure black support in the North, where the Negro voted counted. 
It was left to the Progressive prot^isional national committee 
to decide whether the white or Negro delegations would be 
seated at the convention. When the committee met, Roosevelt’s 
plans of exclusion of Southern black delegates were followed.
The committee passed a motion which permitted each state organ­
ization to determine the legality of contested delegations.
A motion which concurred with Roosevelt’s position on black
22participation was also carried.
In the fight over delegate seating, the committee ruled 
in favor of excluding Negro delegations from the South. The 
contest in Florida was so bitter that the state was allowed to 
go unrepresented. The fight in Mississippi was also particular­
ly bitter. Prior to the convention Perry W. Howard, a Negro 
from Jackson, had written to Senator Dixon asking whether the 
Negro delegation would be seated at the convention. Dixon re­
plied* "It would not be possible to admit as delegates men 
elected by any of the old Republican organizations. The new 
convention will not be a wing of the Republican party but will 
be representative of the Progressive thought in both the old 
Republican and Democratic parties* in other words, it will be
^^Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Move­
ment, p. 269.
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23a new deal from the beginning.** When the Southern Negro dele­
gates were refused their seats at the convention» they appealed 
to the credentials committee. After a heated controversy in
that committee, the delegates were refused their seats by a vote 
, oilof 17 to 16. ^
Efforts were made to introduce a plank into the Progres­
sive platform dealing with the "Negro Question." The proposal, 
demanding the repeal of discriminatory laws and a guaramtee for 
the Negro’s right to vote, was drafted by W. E. B. DuBois and 
was carried to the convention by Joel Spingam, an official 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo­
ple. Despite the efforts of Spingam, Henry Moskowitz, and 
Jane Addams to have the resolution adopted, the convention re­
fused to accept the plank and the Progressives adjourned on 
August 8 without reference to the "Negro Question" in their 
platform,
Reaction of the black community to the Progressive con­
vention was immediate. The New York Age, once Roosevelt’s 
most fervent supporter, editorialized that his exclusion of 
Southern black delegates was only an "elaboration of a position
^^Perry W. Howard to Joseph M. Dixon, July 12, 1912; 
Dixon to Howard, July 14, 1912, Dixon Papers.
24The New York Times, August 7, 1912; Arthur S. Link, 
"The Negro as a Factor in the Campaign of 1912," Journal of 
Negro History, XXXII (January, 1947), P. 96.
^^Elliott Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBoist Propagandist of the 
Negro Protest (New York» Athene tun, 1968), p. 159; Link,"~^Negro 
as Factor in Campaign of 1912," pp. 96-97.
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that £~hej/ had always held." Editor Fred Moore conducted a 
symposium seeking black opinion throughout the country on 
Roosevelt's action. Perhaps the general attitude was best ex­
pressed by Ralph W. Tyler, who offered the mildest criticism. 
Tyler believed that Roosevelt's position "invited renewed op­
pression of blacks from their old uncompromising enemies in 
the South," and that the exclusion of the Southern black Pro­
gressives was "more cruel than any disfranchisement laws enact-
26ed by any Southern State,"
Influential Bishops of the African Methodist Episcopal 
and AME Zion Church cautioned their congregations against join­
ing the Progressive party. Bishop Alexander Walters of the 
AME Zion Church and President of the National Colored Demo­
cratic League declared that the Progressive party was "nothing 
but the wail of an unscrupulous man, drunk with a mixture of 
ambition and malice and determined to kill the party that 
thwarted his will." Walters warned blacks that Roosevelt was
neither a progressive nor a reactionary, but "anything and
27everything that suited his purpose for the time being."
A mass meeting in celebration of the 121st Anniversary of 
the Haitian Revolution was turned into an anti-Roosevelt rally 
when Reverdy C. Ransom, editor of the AME Review, denounced 
the ex-President's action and promised to fight against him
26The New York Age, August 15» 1912.
^^The New York Age, October 12, 1912.
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"just as hard as /^he_/ had fought for him at the Republican 
National Convention."^® And outside the black community pro­
test was expressed against Roosevelt. The Independent declaredi 
"A bpll is an unwelcome apparition in a china shop, and the 
Progressive party convention gave no kindlier welcome to the 
negro question ... we condemn Mr, Roosevelt ,.. for refusing 
the square deal for whites and blacks alike in those states 
in which the white citizens shut out the colored citizen from 
the ballot."29
By appealing to Southern white convictions, Roosevelt 
hoped to win enough votes away from the Democratic ranks effec-W 
tively to break the solid South, However, many white Southern­
ers did not believe that the Colonel was sincere in his policy 
of North-South racial discrimination. They viewed it simply 
as an effort to gain Southern Democratic support on the one 
hand and Northern Negro votes on the other. This was precisely 
what Roosevelt desired. Typical reaction vrais expressed by the 
Nashville Bannert "The great Bull Moose leader has summarily
ejected the black mooses that hail from the sunny land of
30Dixie from his herd." Southern Democrats had not forgotten 
that only a few years ago, Roosevelt appointed Crum in Charles­
ton, closed the post office in Indianola, and entertained
28^ The New York October 17, 1912,
29"No Square Deal," Independent. LXXIII (August 15, 1912), 
391-393.
^^The Nashville Banner, August 6 , 1912, quoted in Link, 
"Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," p, 318.
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Booker T. Washington at the White House. Roosevelt campaigned 
hard in the South throughout the month of September and on his 
"swing around the circle" tour of the Southern states he was 
received enthusiastically, proving that he was popular with 
the Southern people. However, the Colonel discovered in Novem­
ber that "people often shout one way and vote another"; he re-
31ceived only a small minority of votes in the South,
The black community had always remained loyal to the Re­
publican party, but in 1912 there appeared to be a disaffec­
tion with the party leadership. Black leaders were now seri­
ously considering the Democratic party. Following the election 
of 1908, Alexander Walters and William Monroe Trotter had re­
christened the National Negro-American Political League as the 
National Independent Political League. The Independents work­
ed closely with the Colored National Democratic League, of
32which Walters was president. W. E. B. DuBois resigned from 
the Socialist party after realizing that Eugene Debs could not 
win. He denounced President Taft for his "abject surrender" 
to racism and called him the worst Chief Executive in half a 
century. "Any colored man who votes for Mr. Taft," DuBois 
warned, "will do so on the assumption that zero is better than 
minus l."^3 The Crisis editor also viewed the Progressive party 
as having no respect for Negroes because of its Lily White
31Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," p. 323.
32August Meier, Negro Thought in America, p. 187.
^^The Crisis, IV (1912), 180-181; Rudwick, W. E. B. DuBois. 
p. 159. ^
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faction in the South. There can be no doubt that DuBois was 
further disturbed over the Progressive refusal of his proposed 
Negro suffrage plank.
Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic nominee in 1912, made a 
bid for the large Negro vote in the North. He personally rec­
ognized the National Independent Political League and acquired 
the services of Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the New 
York Evening Post and grandson of William Lloyd Garrison, as 
his advisor on the race question. He told Villard that if 
elected, he would be President of all the people. Wilson fur­
ther stated that he would denounce lynching but believed that 
he as President, could not help the Negro in this matter and 
did not wish to give the impression that he could. Speaking 
to a delegation from the United Negro Democracy of New Jersey, 
Wilson declared*
I was born and raised in the South. There is no place 
where it is easier to cement friendship between the two 
races then there. They understand each other better there 
than elsewhere. You may feel assured of my entire com­
prehension of the ambitions of the negro race and my will- 
in^j|ss and desire to deal with that race fairly and just-
Despite these overtures from the Democratic nominee, the 
black community as a whole was suspicious of Wilson and the 
Democratic party. They feared that a Democratic majority in
p. 88.
^^Quoted in Link, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912,"
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Congress and an administration controlled by white Southerners
would only follow their predecessors in ignoring the black race.
They were aware that a white Democratic Southerner, James K.
Vardaman, was elected to the Senate in Mississippi in 1911 on
the platform of modification of the Fourteenth and repeal of
the Fifteenth Amendments. But above all, the Negro feared that
Woodrow Wilson was a Southerner who had "inherited all the usual
baggage of southern racial prejudice.
Wilson received only a small vote from the black community
in the election of 1912; The only editorial support for the
Democratic candidate from the black press came from DuBois*s
36Crisis and Trotterfs Guardian„ The Cleveland Gazette, a de­
cidedly radical paper, had supported Bryan in 1908 but in 1912 
believed that Taft was the "least of the three evils" that had 
a chance of winning. Together with the Washington Bee and the 
New York Age, the Gazette conducted extensive editorial and 
cartoon caaipaigns against Wilson and Roosevelt and in favor of 
Taft. W. Calvin Chase of the Bae asserted that "Roosevelt had 
gone further than anyone else in the propagating of anti-Negro 
sentiment in the country." The New York Age wondered how "it 
will be possible for single self-respecting Negro ... to
vote for ... Wilson." The Age stated that the Democrat, "by
^ L̂inlc, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912," pp. 86-87. 
^^Rudwick, W. B. B. DuBolsa pp. 1^8-160.
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inheritance and absorption ... has most of the prejudices of 
the narrowest type of Southern white people against the Negro."^7 
In November, 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected President, 
receiving forty-one per cent of the fifteen million votes casted, 
Roosevelt finished second with twenty-seven per cent of the 
popular vote and Taft placed third with twenty-three per cent, 
the remainder of the vote was divided among the Prohibition, 
Socialist, and Socialist-Labor parties.^® Wilson received 
more Negro votes than any other Democratic presidential candi­
date prior to 1912 had received. On the other hand, Roose­
velt's proscription of Negro support in the South turned most 
of the militant blacks in the North away from voting the Pro­
gressive ticket. Taft, securing the support of the Washington­
ians and thus » majority of the Negro press, received a large 
black vote. Historians have differed in their estimation of
which candidate received the majority of Negro support between
39Roosevelt and Taft. The black community, however, did not
37The Cleveland Gazette, August 10, 17» September 28, 
October 26, November 2, 1&12; The Washington Bee, August 10, 
1912; The New York Age. July 11, 1912; Meier, Negro Thought 
in America, pp. 188-189.
^®*The Presidential Vote," Current Literature, III (De­
cember, 1912), 603-605; "The National Election," Independent. 
LXXIII (November l4, 1912), 1099-1100; Mowry, Theodore Roose­
velt and the Progressive Movement, p. 281.
39For example, August Meier states that 60 per cent of 
the Negro vote went to Roosevelt and Arthur S. Link assumes 
that the majority of Northern Negroes remained loyal to the 
Republican party and voted for Taft. See Meier, Negro Thought 
in America, p. 188; Link, "Negro as Factor in Campaign of 1912, 
p. 99.
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hold the balance of power in the election, contrary to DuBois’s 
b e l i e f . T h e  entrance of Roosevelt into the race and the sub­
sequent split within the Republican party assured Wilson's vic­
tory in 1912,
Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to break up the solid South 
by the formation of a Southern Progressive Lily White Party 
failed to gain the Southern Democratic vote and only helped to 
alienate many blacks in the North. He had hoped to secure sup­
port from Southern progressives and liberals but ultimately 
failed when Wilson emerged as a liberal Democratic presidential 
contender. To many liberal and progressive Southerners, Wilson 
was the true progressive and Roosevelt an "opportunist* and a 
"demagogue.
Roosevelt sincerely believed that the white Southerner 
offered the best leadership for the Negro in politics in the 
South. He stood by his convictions of the importance of doing 
justice to the Negro who possesses "the intelligence, integrity, 
and self-respect which justifies /”the_7 right of political ex- 
pression in his white neighbor." He further believed that 
his policy would gain the confidence of the white man in the
hnRudwick, W. E. B . DuBois, pp. 159-160. DuBois believed 
that the 500,000 black votes would hold the balance. After the 
election he estimated that 100,000 voted for Wilson,
111Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," pp,
323-324.
42Theodore Roosevelt, "The Progressives and the Colored 
Man," Outlook. 01 (August 24, 1912), 909-912,
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South. However, by the summer of 1913, Roosevelt realized the 
futility of expecting his policy to attract Southern support. 
Writing to 0. K. Davis he confessed* ‘*1 think that the results 
... show that as yet we are not making the slightest headway 
among the Democrats of the South. We have just got to face 
that fact.
The black community found itself in a peculiar situation 
with the election of 1912. With the administration of William 
Howard Taft, the Republican party completed its policy of 
abandoning the Negro. Roosevelt had shown consideration early 
in his first term but decided to follow a different course in 
his second. Taft took over where Roosevelt had left off in 
appealing to the white South. And now a Southerner and a Demo­
crat, Woodrow Wilson, was in the White Hoüse. Despite the op­
timism voiced by DuBois and Walters concerning Wilson's poten­
tial recognition of blacks, the Democrat was to follow the poli­
cies of his predecessor and the Negro was to be forgotten. Early
in his administration, Wilson endorsed segregation of black em-
44ployees in the Treasury and Post Office Departments, As the 
Wilson years progressed, the black community, once again dis­
illusioned, drifted back to the Republican party. Not until
^^Theodore Roosevelt to 0. K. Davis, September 2, 1913» 
Letters, VII, p. 736n.
^^For Wilson's Negro policy see* Henry Blumenthal, "Woodrow 
Wilson and the Race Question," Journal of Negro History, XLVIII 
(1963), 1-21; Kathleen L. Wolegemuth, "Woodrow Wilson's Appoint­
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of Southern History, XXIV 
(1958), 457-471 and "Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation," 
Journal of Negro History, XLIV (1959)» 158-173; Nancy J. Weiss, 
^ïhe Negro and the New Freedom* Fighting Wilsonian Segregation," 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV (1969), 61-79.
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the Neal Deal coalition would blacks permanently leave the party 
of Lincoln. With the fall of the Republican party in 1912, and 
the defeat of Theodore Roosevelt, the age of accomodation, the 
"Age of Booker T, Washington" had come to an end.
CHAPTSa IX
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE NEGROi CONCLUSION
The "Negro problem" was a persistent one for Theodore 
Roosevelt throughout his years in the White House, In his 
search for a solution he was at different times opposed by 
Southerners and Northerners, Negroes and whites, liberals 
and conservatives, moderates and extremists. During his 
first term of office he succeeded in winning the affections 
of Northern and Southern blacks by inviting Booker T. Wash­
ington to dinner at the White House, appointing William D. 
Crum to the Charleston Collectorship, and closing the post 
office in Indianola, Mississippi, These events aroused con­
siderable optimism among black Americans and Negro leaders 
referred to Roosevelt as "our President,"
Although many Negroes applauded Roosevelt and felt 
indebted to him during his first years in office, the Presi­
dent's interest in them was strictly rsalpolitik. He invited 
Washington to dinner to discuss not the condition of the 
Negro in the South but political patronage. Roosevelt's 
selection of Washington as political advisor on Southern and 
Negro policy was part of an effort to maintain Northern black 
support and win over the old Bourbons who accepted Washington 
as the spokesman for the black conanunity but who were, unfor­
tunately for Roosevelt, not in control of Southern politics.
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His appointment of William D, C m m  was an attempt to under­
mine the strength of Mark Hanna and the Lily White Republi­
cans in South Carolina, It was no coincidence that Crum was 
the top Negro Republican in Charleston. And in Indianola, 
Roosevelt closed the post office because the white popula­
tion that intimidated Mrs, Minnie Cox defied the authority 
of the Federal Government by forcing the resignation of a 
presidential appointee.
Roosevelt's main objective in recognising the merits 
of those "occasionally good" and "well-educated* Negroes 
like Washington» Crum and Cox was political* to reform the 
Republican party in the South, In attempting to make the 
party one of blacks and disillusioned white Democrats» he 
contributed to Southern antipathy on the Negro question. 
White Southerners viewed Roosevelt's appointment policy as 
an attempt at establishing social equality in the South and 
"Negro domination" in Southern politics. Subsequently» 
Roosevelt alienated Southern whites and failed to break the 
powerful hold of the Democratic party in the South, His 
second term In office was spent trying to assuage those 
white Southerners who had been offended by what Roosevelt 
came to realise were a couple of rash acts.
Although Roosevelt showed signs of allowing blacks to 
participate in the political process during his first years 
in the White House» he failed to alleviate the serious prob­
lems that affected Southern Negroes. Disfranchisement con-
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stituti^ns were adopted in Alabama and Virginia; **Jim Crow" 
became the established social system throughout the South; 
and lynch law took its toll in the number of deaths of Southern 
blacks. The President failed to take any constructive action 
in dealing with these problems. After his victory in 1904, 
Roosevelt ignored these occurrences and became obsessed with 
gaining the support and admiration of the white Southern popu­
lation.
To stress the importance of sectional reconciliation, 
Roosevelt toured the South and avoided making reference to 
disfranchisement or lynching. His Lincoln Day address in 
1905 marked a public reversal on the Negro question by accep­
ting the Southern argument on the cause of lynching and ad­
monishing blacks for harboring their own criminals. He was 
silent following the race riot in Atlanta in 1906 and backed 
away when Southern moderates requested a formal investigation 
into the affair. In Brownsville, Texas, he summarily dis­
missed 167 black soldiers from the United States Army for alleged 
participation in the "Brownsville shootup." In 1912 Roosevelt 
entered the Presidential race as leader of the Progressive 
party and excluded Southern blacks from participating the par­
ty's convention, thus forming a "lily white" party in the South,
Roosevelt's racial ambivalence imposed strict limitations 
on what he could accomplish as President, In regarding the 
Negro as inferior he denied the belief in "equality of man,"
In recognising those blacks of "property, education, and char-
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acter" he limited his attentions to black statesmen who were 
in substantial agreement with his paternal racial philosophy. 
Booker T, Washington» in the eyes of the President, was the 
ideal model for black advancement. Those Negroes who disa­
greed with Washington's accomodating approach in race rela­
tions and fought for civil and political rights were proscribed 
toy Roosevelt,
The "Negro problem" was not solved during Roosevelt's 
administration. The Washington dinner, the Crum appointment, 
and the ïndiano.la Post Office incident were merely aberrations, 
certainly hot the normal course of events during Roosevelt's 
presidency. Although he conducted a vigorous campaign on be­
half of the Negro in his private correspondence, Roosevelt's 
public achievement in race matters was mirdmal. He refused 
to exploit the full potentialities of the executive office 
in the interest of racial statesmanship. Perhaps he was 
aware that the office of President was not conducive to the 
championing of unpopular causes,
Roosevelt sincerely believed that the "Negro problem" 
was a political problem and not a moral one. Any moral con­
sideration should be left to the moralist and reformer. He 
shared the belief among ether Statesmen in the Progressive 
era that lynching and race riots were direct examples of dis­
order in society and wished to bring it under control. His 
desire for order and harmony between the races appealed to 
the Progressive mind on race relations. Nevertheless, he
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accomplished little in his attempt at racial harmony. He was 
very hesitant in using his office and exerting strong execu­
tive leadership in race matters.
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